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Abstract 
Individual differences in reasoning have been observed in a wide variety of tasks. Descriptions of 
the variation in response have been framed in terms of use of different strategies that invoke dif-
ferent representations. This thesis argues that in order to convert descriptions into explanations of 
performance it is necessary to compare and combine psychometric accounts with computational 
accounts of the processes underlying representation selection and use. Descriptions of strategies, 
representations and algorithms and their inter-relationships are necessary for a full account of 
reasoning behaviour. 
Two large-scale studies of deductive reasoning are presented to illustrate this approach in action, 
and the inadequacy of accounts that do not provide accounts at all these levels. The first compares 
two theoretically motivated methods for solving categorial syllogisms, the second study assesses 
learning from and learning within a multimodal logic course called Hyperproof. These studies 
are compared to measures of spatial ability, field-independence/dependence, and serialist/holist 
learning style. The interaction of students' styles of learning with different presentations of in-
formation generalises across the domains. This generality is best expressed when psychometric 
and computational accounts of reasoning are consolidated. 
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Individual differences and cognitive 
science 
1.1 The starting point 
The role of representation in reasoning has been a central concern in studies of the psychology 
of problem solving. How is information represented during reasoning tasks, and why might 
certain types of presentation assist in reasoning? These questions have not yet been adequately 
answered, primarily because attention to individual differences has been lacking, or differences 
have been assumed to be at the wrong level of description. 
Debates about the nature of the "fundamental reasoning mechanism" (FRM) - the engine that 
drives deductive reasoning processes - have concentrated on disagreements over the represen-
tations used by this mechanism. Rips (1994) has proposed that humans operate some form of 
"mental logic", where information is represented as syntactic statements and reasoning proceeds 
by rules operating on these statements. In contrast, Erickson (1974) has suggested that the repre-
sentations in the FRM are spatial, and operations are on sets of individuals or properties. 
Another alternative was developed by Johnson-Laird and Steedman (1978), where the FRM is 
driven by mental models, or descriptions of individuals. Individual differences can be incorpo-
rated into all three of these accounts, provided the differences can be accommodated by vari-
ations in the parameters of each account. Therefore, individual differences will be qualitative, 
in terms of how many individuals or operations can be supported by working memory, or how 
many alternative models can be constructed due to storage limitations. Individual differences 
were considered to revolve around different abilities for subjects to maintain or operate on the 
particular representation. The possibility that different representations might not actually be 
conflicting accounts, but might express different strategic approaches to reasoning was not con-
sidered. 
Studies of problem solving that seemed to indicate use of different representations do not fit eas-
ily with unitary accounts of the FRM, these studies are reviewed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Roberts 
(1993) has eloquently articulated the problem that strategies have on attempting to pursue the 
FRIvI. He suggested that the existence of individual differences is the major challenge to such sin-
gle representation accounts of the FRM. There are three possibilities for the impinging of strate-
gies on FRM investigations. Either the representations exhibited by use of different strategies are 
interfering with the FRM's processing. Alternatively, different strategies will have the same un-
derlying representations, but the underlying representations are overshadowed by the strategies. 
The final alternative is that the representations used by different strategies are not underwritten 
by any more fundamental mechanism - strategies are all we have. In any of these cases, deducing 
the FRM proves to be impossible: it cannot be observed directly, or it does not exist. However, 
studying the development and use of different strategies is the way to advance research in rea-
soning. 
Strategies have been defined as "any procedure that is non-obligatory and goal-directed" (Siegler 
& Jenkins, 1989, p.11). Strategies in the sense discussed by Roberts, and adopted here, differ in 
terms of the representations that they invoke. 
Representations are particular data structures. Newell provides a "representational law" for (in-
ternal) representations: 
In an external world, entity (X) is transformed (T) into entity (Y). A representation 
of X-T-Y occurs in a medium within some system where an encoding from X to an 
entity in the medium (x) and an encoding of T into an internal transformation in the 
medium (t) produces an internal entity (y), which can be decoded to the external 
world to correspond to Y (1992, pp.416-7). 
Understanding the representational system, then, requires an exposition of the entity (X), the 
transformation (T), and the operations on the entity (Y). Coupling a representational system with 
a procedure for using the representations defines a strategy. 
Stenning and Oberlander (1995) present a complementary perspective on difficulties of postu-
lating a unitary account of reasoning performance. They argue that the debate about the FRM 
has been conducted at the wrong level of description. Roberts proposes that the level of descrip-
tion should be in terms of the strategy - representation relationship. Stenning and Oberlander, 
however, argue that the point at which to discriminate different accounts is in terms Of the repre-
sentation - algorithm relationship. The FRIM debate is misguided because it is impossible to dis-
criminate the different accounts in terms of performance. This is because performance is in terms 
of input-output pairings and any number of representations could be used to implement this 
pairing. Stenning and Oberlander develop an Euler's Circles method that is indistinguishable 
from the mental models account in terms of the data used to previously support particular rep-
resentational systems. Stenning and Yule (1997) further hammer home the point by developing 
a "natural deduction" method that is also indistinguishable from mental models. Each of these 
methods implements the same underlying algorithm, but the implementations differ. Stenning 
and Oberlander 's challenge is to provide accounts of reasoning that explore the representation - 
algorithm relationship. 
This thesis differs from Stenning and Oberlander's account in that different representations are 
seen to relate to different algorithms (even if these are not distinguishable by input-output pair-
ings), but the different algorithms do have a strong family resemblance. Stenning and Oberlander 
suggest that use of different representations will inherit properties of the larger representational 
systems from which tokens are drawn, but that discriminating the influence of these systems 
requires more detailed data to individuate different accounts of reasoning. The differences be-
tween algorithms in the account proposed in this thesis are related to the properties of these 
larger systems. 
The difference between algorithms and strategies, then, may be due to disciplinary boundaries: 
strategies and representations are within the domain of psychometric research, whereas rep-
resentations and algorithms are discussed within computational accounts. Satisfying Newell's 
requirement on describing representations and coupling this with an account of procedure pro-
vides something very close to an algorithmic account. Exploring the strategy - representation - 
algorithm triangle forms the conceptual basis of this thesis. There are differences in levels of de-
scription here, but cognitive science benefits from corresponding concepts within different levels. 
Indeed, providing a full account of a system performing a task requires descriptions at several 
levels of description. Marr distinguishes several levels for consideration: 
At one extreme, the top level, is the abstract computational theory of the device, in 
which the performance of the device is characterized as a mapping from one kind of 
information to another ... In the center is the choice of representation for the input 
and output and the algorithm to be used to transform one into the other. And at the 
other extreme are the details of how the algorithm and representation are realized 
physically (1982, p.24). 
Anderson (1989) finesses this levels account somewhat, by redefining the "computational" level 
of Marr's account with a "rational level". This frees up use of the "computational" level to refer 
to several different levels of description. Marr's use of "computational level" referred only to the 
goals of computation, and a richer conception of this level, including descriptions of the proce-
dure utilised, would correspond better to studies of strategies, representations and algorithms. 
The rational level is intended to encompass descriptions in terms of goals and processes. An-
derson also distinguishes Marr's representation and algorithm level into two separate levels: an 
algorithm level and an implementation level. The algorithm level is described as the "program 
symbol level" (p.  4, Anderson, 1989), where the task can be described in terms of symbol manip-
ulation, or input-output pairings. The implementation level is the "register transfer level", which 
stands as an approximation to the biological level. 
Neither Marr's nor Anderson's formulation of the different levels of description fully capture 
the properties of the strategy level, representation level, and algorithm levels of description re-
quired for interpreting reasoning tasks. The algorithm level correctly describes the input-output 
pairings of the processing underlying task performance, but these algorithms are implemented 
in particular systems of representation, which means something different to the grounding of 
symbols in a physical system. The embedding of the algorithm within a representational system 
is at a higher level of description than the algorithmic level. The rational level relates closely 
to conceptions of descriptions of strategy differences. Newell's formulation of the principle of 
rationality is that "if an agent has knowledge that one of its actions will lead to one of its goals, 
then the agent will select that action" (p.102, 1982). The knowledge level places constraints on 
actions, it does not entirely determine them. 
The psychometric approach has had a slightly different agenda. The history and methodology of 
psychometrics is now discussed, before the way psychometric and computational accounts are 
shown to be mutually compatible and beneficial approaches. 
1.2 The psychometric approach 
Many of the strategies discussed in this thesis utilise either graphical or verbal representations 
to solve problems. One approach to study use of these different representations is to relate the 
selection or effectiveness of their employment with measures of "cognitive ability" or "cognitive 
style" for using these different representations. 
Cognitive ability can be defined as "a person's performance on some task that has a substantial 
information-processing component" (p.93, Cooper, 1990). Messick defines them similarly: "Di-
mensions of intellective ability refer to the content, component processes, and level of cognition - 
to the questions of what? and how much? What kind of information is being processed by what 
operation in what form and how well?" (Messick, 1984, pp.62-63). The use of ability measures is 
one psychometric approach to studying complex task performance. Spearman (1904) gave sub-
jects a set of ability tests, and performed factor analysis on test performance. He determined a 
single factor g: a measure of "general" ability, or "intelligence". Thurstone (1957) gave a sim-
ilar set of tests to subjects, but identified 12 separate factors. These "primary mental abilities" 
included spatial ability, verbal relations ability, and (not very usefully, for the current studies) 
deduction ability. Individuals vary in the extent to which they have a particular ability. Once 
identified, the psychometric research program suggested that such basic abilities can be found 
to be related to any cognitive task, insofar as the task requires the processes of the various sub-
factors of g. The development of items on such tests, though, is rather ad hoc, and it is often not 
clear what the tests are assessing or whether subjects are solving the tasks the same way. These 
problems are further discussed with regard to spatial ability measures in Chapter 2. 
An alternative psychometric approach is to assess cognitive styles. These are measures of the 
propensity or preference an individual has for processing information in a particular manner. 
Unlike abilities, styles are morally neutral. Being at one end of the style scale may reflect better 
performance on certain tasks but worse performance on other tasks. Different styles may be more 
or less appropriate as the task varies. 
Relating complex tasks to psychometric measures, then, applies descriptions of performance at 
different levels of description. Strategy choice can be related to style, insofar as the different 
strategies used are predicted by some style measure. Strategy choice can also be related to the 
abilities underlying the use of a particular strategy: if ability measures relate to preferential Se- 
lection of strategies that use the processes assessed by the ability measure then this suggests that 
there is some causal connection between them, so abilities are intended to expose the processes 
underlying representation use. 
There is a distinct difficulty with using the psychometric approach to determine the processes 
involved in reasoning performance. Finding a test that probes a particular primary ability and 
no other has proved difficult. Indeed, approaches that have attempted to produce measures of 
purity have then had the unfortunate consequence of just not being very interesting, as they do 
not relate to performance on any complex tasks! This difficulty means that psychometric stud-
ies tend to use many subjects and many tests in order to reduce the noise in the measures and 
to factor out the "primary" abilities. Specifying the task requirements in greater detail, and ex-
panding on the parameters of performance is one way to address this problem. Then the "noise" 
can be made the topic of study - in any case, this may well be the point of interest in perfor-
mance. Similarly for styles, without expressing the connection between style and the properties 
of the representations used and the procedure operating on the representations will produce an 
incomplete picture of performance. Without this information-processing supplement provided 
by computational approaches, the best that can be achieved is correlation without explanation. 
1.3 Integrating individual differences 
The essence of cognitive science is to explore and extol the virtues of the overlap between disci-
plines. So, how will cognitive science benefit from psychometric research? As a point of depar-
ture, relating psychometric research to computational accounts will provide some justification 
for observations of individual differences in tasks typically within the domain of computational 
theories. Noting their existence is a preliminary to providing justification for why computational 
accounts ought to take them into consideration. 
How will psychometric research benefit from the computational approach? Johnson-Laird wrote: 
Whatever the general merit of investigating 'individual differences' by way of mental 
tests, their use is unfortunately of little value in the study of reasoning. The data they 
yield are ... too gross to elucidate differences in mental processes from one individual 
to another" (p.117, 1983). 
To address this criticism, psychometrics have to be more than mere snapshot measures of perfor- 
mance. They have to contribute towards accounts of process. Many psychometric measures are 
intended to assess response to tasks that require information-processing in a variety of modalities 
and different operations on representations within those modalities. Coming to terms with the 
computational properties of the representations will assist in providing explanatory accounts of 
the connections between different psychometric measures over and above descriptive accounts. 
The measures themselves can be subjected to computational investigation, and this enriches un-
derstanding of the reason behind the connection between measures and reasoning tasks. 
Johnson-Laird (1983) expresses a problem with using individual differences which suggests one 
reason why cognitive science has been resistant to contemplating variation in response. In crit-
icising an attempt by Guyote and Sternberg (1981) to relate syllogism solution to measures of 
spatial ability and verbal ability, he refers to their approach as attempting to provide "a model 
of actuarial data" (p.87) rather than giving an account of individual minds. The mathematical 
model provides us with an account of a "group mind" (p.86). A better approach is to provide 
a computational account of the processes involved, with basic parameters that can be adjusted 
according to individual differences, such as resource availability, working memory span, or rate 
of degradation of information. This approach is exemplified by Johnson-Laird's mental models 
account, or by ACT-R (Anderson, 1993) or SOAR (Newell, 1990) cognitive models. 
But the simplifying assumption taken in cognitive science that there are basic parameters that can 
be adjusted to account for difference in performance is as primitive as the approach of Guyote and 
Sternberg. These accounts appear "gross" when qualitative rather than quantitative differences 
between individuals are observed in task performance. Parameter-shifting alone cannot account 
for the sizeable differences in performance that accompany use of different representations to 
solve reasoning problems, for example. When styles are at issue rather than abilities, this presents 
a challenge to unified theories of problem solving. This is not to say that low-level parameters 
do not influence the selection and use of high-level strategies, and a central aim of this thesis 
is to indicate that several supposedly qualitative differences, such as representational modality, 
can be interpreted along a continuum when described computationally. But absent from many 
computational accounts of performance are the necessary degrees of freedom for modelling these 
style differences at all levels of description. 
Doing away with the simplifying assumption of homogeneity in response is akin to making the 
variance of the population, rather than the mean, the topic of study. This does not necessarily 
mean a more complex theory, but rather entails a richer understanding of the range of responses 
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and gives an indication of the size of the solution space for problems. Newell writes: "The 
prime question about computational systems is what functions they can produce" (my emphasis, 
Newell, 1992, p.427). Studying a single approach to problem solving, for example, will provide 
an account of what function a system is producing. To address the potentiality of the system, one 
needs to study a variety of strategies. Determining the range of strategies will, at least, begin to 
address the issue of defining the range of possible solutions, rather than just plotting individual 
points. 
Chater and Oaksford's (1999) rational analysis approach has indicated the importance of varia-
tion in response as revealing the local minima surrounding the optimal solution. Their account 
of the four-card task illustrates the power of considering variations in response in order to finesse 
understanding of the task and the range of possible performance. In the four-card task subjects 
are presented with four cards, each of which has an A, a K, a 4 or a 7 on the side facing up. The 
subject is told to turn the fewest cards they have to to test whether the rule: "If there's a vowel on 
one side there's an even number on the other" is true or false. Most subjects respond by turning 
the A and the 4, or just the A card. Very few subjects (about 4%) turn the A and the 7 cards, 
which is the normative answer. Oaksford and Chater (1994) found that an optimal data selection 
analysis predicted an order to turning the cards. If a subject will turn just one card, then they 
will turn the A, if they turn two, it will be the A and the 4, and so on. This approach accounts 
for the majority of responses, but it does not explain how and why some subjects respond with 
the A and the 7 cards. These subjects have to be solving the task using a different strategy, which 
would require an alternative "rationality". 
This is the approach of Stanovich (1999) who argues for a dual-process theory of reasoning, dis-
tinguishing individuals in terms of the extent to which they decontextualise information. In the 
four-card task, for example, the optimal data selection analysis will only apply if information is 
embedded in a context, a context where co-occurrence (in the four-card task, the co-occurrence 
of vowels and even numbers) is rare. If information is decontextualised, then different princi-
ples underlying data selection are at play. This is a promising line of investigation, conducted 
by Stanovich and colleagues within the psychometric domain. A computational account of de-
contextualisation will enable the alignment of their stylistic account with such rational analysis 
approaches. 
Aptitude treatment interactions (Ails) describe the relationship between a subject's profile as 
1.1 
measured by psychometrics and the extent to which they learn from different teaching inter-
ventions. Such phenomena, though rare, present a powerful challenge to unified computational 
accounts of performance, as they cannot then be dismissed as noise. They also present an im-
portant area of overlap between psychometric and computational studies of cognition. A fuller 
understanding of the nature of ATIs has implications for teaching of problem solving as well as 
the design of educational programmes in general. These Ails are the principal point of synthesis 
for this thesis. 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 2 is a review of studies of reasoning tasks that exemplify a range of strategies used to 
solve the problems. These strategies are reinterpreted in a framework that considers the com-
putational properties of the representations used by each strategy, rather than describing the 
strategies just in terms of their apparent use of different representations. 
Chapter 3 sets the psychometric context, by considering several measures that are potentially use-
ful for discriminating "ability" and "style" dimensions relevant to representational and strategy 
differences in reasoning. Requirements for suitable tasks for relating psychometric and computa-
tional approaches are discussed, and illustrated in a preliminary study of strategy variation and 
change in Hyperproof. 
Chapter 4 takes up strategy and representation variation in syllogism solution. Syllogisms have 
been closely studied, and computational theories of their solution abound. As the introduction 
indicated, this is also an area of bountiful confusion, with different levels of description being 
confounded. Accounts that assess differences in strategy, representation and algorithms are con-
solidated. 
Chapter 5 summarises the aims and hypotheses of the empirical studies, studies that attempt to 
align psychometric with computational accounts of individual differences in reasoning. 
Chapter 6 then presents a study on teaching syllogisms using different representations, provid-
ing empirical support to the theoretical distinctions offered in Chapter 4. This study explicitly 
connects psychometric and computational accounts of reasoning. 
Chapter 7 presents a replication of the teaching study in a different domain, returning to Hyper- 
proof. This study relates responses to taught methods to spontaneous strategy development. The 
strategies devised by subjects are related to the psychometric and computational interpretations 
of representational differences used by the different strategies. This study also addresses issues 
of transfer of skills between domains, providing a computational perspective on observed ATIs. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the main achievements of the thesis, and addresses some potential 
criticisms of the account. The empirical studies presented are embedded in a larger program that 
uses individual differences to reveal the range and the fundamental nature of cognition. 
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Chapter 2 
Strategies in complex problem 
solving 
2.1 Strategies in reasoning 
Responses to reasoning tasks are replete with strategic variation, but is this variation ad hoc, 
changing from task to task and from subject to subject, or is there some commonality and gen-
eralisability in the strategies employed? There are several observations of the general nature of 
strategy change, which support the pursuit of an account that generalises over different reason-
ing domains. 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the range of strategies on a set of established reasoning tasks, 
and the manner in which strategies develop in a principled way. The principle underlying such a 
description is in terms of the level of abstraction in the representations used by the strategy. This 
description is grounded in computational theories of the difference between graphical and verbal 
forms of information in terms of the expressivity of the system from which the representations are 
drawn, indicating a first pass at the strategy - representation - algorithm distinction. Though the 
difference in expressivity may be slight for the alternative strategies presented here, in Chapter 4 
the same distinction is illustrated for syllogisms where the differences in expressivity is greater. 
Before moving on to describe this computational framework, the common characteristics of 
strategies in reasoning domains are discussed, and several studies which suggest common mech- 
11 
anisms are reported. 
Roberts (1999) attempted to classify and generalise different strategies that are used in a range of 
problem solving tasks. Roberts identified three types of strategy that subjects use on a range of 
reasoning tasks: 
• spatial strategies: "information is represented spatially, such that the configural informa-
tion in the representation corresponds to the state of the affairs in the world" (p.4 1 ); 
. verbal strategies: "information is represented in the form of verbal or abstract propositions, 
and that various content/context-free syntactic rules enable new conclusions to be drawn 
from the represented information" (p.5); 
• task-specific short-cut strategies: result when subjects "notice certain regularities or redun-
dancies during the problem solving process" (p.5). Quinton and Fellows (1975) termed 
such strategies representation-free strategies. 
Roberts (in press) observes a general change across a number of reasoning domains from spa-
tial to verbal strategies - several domains where such changes occur will be discussed below. 
One aim of this chapter is to recast such changes in terms of the computational properties of 
different representations of information, using the specificity/expressivity distinction (Stenning 
& Oberlander, 1995). This enables a clarification of the difference between spatial and verbal in-
formation presentations, which avoids recourse to phenomenology (Pylyshyn, 1973; Anderson, 
1978) and also marks the short-cut strategies as an extreme on the spatial-verbal dimension used 
to make distinctions between strategies. After detailing the specificity/expressivity theory and 
discussing how it relates to spatial, verbal and short-cut strategies, three problem solving do-
mains that have indicated strategic variation in solution strategies will be reinterpreted in this 
framework. Previously, the specificity/expressivity framework has only been applied to the use 
of static representations, here it is extended to apply to dynamic features of strategy development 
and change. 
Several descriptions of the nature of the change in process determined by strategic change have 
been registered. 
'Page numbers are taken from a pre-publication manuscript. 
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Changing strategy in the linear syllogism task results in different use of memory resources: "The 
subject supposedly moves from a reliance on 'symbol' memory to a more positionally governed 
technique where merely to read through statements in a rule-governed sequence is to solve the 
problem" (Wood, 1978, p.333). Positing different uses of memory resources as a feature of differ-
ent strategies is a widely applied account. Baddeley's (1990) model of working memory includes 
separate storage modules for spatial and verbal information. However, whether the different 
memory traces are best described in terms of the representations (as is currently the case) or 
processes is a point returned to in the next chapters. Wood's (1978) account of different uses 
of memory may be that the list method uses memory storage whereas the search method does 
not use any memory trace, though it is hard to believe that no memory storage is required by 
the latter method, in terms of keeping track of which information has already been searched, for 
instance. 
A second description of the general nature of strategy change is made by Wason and Johnson-
Laird (1972). They describe the strategy change for students that have protracted experience with 
tasks as a development from representational to non-representational thinking. They write: 
the inexperienced subject represents the premises in a unified form (with or without 
imagery) because this is likely to be the normal practical mode of dealing with the 
relational information. But by dint of sheer repetition this approach is likely to give 
way to a purer and more formal strategy geared to the specific constraints of the 
problem (p.122). 
Practice in a task leads to a more "mechanised" approach "which minimizes effort and which is 
appropriate to the particular constraints of the material" (p.126). 
Relatedly, Wood (1978, p.336) describes the development of strategies in terms of "economy". 
For example, in changing from search to scan strategies in linear syllogisms (see below), if the 
subject searches for "A is taller than B" and this proves unsuccessful, then any searches after this 
point are redundant as a consequence of the task constraints is that necessarily "B is taller than 
A". The subject's realisation of this means the method can be pruned. 
All these accounts utilise terms like efficiency, economy, and specificity to describe the develop-
ment of strategies. These observations prepare the ground for a theory of the information used 
by different strategies that appeals to how the different types of information provide differing 
degrees of specificity and efficiency in processing. The next section discusses representations in 
terms of their informational properties. 
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2.2 Spatial and verbal: specificity and expressivity 
Larkin and Simon (1987) consider the computational differences between diagrammatic and 
sentential representations for solving problems when these representations are informationally 
equivalent. Their analysis concerns external representations, but the processes that operate on 
these representations are internalised. They consider the critical properties of sentential repre-
sentations to be that the data structure is such that elements appear in a single sequence, whereas 
for diagrammatic representations the data structure is organised such that information is indexed 
by two-dimensional location (p.68). These differences in representation cause differences in the 
facilitation of solution for a range of problems in a variety of subject domains, such as mathe-
matics, or economics. The informational differences induced by the data structures fall into three 
categories: Search is a process where sets of elements are located that satisfy the conditions of 
one or more productions (p.69). For sentential representations, the search must advance through 
the list. For diagrammatic representations, the search may be localised, where elements required 
for the inference are grouped together. The second category is differences in recognition which 
are due to the explicitness of the diagram, where inferences are immediately apparent through 
the process of drawing the diagram. For example, being told that two lines intersect additionally 
provides data about four angles when a diagram is produced, this is information that remains 
implicit in a sentential expression. This property is due to the specificity of diagrammatic repre-
sentations, where decisions about the inter-relationships between elements of the problem have 
to be made and are demonstrated in terms of the relative location of elements in the represen-
tation. The third category - inference differences - is seen to be less strong, indeed, Larkin and 
Simon claim that inference is largely independent of representation if the information content of 
the two sets of inference rules is equivalent (p.71). 
Larkin and Simon pick up on the property of specificity of spatial representations. However, 
their discussion concerns the specificity of individual tokens of information in graphical/ spatial 
representations. This account is difficult to apply in the case of strategy change, because the 
researcher needs to know exactly which tokens are used in each strategy. A more far-reaching 
account would address informational properties of the system from which the tokens are drawn, 
and this is the approach taken by Stenning and Oberlander (1995). They observe: 
graphical representations such as diagrams limit abstraction and thereby aid proces- 
sibility. We term this property of graphical systems of representation specificity: the 
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demand by a system of representation that information in some class be specified in 
any interpetable representation. (p.91). 
Whereas Larkin and Simon contrast computational and informational properties, Stenning and 
Oberlander contrast the logic of a task with its implementation. The logic of a task is the under-
lying abstract algorithm, and the implementation is the specific representation of the algorithm, 
which is committed to a certain media of presentation. 
Stenning and Oberlander (1995) use Euler's Circles to illustrate this contrast and exhibit the com-
putational properties of graphical representations. Euler's Circles were useful for Euler's pupils, 
both past and present, because of their combination of requiring certain information to be spec-
ified, together with only allowing limited abstraction. Systems where abstraction is too limited 
are not so powerful, and systems where abstraction is unrestricted prove difficult to operate and 
apply to a given problem. The specificity of a system exists at the expense of its expressivity, and 
finding the appropriate level of specificity is the ideal for solving tasks with the greatest ease. 
This is a motif that will be returned to continually in discussing strategies used in reasoning 
tasks. 
Stenrting and Yule (1997) devised a verbal system for solving syllogisms, which was designed 
to be equally expressive as the Euler's Circles system developed by Stenning and Oberlander 
(1995). However, the general languages from which these two systems draw their tokens are 
different in their expressivity. The system from which the verbal system is drawn can express 
more relations than that from which the Euler's Circles method takes its tokens (see Chapter 4). 
The expressivity/specificity distinction immediately suggests application to the literature on 
strategic variation in deductive tasks. Most apparent is that it deals with differences between spa-
tial and verbal information, and so redescriptions of strategies that invoke such representations 
thus benefit from this informational interpretation. The change from general to specific strategies 
mirrors the change from creating "unified" representations to more economical representations 
(Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972), which means that the representations are increasingly abstract, 
and drawn from increasingly expressive systems. In complex problem solving tasks, subjects 
often seem to overshoot in the specificity of their representation, meaning that problem solving 
is less efficient before the appropriate level of expressivity for the task has been found. This de-
scription of change in terms of expressivity has the advantage of being modality independent, 
which explains why in some tasks observed change is from spatial strategies to verbal strategies, 
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and in others the change is in the opposite direction. In computational terms, specifying all and 
only the information required for solving the task means greater tractability. The following dis-
cussion of the variety of strategies used for reasoning tasks indicates that the subject's ability or 
propensity to hone down their system to this minimum is a matter of individual differences, as is 
the student's preference for using representations that invoke various levels of abstraction. Use 
of different levels of abstraction in representation relates to different algorithms for solving the 
problem, but these representational preferences can equally be expressed as strategic variations. 
In the next section, three deductive reasoning tasks are described in detail, indicating general 
features of strategy variation and development in terms of changing levels of abstraction in the 
representations used. 
2.3 Expressivity/specificity in reasoning 
2.3.1 Linear Syllogisms 
Linear syllogisms are sets of statements about particular terms that define the relationship be-
tween the terms. The relationship is asymmetrical, and usually about the relative size or position 
of terms. The type of linear syllogism that Wood (1969; 1978) investigated was of the following 
form, though the number of statements can vary (for example, Sternberg (1980) and Sternberg 
and Well (1980), discussed below, studied problems with only two statements): 
John is taller than Paul 
Dave is taller than Paul 
Tom is taller than Dave 
Ian is taller than Tom 
Dave is taller than John 
The subject is asked to say who is taller from Dave and Ian. The presentation of the problem 
requires certain inferences in the material to be made explicit (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972): 
in the above case in order to solve the problem the subject needs to apply knowledge about 
the asymmetry and transitivity of the relationship "taller". One strategy for solving this task, 
described by Hutterilocher (1968), is to construct a "ladder" where tall items occur at the top of 








The spatial arrangement is not essential as a feature of this strategy, only that the relations be-
tween all of the individuals are represented in some way. Then the answer is "read off". This 
strategy expresses all the relations between individuals in the problem, where all inferences are 
made explicit in constructing the representation. The spatial strategy produces the "unified" 
form, or the representation that makes concrete all the information in the problem. Therefore, 
this can be seen as the strategy using the most concrete form of representation. 
Once the subject has had lengthy experience with the task, Wood (1969) found that many subjects 
report using a different strategy, where a selective search is performed. The first term in the 
question is taken and a search performed down the left colunm of the statements. If a match 
occurs, then the subject checks to see if this connects it to the second name in the question. If so, 
then the answer is available, if not then they search for occurrences of this new item to see if this 
links it to the second term in the question. If there is no link, then subjects begin a search with 
the second name. With more experience of the task, some subjects come to realise that if there 
is no link from the first name, then the second must be the taller, and this reduces their solution 
time by 25% (Wood, 1978, p.332). This strategy does not make explicit all the relations between 
terms in the syllogism, only the relations between relevant terms are expressed. For the above 
problem, the representation used by this strategy is as follows (again, the spatial arrangement 





For this problem, the relative size of the other two items is not specified, and so the representation 
used by this strategy is more abstract. 
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A third strategy has been observed by Wood (1969). Some subjects adapt their search so that they 
scan the left-hand side of the statements in the list. For some problems, this determines if one or 
other person cannot be taller as if they don't appear on the left they can't be taller than anyone. 
If the question for the above problem was "Who is taller, Peter or Tom", then the subject could 
scan the left of the list for the name Peter, find his name does not appear there, and conclude that 
"Torn is taller". In this case, the representation used would only be explicit about the relative size 
of one item: 
all others 
Peter 
Thus, three strategies have been observed for this type of problem: list, search, and scan strate-
gies. Wood (1978) reports that when a subject uses more than one strategy, there is always a 
"privilege of occurrence", so that the list method comes before the search method which pre-
cedes the scan method. Later strategies were found to be more efficient. Wood (1978) found that 
subjects who are initially very good at solving linear syllogisms using list strategies are those that 
develop "short-cut" strategies sooner. Relatedly, in a teaching study, Quinton and Fellows (1975) 
found that subjects performed most quickly and accurately if they were taught to use the scan 
method, and least quickly and accurately when taught to use the list method. 
The most efficient strategy is one that uses the most appropriate level of abstraction for the task 
in hand. The list strategy makes more information explicit than is necessary, and this means 
that much effort is expended in forging the inferences to work out the relations between all the 
items in the problem, and then the storage of all the terms is additionally effortful. A more 
efficient method will only specify the relations between terms that are required in order to reach 
the solution: so either the two terms in the question and those items that intervene, as in the 
search method, or just one term, as in the scan method. Hence, there is a distinct connection 
between the specificity of the representation (in terms of how task-specific it is), its efficiency, 
and its "privilege of occurrence". 
Wood's studies report that the more able subjects tended to discover the more efficient strategies 
sooner, they seemed to be better attuned to the constraints of the task that make such strategic 
discovery possible. This suggests that there is either an ability or a style dimension relevant to 
the development of strategies that vary in terms of their specificity. 
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An alternative, complementary investigation into linear syllogistic problem solving was con-
ducted by Sternberg (1980) and Sternberg and Weil (1980). They investigated linear syllogisms of 
the form: 
John is taller than Bill 
Pete is not taller than Bill 
Who is tallest? 
The statements can vary in terms of whether they state a relation of "taller than", "shorter than" 
or of "not taller than" or "not shorter than". Their aim was not so much to examine strategy 
change as students solved the problem, but to investigate variation in initial strategy use and the 
effects of teaching strategies for solving these problems. 
Though there is less variation possible in terms of specifying or leaving abstract the relations 
between terms, Sternberg (1980) has provided componential models for four different strategies 
that were used to solve these problems. These strategies vary in terms of the abstraction present 
in the representations. 
The "spatial" method arranges the terms of the syllogism spatially "in an imaginal, linear array 
that is an analogue to a physical, linear array" (Sternberg & Weil, 1980, p.236). Each premiss is 
used to construct a separate array, with the properties flipped in the array if a negation is present 
in the premiss. Then the two arrays are integrated, the question read, and the array examined 
for the answer. This is very similar to Wood's list strategy, and, as with Wood's analysis, is also 
related to Huttenlocher's (1968) spatial strategy model of subjects' performance. So, for the above 




The "linguistic" method stores the terms of the syllogism using functional relations in terms of 
the deep structure of the premiss statements, thus properties have one of the predicates of tall, 
tall+, short, or short+. If negation occurs in a premiss, then a linguistic transformation changes 
the propositional statements into one of the four forms above. Information is left unintegrated, 
but the middle term of the problem is searched for, then the question is read and a final search 
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of the propositional terms is made. So, the representation in use only specifies the relative size of 
the middle term and one of the other individuals: 
John 
Bill 
This is akin to Wood's search strategy in that it extracts only the information that is required 
for the search, avoiding the additional effort required for integrating the information. The two 
statement version of the task means that search is for the middle term whereas in the multiple 
statement task search must start with one of the target terms and investigate the intervening 
terms before finding the other target term. Hence, it can be seen as a special case of the search 
strategy, one which is only feasible due to the additional constraints of the two statement task. 
Stemberg's third model - the "linguistic-spatial mixed" method - decodes the premisses into 
linguistic propositions, but then reorders these propositions into a spatial array. As with the 
linguistic model, the middle term must be identified from the linguistic encodings in order to 
construct the array. 
Finally, in the "algorithmic" method the question is read first then the question answered in 
terms of a linguistic encoding of the first premiss. Then, the second premiss is scanned ignoring 
the relationships between the terms. If the answer to the first statement is not contained in the 
second statement then the first answer is taken. If the answer to the first statement is contained 
in the second premiss then the answer is the other possible answer choice in the second premiss. 
This strategy makes more use of the constraints of the task than did the linguistic strategy, so it 
can be seen as the most task-specific of the strategies described by Sternberg (1980), or as a short-
cut strategy in Roberts' (in press) framework. In the above example, only the information of the 
relative position of Bill will be specified. This strategy is comparable to Wood's scan strategy, in 
that it only attempts to garner information about one of the items. 
In Sternberg and Weil (1980) support was gathered for the implementation of these strategies in 
human performance. In addition, an aptitude treatment interaction was assessed, where students 
were pre-tested for verbal and spatial ability and then taught to use either the spatial or the 
algorithmic method. The pre-test verbal measures were a word grouping task where subjects had 
to indicate which word does not fit with the other four, and Form S of the DAT Verbal Reasoning 
Test which is a verbal analogy test. The first spatial test was Card Rotation from the French Kit of 
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Reference Tests for Cognitive Factors, where two-dimensional shapes at different angles have to 
be compared as mirror-images or identical. The second spatial test is Form S of the DAT Spatial 
Relations Test, which requires a shape to be folded from a two-dimensional outline and compared 
to three-dimensional shapes. After solving 40 linear syllogisms, subjects took the pre-tests and 
were either instructed in the spatial method, the algorithmic method, or had no instruction. They 
then solved a further set of syllogisms. 
The results indicated that those taught to use the algorithmic strategy were faster at solving the 
post-instructional problems (Newman Keuls test, F(2, 141) = 25.91, p<O.00l), but the spatially 
instructed students did not differ from uninstructed subjects. This supports the results from 
Wood's studies showing that strategies specifying less information are more efficient for this 
task. 
Fitting each teaching group against the predictions from each of the four theoretically motivated 
models indicated that both the untrained and the spatially taught group used a mixed model, 
but the algorithmic taught group did not fit the pattern for any of the models. Pre-test measures 
were combined into a spatial factor and a verbal factor. Significant negative correlations between 
these factors and solution latencies for each teaching group were significant for all groups for 
every factor. 
Re-sorting groups according to their model fit on the post-instructional problems indicated that 
many students did not use the method in which they had been instructed. When assigned to 
groups according to the strategy determined by a best fit of the latency data for each individual, a 
significant negative correlation between solution latencies for the mixed method group and both 
spatial and verbal factors was found (r = -0.27, p<O.Ol, r = -0.45, p<0.001). The linguistic model 
group latencies negatively correlated significantly with the verbal factor (r = -0.76, p<0.001) but 
not with the spatial factor. The spatial model negatively correlated with the spatial factor (r = 
-0.61, p<O.Ol) but not with the verbal factor. The algorithmic model correlated negatively with 
the verbal factor (r = -0.32, p<0.05), but not with the spatial factor. Hence, an aptitude treatment 
interaction was found when subjects were classified according to the strategy they seemed to be 
using. Spatial and verbal ability measures are found to relate to effective use of strategies that 
use spatial and verbal representations, respectively. 
Sternberg and Weil (1980) show that a wide variety of strategies, varying in terms of their expres- 
sivity are used, and can be taught, though with limited success as subjects often used a strategy 
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other than the one they were taught to employ. Unfortunately, the data of the studies does not 
indicate the relationship between strategy selection and the pre-test measures. It does address 
the issue of effective use of a strategy once it has been selected, and indicates that subjects with 
high spatial ability are better able to use a method that specifies and resolves more information. 
Subjects with high verbal ability are better at using all the strategies. 
Wood's approach explores strategy change and shows that there is a general move from strate-
gies that draw on specific systems to strategies that draw on more expressive systems, though 
difference in expressivity is only slight for this task. This difference in expressivity can equally 
be expressed in terms of the level of abstraction present in the representations. Wood's more 
complicated version of the task seems to promote a wider variety of strategy, and the greater 
processing load in the spatial task seems to provoke strategic development in order to reduce 
the load. The relationship between stragegy use for solving linear syllogisms and psychometrics 
has not been extensively studied and the Sternberg and Weil (1980) results indicate correlations 
with performance without explaining how ability helps for each method, or how strategies are 
selected. Another domain where the relationship between psychometrics and strategy use has 
been investigated is the sentence-picture verification task, where spatial ability has been used to 
reflect strategy selection. 
2.3.2 Sentence-picture verification 
The sentence-picture verification task was originally designed to assess the ways in which nega-
tion was processed in sentences (Wason, 1972; Wason & Jones, 1968). It involves the subject 
viewing a sentence followed by a picture, and assessing the truth value of the sentence with re-
spect to the picture. Clark and Chase (1972) and Carpenter and Just (1975) described a method 
of solution in which the picture is translated into a sentential form and then compared with the 
sentence. This was termed a "verbal" strategy. Thus, a sentence containing negations would 
take longer to process than a simpler sentence. Response time data supported this description. 
However, for Carpenter and Just's study, only the first few trials were analysed, as pilot stud-
ies indicated a systematic change in response times after being exposed to many problems. As 
Roberts, Wood and Gilmore (1994) comment: "This leads one to wonder exactly what the status 
should be of an all-encompassing model of performance that only applies to the first 36 trials of 
a 252 trial task" (p.416). 
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Macleod, Hunt and Mathews (1978) found that the performance of about a quarter of their sub-
jects did not fit the expected pattern of processing time associated with the verbal strategy: these 
subjects did not take longer over more complex sentences containing more negations as the ver-
bal strategy would predict. Macleod et al. proposed that these subjects were using an alternative 
"spatial" strategy where the sentence is translated into a spatial array, which is then compared 
with the picture. Use of these different strategies (verbal or spatial) can be detected by different 
lengths of processing of the stages of the task. A subject using the spatial strategy will take longer 
over processing the sentence stage, and less time over processing the picture stage than a subject 
using the verbal strategy. 
Marquer and Pereira (1990) found that introspective accounts from subjects while they were per-
forming the sentence-picture verification task did not match the response time data correspond-
ing to the strategy the subject said they were using. The majority of subjects whose data fit the 
spatial strategy reported using verbal strategies. Roberts, Wood and Gilmore (1994) suggested 
that a verbal recoding strategy would produce the same response time data as the spatial strat-
egy. This strategy involves recoding negative statements as affirmatives and then this sentence is 
compared to the picture. Like the spatial strategy, this produces response times that are invariant 
with regard to whether negation is present or absent. Roberts et al. term this type of strategy a 
"flat strategy", a characterisation independent from representation type, instead invoking level 
of abstraction in order to describe the different families of strategy. 
How do the verbal and the flat strategies differ in terms of the level of abstraction used in the 
representations? For the verbal strategy, the information is more abstract in that the encoding is 
also compatible with situations where the shapes are alongside each other - it is the maintenance 
of negation in the encoding that gives this, and this means that the representation system is more 
expressive. In the verbal strategy, there are more situations consistent with the expression used. 
In the spatial strategy, the shapes are specified in terms of one always being above the other, so 
the transformation from, say, "The cross is not below the asterisk" to "The cross is above the 
asterisk" is performed in the spatial strategy, but not in the verbal strategy. The spatial strategy 
specifies a particular situation, and so the representational system is less expressive. 
Two features of strategy variation raised with regard to the linear syllogism studies are now 
investigated. The first pursues the issue of strategy development, and the second looks at the 
relationship between psychometrics and strategy use. 
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For the sentence-picture verification task, the change in representational form seems to be from 
more abstract to more concrete. Carpenter and Just (1975) mention different performance in later 
trials on the task, which were incompatible with a verbal encoding model. This suggests some 
change in the expressivity of the representational system occurred after exposure to the task, and 
a change away from the verbal strategy that uses more abstract representations. This is in the 
reverse direction to the change observed in the linear syllogisms study, where the privilege of oc-
currence changes from more concrete to more abstract representation use. But is the flat strategy 
more efficient than the verbal strategy? If so, then this means strategy change in both the linear 
syllogism and the sentence-picture verification task is towards more efficient or appropriate lev-
els of abstraction. Macleod et al.'s (1978) study does not indicate that the flat strategy (in their 
study, described as a spatial strategy) is more efficient than the verbal strategy, if response time is 
taken as a measure of efficiency. Verbal strategy subjects took an average of 2862ms to respond, 
whereas the spatial strategy subjects took 3230ms on average. In Roberts, Wood and Gilmore's 
(1994) study, no difference in response time is observed, either. For the flat strategy, mean RT = 
2.51s, and for the verbal strategy, mean RT = 2.48s. 
However, two types of problem can be distinguished: those where the sentence is affirmative, 
and those where the sentence is negative. It is predicted that the former are easier for the verbal 
strategy, but the latter would be more difficult for the verbal strategy, as the representation used 
is too abstract to be optimal. Response times for problem type by strategy group from the subjects 
in Roberts et al.'s (1994) study are reproduced in Figure 2.1. 
These results suggest, as anticipated, that the verbal strategy is better for the affirmative prob-
lems, but worse for the negative problems. An ANOVA of response time with strategy and 
problem type as factors was performed'. A main effect for problem type was found (F(1, 39) = 
112.85, p<0.0001) with affirmative problems more quickly solved. There was no main effect for 
strategy. As predicted, there was a significant interaction of strategy with problem type (F(1, 39) 
= 7.72, p<O.Ol), confirming the suggestion that the flat strategy is most appropriate for the more 
difficult negative problems. 
The second issue was the relationship between strategy use and psychometric measures. 
Macleod et al. (1978) found that subjects using the flat strategy responded more quickly if they 
















Figure 2.1: Response times in sentence-picture verification task, problem type by strategy. 
had high spatial ability than subjects using this strategy with lower spatial ability. This reflects 
the Stemberg and Well (1980) finding that high spatial ability related to effective use of the spatial 
strategy for linear syllogisms. In addition, spatial ability was found to relate to strategy selection 
as well as use. The mean spatial score for subjects using the flat strategy was higher than that 
for the subjects using the verbal strategy, but verbal ability was equal for each group 3 . This re-
sult, coupled with the response time data from Roberts et al. (1994) suggests that those with high 
spatial ability choose a strategy that is most effective for the harder problems. Their choice min-
imises the effort required for harder problems, at the expense of making easier problems slightly 
more effortful. 
The compass directions task also demonstrates different representation use in problem solving, 
and studies have connected psychometrics to strategic variation and change for this reasoning 
domain. 
'Mathews, Hunt and Macleod (1980) failed to reproduce this aptitude-selection relationship, so the results must be 
treated only as suggestive. 
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2.3.3 Compass Directions Task 
Roberts, Gilmore, and Wood (1997) studied individual differences in response to the compass 
directions task (Wood, 1978). This task presents a series of directions simultaneously, and subjects 
have to say what point on the compass they end up at with respect to the starting point. An 
example is: 
One step East 
One step South 
One step East 
One step South 
One step West 
One step West 
One step North 
One step West 
The answer to this problem is South-West (this being the nearest point to the finishing position 







Figure 2.2: Strategies for solving the compass directions task. 
One method of solving this problem is to draw or imagine moving each step, then calculate 
the answer from the resulting path. This is termed a "spatial" strategy, according to Roberts' 
classification system. The path for the above example is illustrated on the left of Figure 2.2. It 
requires the starting point to be maintained, as well as every intervening point on the path, and 
can thus be interpreted as a concrete representation. Alternatively, the starting point and position 
with respect to the starting point must be maintained. 
An alternative method is to use a cancellation strategy, where moves East/West and North/South 
cancel each other out in the list until there are just the non-cancelled moves left. The cancellation 
strategy applied to the above problem is shown on the right of Figure 2.2. Counting the remaining 
moves after cancelling gives the answer: South-West. The cancellation strategy is a short-cut 
strategy: it is not generally applicable (consider a variant on the task where movements can be 
in any direction for varying numbers of steps). The cancellation strategy avoids the requirement 
that the initial or intermediate positions be maintained by making explicit the inverse operations 
of moving east/west or north/south that are implicit in the path of the spatial strategy. As the 
starting point and the intermediate steps are not represented this method can be seen as using 
more abstraction. As with the flat strategy in the sentence-picture verification task the amount of 
information that has to be specified in the representation is reduced. 
Subjects reported using both the spatial and the cancellation strategy, and there was a general 
trend towards using the cancellation strategy on later trials (see also Newton & Roberts, in press). 
This suggests that the later developed strategy is one that employs operations to minimise the 
amount of information that has to be specified. This is closely akin to the strategy change that 
occurs in the linear syllogisms. 
Strategy use was related to spatial ability in these studies. To measure spatial ability, subjects 
were given the Saville-Holdsworth Advanced Test Battery Spatial Reasoning Test (Saville & 
Holdsworth Ltd, 1979). Items on this test require subjects to imagine folding 2-dimensional fig-
ures to make patterned cubes in order to decide to which of several possibilities they match. Sub-
jects with high spatial ability did not use the spatial strategy, but tended to use the cancellation 
strategy instead. This inverted aptitude-strategy relationship suggests that high spatial ability 
does not mean that spatial strategies are employed. When coupled with the sentence-picture 
verification task data, however, there is a suggestion that high spatial ability subjects use more 
abstract representations that in this case reduce the amount of information that has to be main-
tained by the subject. As with the sentence-picture verification task, high spatial ability subjects 
seem to use strategies that minimise effort, at least for harder problems. 
Roberts et at. (1997) extended the initial study of the relationship between strategy selection and 
spatial ability by presenting an adapted version of the compass directions task. This adaptation 
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requires the subject to assess the final position of two individuals moving according to given 
directions. Moves were presented one at a time on a computer screen. Using the cancellation 
strategy on this method is particularly difficult as applying the cancellation rules requires storing 
the moves (this is not the case when moves are presented in parallel) and some moves must also 
be reversed before they can be cancelled. Roberts et al. (1997) refer to the cancellation strategy 
being more efficient in terms of working memory for the simple compass directions task, but less 
efficient for the two person compass directions task. They suggest this is due to differing loads 
on working memory resources but the precise details of the different loads are not specified. 
The harder task seems to mean that the extra effort of applying cancellation is greater than that 
required to construct a representation that includes the starting point and/or intervening steps. 
High spatial subjects were found to be more flexible than low spatial subjects: they were more 
likely to change to the spatial strategy on this second task. When the task changes, high spa-
tial ability subjects are sensitive to the appropriateness of the strategy for the task and switch 
accordingly. The development of the cancellation strategy for the standard compass directions 
task only occurs when there is some memory load, however. When subjects were given paper 
and pencil for solving this task, all subjects use the spatial strategy (Newton & Roberts, in press). 
When the change in task requirements is stable then high spatial ability subjects will change to 
a more appropriate strategy. When the task requirements cannot be predicted in advance, as 
with the sentence-picture verification task, a strategy that levels out the effort required for harder 
problems and easier problems is used by the high spatial ability subjects. 
These intriguing studies with the compass directions task support an analysis of strategy change 
in terms of developing an appropriate level of abstraction in the representation. Analysing strate-
gies in this framework indicates the commonalities between all three reasoning tasks considered 
here. Furthermore, spatial ability can be seen to be testing the same ability to develop strate-
gies that use more appropriate levels of abstraction across these different tasks. Spatial ability 
is as much an indicator of strategy selection as it is of ability to use a strategy once selected. It 
is this issue of strategy selection that suggests that spatial ability measures may assess a style of 
information representation as much as an ability to represent. All the reasoning tasks considered 
present with strategies that are more or less appropriate for solving the problems, so selection 
of a level of abstraction for solving the task is confounded with ease of solution. Finding a rea-
soning domain where strategies using concrete and abstract representations are equally effective 
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will indicate whether spatial ability, for example, relates to a style for using certain strategies, or 
an ability to select an appropriate representation. This issue will be pursued in Chapters 3 and 
4. In the meantime, understanding the process of strategy ,  selection does not stop with linking 
it to measures of spatial ability. In order to approach an explanation, exactly what spatial ability 
measures are testing must be considered in more detail. 
Roberts, Gilmore and Wood's (1997) explanation for why high spatial ability subjects are more 
likely to use the cancellation strategy hinges on the greater ability of these subjects to use the 
spatial strategy accurately which provides more likelihood that, for these subjects, they notice 
redundancies in the method and this leads to the development of the cancellation strategy. Ex-
planations in terms of cognitive style - that strategy choice is a matter of preference - are in-
adequate, as Newton and Roberts (in press) show: those using the spatial strategy do not have 
any choice about this. Furthermore, explanations in terms of knowledge do not account for all 
the data: when provided with pencil and paper those previously using the cancellation method 
revert to the spatial strategy (Roberts, Gilmore & Wood, 1997). For task variants, subjects who 
have higher spatial ability are more likely to use the spatial strategy on the two-person compass 
directions task. Low spatial ability subjects continue to uncritically use the cancellation task after 
being shown this for the one-person version of the task. Furthermore, Macleod et al.'s (1978) high 
spatial ability subjects use a flat strategy which seems to be more efficient for harder problems, 
though there is extra expense for easier problems. Hence, spatial ability seems to lend an ability 
to selectively apply strategies as appropriate to the constraints of the task. Crowley, Shrager and 
Siegler (1997) suggest that the higher ability of these subjects frees up metacognitive resources 
which can be used to critically assess strategies for a given task. 
All these accounts are given without regard to subject's performance on spatial ability measures. 
The next section discusses the sensitivity of different measures of spatial ability to strategic varia-
tion. This strategic variation can again be characterised in terms of level of abstraction used in the 
representation. Those with high spatial ability, the subjects that demonstrate strategic flexibility 
in the reasoning tasks, are those that use a variety of strategies on the items in the spatial ability 
measures. However, the link remains contentful if use of abstract or concrete representations is 
considered as a matter of style rather than ability, a perspective later offered by relating differ-
ent representation use to use of alternative algorithms. The styles of processing with abstract or 
concrete representations will be considered further in Chapter 3. 
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2.4 Spatial ability: what does it measure? 
Spatial ability can be defined as the ability to generate, retain, and transform abstract visual im-
ages (from Lohman, 1979, reported in Kyllonen, Lohman & Snow, 1984). There are numerous 
psychometric tests designed to measure spatial ability, and these have developed against a the-
oretical background where subfactors of spatial ability have been discovered. Hence, spatial op-
erations, spatial visualisation, and spatial relations abilities have been distinguished as separate 
abilities measured by different tasks (Poltrock & Brown, 1984). However, fine-grained distinc-
tions concerning the definition and subfactors of spatial ability tend to ignore the susceptibility 
of these tests to different strategic approaches to solving the problems. Indeed factor analyses will 
gloss over individual differences resulting from the application of more than one strategy. Many 
spatial tasks can be solved using representations that have been described as more "linguistic" 
than "spatial", and use of strategies that employ these "non-spatial" representations have been 
observed on many of the tasks designed to assess spatial processing. These contrasting strate-
gies have often been described as "analytic" and "holistic", where holistic strategies preserve the 
unity of the presented stimulus, and analytic strategies attempt to decompose the stimulus into 
components which are then operated upon. 
Lohman and Kyllonen (1983) reviewed studies where subjects were asked to introspect on how 
they solved spatial tasks. The results indicated that strategies differ between subjects both within 
a task and between different tasks. Lohman and Kyllonen note a general trend in strategic ap-
proach to spatial tasks where, as items become more difficult, there is an increase in the tendency 
to use what they term "analytic", or "non-spatial" strategies. Thus, a general review suggests 
that spatial task solution is replete with strategic influences. Several studies are reviewed in 
more detail below. 
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Figure 2.3: Example of an item from the PFT. 
Snow (1980) recorded subjects' strategies on the paper folding test (French, Ekstrom & Price, 
1968), or PFT. This task requires the subject to imagine the array of holes resulting from a piece 
of paper being folded then having a hole punched in it, and match this target to one of a set 
of multiple choice possibilities. An example item is shown in Figure 2.3, where the left three 
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diagrams show the folds, and the right five diagrams show the possibilities for the outcome of 
the hole-punching. Snow noted two strategies for examining the target figure: a subject could 
"mentally construct" the target from the folds, or alternatively the subject could use a "feature-
extraction" strategy, where the subject attended to symmetric folds and number of folds in order 
to devise an encoding of the stimulus. For example, as the first fold is down the left-right diag-
onal in Figure 2.3, the resulting holes must be symmetrical about this axis. For examination of 
the multiple-choice items, the subjects used either a template-matching strategy, or a distractor-
elimination strategy. The "mental construction" strategy specifies all the information in the array, 
whereas the "feature-extraction" strategy only specifies enough information to select the correct 
answer, abstracting away from exact position of holes and considering the arrangement of holes 
instead. The more concrete representation is holistic, as defined above, and the more abstract 
representation is analytic. 
Cooper (1980) also found different strategic approaches to spatial tasks. She found that there were 
two distinct strategies used by subjects for a mental rotation and visual comparison task. Some 
subjects used a holistic approach, where the "visual memory representation" was compared in 
parallel with a test shape. Others used a more sequential, analytic comparison process, where fea-
tures of the stimuli were compared serially. As with the PFT study, the analytic strategy employs 
a level of abstraction greater than that used in the holistic strategy, as only certain features of the 
stimulus are picked out for comparison with other features left unspecified. A similar pattern of 
strategic differences were found in a study by Kail, Carter and Pellegrino (1979) assessing per-
formance on a mental rotation task. The Spatial Relations Test from Thurstone's (1957) Primary 
Mental Abilities set of tests presents a letter-like stimulus with six rotated versions of the target, 
some of which are identical to the stimulus after rotation. The subject's task is to say which ones 
are identical. They computed two latency measures: one to account for the time taken to encode 
the stimuli and make a response, and one time for the mental rotation. They found that the slope 
of the line for degree of rotation and time was widely different for some subjects, who seemed to 
take twice as long to rotate each stimulus as the modal group. They suggest that this is due to 
this group of subjects using an analytic method for rotating: they do not rotate the whole figure, 
but rotate parts of the stimuli sequentially. Rotating only a part of the stimulus demonstrates use 
of a strategy employing representations with more abstraction as elements of the shape are left 
unspecified. 
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Carpenter and Just (1979, reported in Kyllonen, Lohman & Snow, 1984) performed a study of 
a cube comparison task, measuring errors, latencies, eye movements and self reports, which 
revealed two distinct strategies suggestive of the holistic-analytic strategic difference. Some sub-
jects represent and process the cubes holistically, other subjects process the stimulus sequentially, 
using a feature by feature transformation strategy. Again, the analytic strategy uses representa-
tions with more abstraction. 
These studies strongly suggest the need for considering different strategies in terms of the use 
of different levels of abstraction in representation as subjects solve spatial ability tests. How-
ever, none of these studies provide data about the development of strategies as subjects learn to 
solve spatial ability tests. Lohman and Kyllonen (1983), however, developed a study expressly 
designed to address issues of strategy change and variation in a variety of spatial tasks. They 
gave their subjects mental synthesis tasks that varied in complexity. These problems required 
subjects to add simple shapes together and then match the result to a target which may be pre-
sented in a rotated position. They found that individual differences emerged at various stages. 
For memorising the initial stimuli in order to perform rotation or synthesis operations, three dif-
ferent strategies were evident. Subjects either stored each figure as a set of basic features, or 
decomposed the stimulus into simpler units such as triangles or rectangles, or attempted to ap-
ply a descriptive label to the stimulus as a whole. These three strategies vary in terms of the level 
of abstraction involved in the representation: decomposing the figure means more information 
is left unspecified and so is more abstract. 
Some subjects responded flexibly by labelling some figures, and decomposing others, according 
to whichever strategy was easier. Subjects who used the decomposition strategy were faster at 
solving the task, and scored higher on other spatial tests. In terms of strategy change, as the task 
progressed, more than one third of subjects changed from a feature analysis to a decomposition 
strategy. No subjects showed the opposite direction of strategy change. This suggests that the 
most appropriate level of abstraction for the task is employed in the decomposition strategy. 
This hints at spatial ability measures being prone to strategy variation and appropriateness of 
strategy selection along precisely the same lines as those they reflect in the reasoning tasks. For 
the synthesis stage, subjects who scored highest on average on other spatial ability measures 
were those that exhibited the greatest flexibility in strategy for synthesis. For a task where three 
shapes had to be synthesised, these high ability subjects attempted to synthesise all three figures, 
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but if this was too complex, then subjects would recover and attempt to synthesise the first two 
figures, and if this failed, they would try to synthesise the last two figures. If all synthesis efforts 
failed, the three figures would be stored separately. 
These studies all point towards the necessity of considering strategies in even the simplest spatial 
task. Alternative methods other than those purportedly tested by the tasks can be brought to 
bear on the various tasks. Many studies classify contrasting strategies as being either holistic 
or analytic, where holistic strategies use less abstraction in the representation than the analytic 
strategies. 
Is it possible to say whether analytic strategies are more effective than spatial strategies for solv-
ing spatial tasks? The results of spatial ability studies are mixed. Lohman and Kyllonen (1983) 
suggest that analytic strategies are more effective, whereas Carpenter and Just (1979) found that 
the holistic strategy produced more accurate performance. Snow (1980) found that a strategy that 
combined holistic and analytic processes was most effective. Carpenter and Just (1979) found that 
use of the analytic strategy on the cube comparison task corresponded to poorer performance. 
Yallow and Webb (1977) found that low ability subjects on a range of spatial tasks reported using 
more verbalisations and spent more time evaluating and eliminating alternatives, whereas high 
ability subjects tended to know the answer before examining alternatives. The effectiveness of a 
strategy must depend on the task requirements. Lohman and Kyllonen's (1983) study suggests 
that for some items in the mental synthesis task analytic strategies were better, and for other 
items a holistic strategy is more appropriate. The better subjects are those that demonstrate more 
flexibility in selecting the appropriate strategy. Cooper (1976) found that holistic strategies were 
more effective for making "same" judgements for rotated figures, whereas analytic strategies 
were more effective for making "different" judgements. 
In a study of the way individuals shifted strategy on a spatial task, Barratt (1953) found that for 
easy items in the DAT Spatial Relations test a holistic strategy was modal. For harder items, 
however, subjects tended to use an analytic strategy where no folding or unfolding of the stim-
ulus pattern or response figures occurred, rather cues such as angle intersections were attended 
to. This variation in strategy is very like that observed by Snow (1980) in the PFT. A third strat-
egy was when subjects started with the alternatives first, and then looked at the stimulus figures 
for matching, but the numbers of subjects using this strategy did not vary from easier to harder 
items. Myers (1958) reports introspective accounts of subjects solving a number of spatial tasks, 
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and notes a similar change from holistic to analytic strategies as problems get more difficult. 
The strategic variation observed in these spatial ability measurement tasks suggests that what 
they test is not reducible to a single dimension. The generality of strategic variability in a range 
of tasks can be captured by distinctions in terms of holistic/ analytic strategies. The differences 
between these strategies is in terms of the level of abstraction that they employ in the represen-
tations used. 
Different tasks are more appropriate for one or the other strategy, but there is a general trend to-
wards changing from using holistic to analytic strategies when the problems are harder. "Hard-
er" can be defined in terms of the number and type of operations required to produce the unified 
representation, and in terms of the amount of information specified in the resulting representa-
tion. For harder problems the number of operations and the consequent load is greater, so more 
abstract strategies will reduce this load. However, using a more abstract strategy may require 
a degree of reprocessing during the task. If the wrong feature of the spatial stimulus is rotated 
then another may have to be selected. In the sentence picture verification task, when sentences 
contain negation operations are more complex on the verbal representations. This suggests that 
the types of process required by the holistic and the analytic strategies are different, and thus the 
underlying algorithms will be different. The computational differences in operating on abstract 
and concrete representations will be returned to in Chapter 4, but they remain in terms of the 
number and type of operation that has to be performed on the data structure. 
Subjects that score highest on spatial ability measures are flexible in the strategy they use. This 
suggests that the flexibility of representation use in reasoning tasks by high spatial ability subjects 
may be a correlation of approaches rather than anything more contentful. However, there is 
evidence of styles at play in spatial task solution: there are subjects who utilise only an analytic 
strategy uncritically as well as those who use only a holistic strategy for a task. This point is worth 
pursuing, and the next chapter reviews several potentially useful measures for highlighting these 
issues of style and ability in representation selection. 
2.5 Summary of Chapter 
This chapter has made the case for the ubiquity of different strategies in reasoning tasks, and 
particularly the widespread evidence for what have been termed spatial and verbal strategies 
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used for the same task. The distinction between different strategies has been redescribed in terms 
of the level of abstraction present in the representations used, and this forges a qualitative link 
between verbal and analytic strategies, and between spatial and holistic strategies, in that the 
former tend to use more abstraction than the latter. 
Studies relating spatial ability measures to reasoning performance show that high spatial ability 
subjects develop strategies with an optimal level of abstraction sooner. Explanatory accounts that 
invoke spatial ability must further probe the mechanism of strategy selection that spatial ability 
tests measure. The commonalities between strategy use on reasoning tasks and on spatial ability 
test problems are in terms of the extent to which the strategies use abstract or concrete informa-
tion in the representations. This relates to the expressivity of the representational systems from 
which the representations are drawn. The type of operations that apply to the representations 
is going to be determined by the expressivity of the representational system, and the extent to 
which these operations are a matter of style or ability is, as yet, an open question. 
The reasoning domains have presented tasks where different levels of abstraction are more or less 
appropriate for solving the task in terms of the effort or economy of using the representation. This 
makes styles and abilities hard to distinguish for these tasks, though the range of strategy types 
coupled with the different methods for solving spatial ability test problems suggests that some 
dimension of style is at play. The next chapter discusses some potential measures of preferences 
and ability for representing information with different levels of abstraction. It also presents some 
requirements on a reasoning domain where issues of style and ability can be distinguished. 
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Chapter 3 
Selecting tests and tasks 
Chapter 2 made a case for the widespread variety of strategies brought to bear on reasoning tasks 
and psychometric tests for spatial ability. These strategies exhibited some generality, however, in 
terms of the level of abstraction used in the representations. The first part of this chapter consid-
ers a number of conventional dimensions from the psychometric literature on styles and abilities 
that may help in assessing students' propensities and preferences for using representations with 
different levels of abstraction. In consequence, this will reflect abilities and styles for the different 
types of process correlated with the alternative representations. 
The previous chapter illustrated that certain tasks are more effectively solved by constructing a 
more concrete representation, whereas others are better solved by using abstract representations. 
This warns of the need to "know thy task" as a pre-Socratic prequisite before one can "know thy-
self". Ideally, a reasoning domain for study ought to be open to strategic variation, provide the 
potential for the use of different representations, and also the representations used by different 
strategies ought to be encapsulated by quantifiable differences in the abstractness of the repre-
sentations used. Only then can the measures discussed in the first part of this chapter be used to 
distinguish preferences and abilities. Hyperproof, a multimodal, computer-based logic course, 
presents itself as a prime candidate for such a domain. The second part of the chapter illustrates 
the richness of Hyperproof as a didactic tool as well as a microscope for strategic variation. Some 
novel investigations of individual differences in strategy use in Hyperproof will highlight the 
processing distinctions between using strategies that involve abstract and concrete representa-
tions. Where there are these differences in representation, strategic and algorithmic descriptions 
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of individual differences prove to be complementary. 
3.1 Strategies and Styles 
The previous chapter discussed differences in strategy use for reasoning that have conventionally 
focused on alternative uses of representations. Frequently used candidates for reflecting different 
strategies have been spatial ability tests. Use of these tests to illuminate the selection and use of 
different strategies was shown to be in difficulty as measures of ability because the tests are prone 
to strategic variation. In addition, the tests are contentious as measures of strategy preference 
because the effective use of different strategies varied according to the task. 
What would be useful for assessing strategy use in reasoning are measures of different "cognitive 
styles" (see Chapter 1). Five potentially useful measures from the psychometric literature are 
now discussed. These measures are variously referred to as "preferences", "learning styles", or 
"thinking styles". Use of the term "cognitive styles" presupposes that preferences are due to 
differences in cognitive processes, making the assumption that learning is a mirror for cognition 
means that the terminological differences are due to the particular perspectives taken by the 
originators of the methods. 
3.1.1 Visual/verbal preference 
Paivio (1971), following in the imaginal footsteps of Galton (1883), attempted to assess what he 
termed verbal and nonverbal "ways of thinking". These questions covered preferences for visual 
and verbal presentations of information. Example items questioned the subject's preference for 
doing work that requires the use of words, or the ease with which the subject can generate a 
"mental picture" of a friend's face. Such measures are pertinent to issues of level of abstraction 
in representation, as the visual/verbal distinction can be recast in terms of specific /expressive 
systems of representation. Gauging preference for visual/verbal information relates to assessing 
the subject's preference for more expressive or more specific systems for representing. Paivio 
and Harshman (1983) found that responses to these questions were well-fit by a two factor solu-
tion, one relating to verbal preference, and one to nonverbal preference. Richardson (1977) took 
15 items from Paivio's "ways of thinking" questionnaire. This questionnaire is known as the 
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Visualizer-Verbalizer Questionnaire (VVQ). A factor analysis of this questionnaire performed by 
Kirby, Moore and Schofield (1988) found that the nonverbal dimension confounded an "imagery" 
dimension with a "dream" dimension (the vividness and frequency of dreams experienced by the 
subject). They then constructed a 30 item questionnaire that assessed preference for verbal and 
visual information separately from that of dream vividness. 
Kirby et al. tested whether the learning styles of their questionnaire were related to ability mea-
sures. Their verbal ability measure was the ACER Higher Test Form ML from the Australian 
Council for Educational Research (1981). This consisted of vocabulary, verbal similarities, verbal 
reasoning, and verbal analogy problems. There were two spatial ability measures: the Card Ro-
tations test, and the Surface Development test (both from Ekstrom, French & Price, 1963). They 
found that verbal preference corresponded with scores on the verbal tests (r = 0.32, p<0.005), and 
visual preference correlated with the Surface Development test (r = 0.27, p<0.005). They did not 
find a significant correlation between visual preference and the Card Rotations task. But, they 
also found that verbal preference correlated with the Surface development test (r = 0.17, p<0.05), 
and that visual preference correlated with verbal test score (r = 0.32, p<0.005). Hence, there is no 
neat connection between score on verbal tests and verbal preference or between score on spatial 
ability tests and visual preference. 
The lack of systematic connections between visual/verbal style and performance on verbally-
based or spatially-based tasks argues against the use of such measures, as does their derivation 
from introspective accounts. For these reasons, the VVQ is not considered for further use. 
A further criticism of visual/verbal preference as a measure of strategy differences comes from a 
study by Oberlander, Cox, Monaghan, Stenning and Tobin (1996). They showed that differences 
in reasoning with combinations of graphical situations and expressions in propositional calculus 
are not due to differences in the use of either the visual or verbal modality. Rather differences in 
strategy are better expressed in terms of the degree of abstraction employed in representations. 
In the current context, the visual-verbal preference can be subsumed under analyses that explore 
expressivity/specificity in reasoning tasks. 
Paivio (1986) turned to focus on the processes induced by verbal and spatial representations, 
rather than properties of visual/verbal information. His "dual-coding" theory assumes sepa-
rate systems for dealing with verbal and nonverbal information. The properties of the processes 
within each system are resonant of previous discussions of the different properties of strategies: 
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The verbal system is specialized for sequential processing whereas the nonverbal sys-
tem is specialized for synchronous or parallel processing of multiple representational 
units. (Paivio, 1986, p.71). 
This shift in emphasis towards process pre-empts the holistic /analytic style which attempts to 
characterise the difference between "sequential" and "parallel" processing. Holistic/analytic 
style is the next dimension to be considered. 
3.1.2 Holistic/analytic style 
Anderson speaks of cognitive psychology's "almost fatal attraction to bold, general claims about 
human cognition" (Anderson 1993, p.2). The distinction between holistic and analytic processing 
is a casualty of such boldness and generality, as it has been used to distinguish binary perfor-
mance on many dimensions in both social psychology and cognitive psychology. The following 
discussion presents studies that contribute to a coherent conception of the holistic/ analytic dis-
tinction that enables its connection to reasoning, even though their starting points are as diverse 
as hemispheric asymmetry, concept formation, and geometry problem solving. 
The view that the difference between holistic/ analytic processing underlies the visual/verbal 
distinction is pursued by Bradshaw and Nettleton (1981) in their review of the holistic/ analytic 
distinction relating to hemispheric asymmetries, previously considered as a verbal/spatial dif-
ference. Initial claims about hemispheric specialisation from a functional perspective expressed 
the distinction in terms of a verbal advantage for the left-hemisphere and a non-verbal/spatial 
advantage for the right hemisphere. Broca and Wernicke have both claimed a verbal role for the 
left hemisphere, finding as they did that certain areas of the brain that are essential for spoken 
language production are located in the left temporal lobe. Studies on normal subjects employing 
a variety of lateralised presentation methods have found that the left hemisphere is advantaged 
for verbal presentations, whereas the right hemisphere is advantaged for non-verbal tasks. In the 
auditory modality, Goodglass and Calderon (1977) have found a right ear advantage for verbal 
material such as backwards speech, nonsense syllables, and words and sentences maintaining 
normal syntactic structure. In the visual modality, a right visual field advantage emerges for 
verbal stimuli, but a left visual field advantage has been found for visual materials where the 
principle feature of the task is colour discrimination (Davidoff, 1976), dot localisation (Bryden, 
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1976), the perception of line orientation (Atkinson & Egeth, 1973), or curvature (Longden, Ellis 
& Iversen, 1976), as well as a host of other non-verbal features (for a review see Bradshaw & 
Nettleton, 1981). 
As Bogen (1969, 1975) observes, the mode of processing seems to be more fundamental than 
the nature of the preferred stimuli in hemispheric specialisation: the left hemisphere deals with 
analytic processes, the right hemisphere is concerned with holistic processing. This reflects the 
distinction that Paivio makes with regard to spatial/verbal information: the processes operating 
on the stimuli are more fundamental than the stimuli themselves. Thus, the right ear advantage 
for verbal materials disappears when the task demands are altered. Bever, Hurtig and Handel 
(1976) attempted to demonstrate that left hemisphere specialisation is for analytic processing 
rather than a specialisation for verbal material. When the stimuli are presented to one ear, there 
is a right ear advantage for the detection of an initial phoneme of a consonant-vowel-consonant 
syllable, but there are no ear differences in the detection of the whole syllable as a target, though 
other studies have indicated a right ear advantage for syllable identification (Bradshaw & Nettle-
ton, 1981, p.57). Nebes (1978), in a similar vein, illustrates that the right hemisphere is superior 
at perceiving the relationship between component parts and the whole configuration, and in per-
forming spatial transformations of the visual input. He posits that the right hemisphere forms 
a spatial and cognitive map of our surroundings from incomplete sensory information, basing 
this opinion on the right hemisphere being advantaged when forming a complete Gestalt (e.g., a 
circle) from incomplete information (e.g., arcs of a circle), while on the other "hand", the ability to 
discover or isolate a shape within an irrelevant background is a function of the left hemisphere. 
Bradshaw and Nettleton (1981) summarise their review of the literature by noting there is a left 
hemisphere specialisation for temporal order, sequencing and segmentation. This is based on 
studies that have found a right ear advantage for complex, rhythmic, sequential series of acoustic 
stimuli, and a left ear advantage for simple, discrete, unidimensional, global stimuli. Also on 
evidence for a right-body side tactual advantage for sequentially ordered stimulation, and a left-
side advantage for stimuli perceived in terms of spatial distribution. Thus, distinctions have 
moved away from a verbal/non-verbal distinction towards embracing a distinction in terms of 
the holistic /analytic style of processing. 
Kemler Nelson (1984) uses the holistic /analytic distinction to describe different processes leading 
to concept formation: 
40 
On the analytic mode, stimuli are compared and contrasted according to their con-
stituent properties or attributes; in the non-analytic or holistic mode, they are related 
according to global relations of overall similarity (p.735). 
These different approaches to concept formation can be tested by requiring the subject to group 
together stimuli that vary along two perceptual dimensions (Garner, 1974). Figure 3.1 shows a set 
of wedges that vary in terms of size of angle and length of side (Smith & Baron, 1991). Subjects 
that group the left and middle stimuli together are driven by the similarity of the length of side 
of the two shapes, so their decision is dictated by judgment on a single dimension. Subjects that 
group the middle and right stimuli do so due to the "family resemblance" of the two properties: 
the two shapes do not have identical side length or angle, but are closer on both dimensions. 
Kemler Nelson and colleagues (Foard & Kemler Nelson, 1984; Kemler Nelson 1984; 1989; Kem-
ler & Smith, 1979; Smith, 1989; Smith & Baron, 1981; Smith & Kemler, 1977; Smith & Kemler 
Nelson, 1984) have shown that children are more likely to be holistic, but adults more likely to 
be analytic. Adults under dual task conditions, or forced to make judgements at speed, are more 
likely to group stimuli holistically. This leads Kemler Nelson to contend that "holistic processing, 
guided by global similarity relations rather than abstracted stimulus properties, may be frequent, 
fundamental and primitive in human cognition" (Kemler Nelson, 1984, p.735). 
Figure 3.1: Stimuli to test for holistic/ analytic concept formation. 
In a similar vein, Schmeck and Geisler-Brenstein (1989) noted that holistic (or global) learning 
processes seem to involve habitual preference for "a broad focus of attention, formation of im-
pressions, noticing similarities, more interest in wholes than in component parts, and prefer-
ences for more random, less orderly presentations of information. Analytic processing involves 
a narrower attentional focus, retention of facts and details, noticing differences, more interest 
in parts than wholes, and preferences for ordered (usually sequential) presentations of informa-
tion" (p.114). They go on to discuss this issue of cognitive process with respect to development, 
stating that "the highest levels of development require integration, specifically integration of the 
earlier more childlike and random, global functioning with the newer self-controlled, analytic 
skill" (p.116). This suggests that the terminological similarities with the hemispheric asymme- 
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tries studies are expressing a common processing distinction. 
Attempts to locate holistic /analytic processes in complex tasks have been conducted. Boulter 
and Kirby (1994) suggest that strategies used to solve transformational geometry problems can 
be usefully described in terms of holistic/ analytic processes. The holistic strategy involves ma-
nipulating the whole object, focusing on the whole rather than breaking it down into parts or 
features. In the analytic strategy, the subject considers distinct features or parts of the problem 
or display in question when attempting to arrive at a solution. With respect to transformational 
geometry, a strategy that involved the shapes being analysed as being made up of parts, and 
then moving the figure by "pieces" was described as an analytic strategy. A strategy where the 
shape was moved as a whole was described as a holist strategy. Results of the study showed that 
some questions were best solved by one or other strategy - two questions were more successfully 
solved by students using an analytic strategy, and one question was best solved with a holist 
strategy. Therefore, unsurprisingly perhaps, the most successful approach to solving the range 
of problems seemed to be flexible strategy deployment. 
Some studies have attempted to relate the holistic /analytic distinction to complex problem solv-, 
ing. The difficulties of attaining an agreed conception of the relation between these processes 
and complex tasks is evident in such work. Alesandrini, Langstaff and Wittrock (1984) measured 
holistic and analytic abilities in both pictorial and verbal modalities. Their approach was in terms 
of ability rather than style, so their studies are indicative of performance on tests that prioritise 
one form of processing over another. Tests that require the subject to focus more on the parts than 
on the whole or to pick out the parts from the whole in order to get the correct answer were taken 
to be analytic tasks. Holistic tests were classified as those that require the subject to mentally 
combine parts into a whole or to focus more on the whole than on the parts in order to get the 
correct answer (p.152). To measure pictorial-analytic ability, Witkin, Oltman, Raskin and Karp's 
(1971) Group Embedded Figures Test (see discussion of field-independence/dependence below) 
was used "because it requires the respondent to analyze a spatial whole in order to pick out a 
component part" (p.153). For pictorial-holistic ability, the Street Figure-Completion test was used 
(Street, 1931). This "requires the respondent to recognize a spatial whole from the several com-
ponent parts shown" (ibid.). Verbal-analytic ability was measured with the Nonsense Syllogisms 
test (French, Ekstrom and Price, 1963): "since the respondent must sequentially focus on pieces of 
information to derive another piece of information, this test was selected as a measure of verbal- 
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analytic ability" (ibid.). Lastly, verbal-holistic ability was measured by the Similarities subtest of 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) (Wechsler 1958), where the subject is required "to 
see a higher level of relationships between the paired objects. If the subject gives the higher level 
commonality of the two objects, a higher score is given than if the response is analytical, focusing 
on specific attributes of each object in the pair" (ibid.). This latter test has also been used as a 
measure of verbal-analytic ability by a subset of the same authors, where higher scores are given 
for what are termed "symbolic-abstract similarities, and lower for spatial-relational similarities" 
(Wittrock & Alesandrini, 1990, pp.493-494). This test and the Street Figure-Completion test have 
(apparently) "been frequently used in neuropsychological studies to assess spatial-holistic and 
verbal-analytic abilities, respectively" (Wittrock & Alesandrini, 1990, p.494). Unfortunately, the 
only reference to use of these tests is the Street test used by Bogen et al. (1972). 
There are evident difficulties in linking holistic /analytic processing to complex problem solving 
tasks. Using tests that are as complex as the task to which they are compared does not clarify 
the nature of preference for using different processes in reasoning tasks. Das, Kirby and Jarman 
(1975) have suggested that holistic/ analytic processes are one of a family of related descriptions 
of different processes that are brought to bear on complex cognitive tasks. Clark and Frisby 
(1980, reported in Alesandrini, Langstaff & Wittrock, 1984) take a similar line, suggesting that the 
processes contribute to different ways of thinking about problems. Holist (or synthetic) thinking 
enables an individual to put the discrete parts of an information presentation together into a 
meaningful whole by focusing on the whole rather than on the parts. Analytic thinking entails 
critically categorising and classifying information. 
After reviewing several studies for assessing holistic/ analytic processing differences, Beyler and 
Schmeck (1992) suggest that a unified concept of holistic /analytic is emerging. It certainly ap-
pears as a relevant and important distinction for expressing the strategies observed in spatial 
ability tests, and thus for capturing the difference between use of different levels of abstrac-
tion in representation. The problem is what tests are to be used in order to assess it. Those 
used by Alesandrini et al. (1984) seem unsatisfactory as their complexity means that at best they 
can offer a correlation rather than an explanation. The concept formation test used by Kemler 
Nelson and colleagues is promising, but such measures seem very fragile, as responses change 
with slight changes to stimuli or to their presentation (Foard & Kemler-Nelson, 1984). Miller 
(1988; 1991) suggests that the holistic/ analytic processing distinction underlies both the field- 
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dependence/ independence and the serialist/holist styles. These measures are now considered 
as potential tools for assessing performance in complex tasks. 
3.1.3 Serialist/holist style 
In order to explore different learning strategies on an unfamiliar task, Scott devised an experi-
ment known as the "martian animal classification task" (Pask & Scott, 1972). Students had to 
learn taxonomies for two different sorts of animal: the "clobbit" and the "gandelmuller". Infor-
mation about the different species was presented on 40 cards which provided different levels of 
information. 10 cards were typical subspecies, 15 were of contextual data about habits, 5 were test 
types in the taxonomy, 7 were of physical characteristics, and 7 indicated why names of parts or 
behaviours are used. Subjects were free to select any card they wished, but were required to give 
a reason why they chose that particular card. Strategies were distinguished in terms of whether 
large global predicates were tested, or whether the subject preferred step-by-step approaches to 
learning. The holist learner prefers relations of topics, preferring to structure their learning at the 
global level, and investigating individual cases or cards presenting information at a lower rela-
tional level to fill out this structure. The serialist learner builds up a structure by investigating 
particular instances of the animals, creating abstractions from these individual cases. This dis-
tinction suggests similarities with the holistic/ analytic processing distinction, but applies these 
concepts to learning situations. Pask expresses the distinction with relation to learning tasks in 
general: "Serial learners showed intention to search for specific data. Holist learners showed 
intention to test a large predicate or relational hypothesis" (Pask, 1988, p.90). 
Alternative formulations of the serialist-holist learning strategy have been made in terms of the 
number of goals and working topics maintained during learning. The holist has many subgoals 
under his main topic, whereas the serialist has only one goal which may be the main topic. Once 
this goal is achieved, the serialist will move on to the next goal or topic (Pask, 1976). The distinc-
tion has also been supported with reference to questions asked by the student during "feedback" 
routines where the student recounts their knowledge of the domain. Holists ask questions about 
broad relations, to support their hypotheses about generalisations. Serialists' questions concern 
narrower relations, and hypotheses are specific. In the martian animal classification task, a holist 
asks questions such as "Are there more kinds of Candler with mounds?" whereas a serialist 
questions a specific attribute: "Which kind of Gandlemuller has no sprongs ... ?" (Pask, 1976, 
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p.130). 
The serialist/holist distinction in strategy is described within a particular learning situation, so 
it is an expression of the particular relationship of the student to a particular task. Thus, strate-
gies are mutually exclusive for a given learning situation. Certain tasks are likely to be better 
solved with one strategy over the other, but what in general disposes a student to use one or 
other of these learning strategies? The disposition a student has towards using a certain strategy 
defines the student's individual learning style. A student who uses a holist strategy frequently 
is classified as a holist, or comprehensionist, learner. The frequent user of a serialist strategy is 
named a serialist, or operationalist, learner. A comprehension learner readily picks up an over-
all picture of the learning situation, and recognises clearly where information can be obtained 
to fill out the details. Comprehension learners have the ability to build descriptions supple-
mented by associations between topics. Operation learners pick up rules, methods and details, 
but lack the awareness of how the elements of the learning situation fit together. The comprehen-
sion/operation distinction in learning style does not divide students into distinct classes - there 
is no mutual exclusivity as there is in defining the holist/serialist learning strategies. Instead, the 
scale is continuous, biases towards certain learning strategies are a matter of degree, and some 
students demonstrate an ability to effectively apply both serialist and holist strategies. These 
students are termed "versatile" learners. 
However, students are often very inflexible with regard to use of a learning strategy, thus con-
textual effects of different tasks were found to be less a determiner of choice of strategy than 
stylistic consistency (Pask, 1975). Once a strategy has been chosen by a student it is rare that it is 
relinquished, even if it proves difficult to execute, resonating with Roberts, Gilmore and Wood's 
(1997) study on strategies for different versions of the compass directions task. Pask observes 
that only "strong advice" will encourage the student to start afresh. He goes on: "sharp strategic 
distinctions occur because students become locked into one strategy to the exclusion of others" 
(Pask, 1976, p130). This means that the probability of a student using a particular strategy for 
a given task can be predicted in advance by measuring the student's bias towards a serialist or 
holist strategy for learning. Furthermore, task constraints indicate that every holistic or serial-
istic strategy is not efficient or effective. Thus, the student must be able to tailor their choice of 
strategy to the situation. Pask describes what he terms "learning pathologies" of students who 
approach every problem using the same strategy, no matter how inappropriate. Unsuccessful 
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application of a holist learning strategy is termed "globetrotting", whereas misapplication of a 
serialist strategy is labelled "improvidence". Use of analogies during learning is an example of 
these pathologies in action. The globetrotter will apply analogies, but inappropriate ones that re-
late to irrelevant or vacuous elements, or relate the wrong elements to the analogy. Improvidence 
is characterised by the lack of application of analogies, or the failure to use a common principle to 
relate elements (Pask, 1976, p.140). However, learning will be affected by interactions of presen-
tation style and learning style. Materials in the martian animal classification task were adapted to 
favour a serialist or a holist strategy. Students presented with materials that matched their spon-
taneous approach to the task learned much better, requiring far fewer instructional presentations 
before they learned the task. Other studies by Pask have shown that mismatched conditions 
mean longer learning periods and information being retained for shorter periods. Pask (1976) 
writes: "a mismatched condition leads to grossly inferior performance and a pronounced failure 
to comprehend the principles underlying the subject matter" (p.132). 
Pask is at pains to note that an effective serialist learner acquires the same understanding of 
the learning situation, it is just their approach that is diverse. The serialist gains understanding 
from particular instances, or a routine approach to learning. The holist learner gains insight from 
working out the details of the situation from the global perspective, preferring freedom to move 
between informational levels, filling out the details of a structure constructed at a more general 
level. Pask contends that the end-product is no different, what varies is the point of focus during 
learning. 
In summary, Pask has shown that there are fundamentally different ways in which complex learn-
ing situations are approached by students. He has indicated that there are different ways of learn-
ing the same material, and these different approaches can be broadly characterised in terms of 
whether the student treats the material as a whole, later filling out the structure of the situation 
with detail, or whether the learner prefers to focus on the particulars of the presented material, 
and gradually build up an overall sense of the situation. This characterisation of the learning 
style suggests a difference in terms of the level of abstraction to be employed in the learner's rep-
resentations. The holist begins with an abstract, schematic structure, and fills out the details later, 
whereas the serialist begins with more concrete representations, generating comprehension of 
the whole subject by later abstracting over these cases. Pask has also shown that an individual's 
learning style determines, for a given task, which approach will be taken towards the new learn- 
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ing situation. Though a student's approach to different situations can vary according to the task, 
most students are fairly inflexible in their approach to novel problems, demonstrating learning 
pathologies that limit their strategy application. Thus, the learning style of a subject is useful in 
depicting the process of problem solving. 
Furthermore, the similarity of concepts between the serialist/holist learning style and the holis-
tic/analytic processing distinction supports Miller's (1989; 1991) contention that the processing 
differences underly the learning styles. Pask considers the processes that may underly the style: 
holism and serialism appear to be extreme manifestations of more fundamental 
processes, which are induced by systematic enforcement of the requirement for un-
derstanding" (Pask, 1976, p.133). 
The fundamental processes that the serialist/holist learning style taps into are the holis-
tic/analytic differences that are inherent in the use of different levels of abstraction in repre-
sentation. A small-scale study on University of Edinburgh students related serialist/holist pref-
erence as tested by Clarke's (1993) question (see Chapter 6 for further details of this question) to 
holistic /analytic processing using Smith and Baron's wedges stimuli (Figure 3.1). There was a 
suggestion that serialists made more dimensional, or analytic, judgments than holists (8.0 com-
pared to 4.6 out of 32 items, t(10) = 1.69, one-tailed p=0.06). Due to the variability of these concept 
formation measures, however, this was not pursued. A measure of serialist/holist style will be 
further considered as highlighting the essential differences between representation use in Hyper-
proof, considered later in this chapter, and a measure will also be used in the empirical study 
reported in Chapter 6. 
3.1.4 Field-independence/dependence 
Field-independence/dependence (FID) was also considered as a style which trades on the holis-
tic/analytic processing difference, according to Miller (1989; 1991). 
Gottschaldt (1926), in his studies of the roles of contextual factors and past experience in percep-
tion, constructed a test where a target shape was hidden in a complex line-drawing (summarised 
in Witkin, Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971). When the context plays a strong role in the subject's 
perception, the task was found to be more difficult as the disembedding of the shape is harder 
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for these individuals. The Embedded Figures Test (EFT) was derived by Witkin et at. (1971) from 
this test, which bears a strong resemblance to the Hidden Figures Test (HFT), devised by French, 
Ekstrom and Price (1963). An example item from the HFT is shown in Figure 3.2. The task in 
the HFT is to say which one of the five shapes shown at the top of the diagram is contained in 
the complex figure. Subjects demonstrate different abilities to locate the shape in the complex 
array of lines. Individuals that can perform this task quickly are more field-independent, as the 
context of the shape plays less of a role in their perception. Individuals that are slow on this task 
are more field-dependent, where their perceptual processes are much more determined by the 
context. This is the basis of FID as a style. 
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Figure 3.2: Example of an item for the Hidden Figures Test. 
Another test which helped to define the FID dimension was the Rod Frame Task (RFT) where the 
subject is sat in a room, then the room is tilted, and the subject is instructed to move a rod until it is 
vertical. Subjects who are field-independent are better at this task than field-dependent subjects, 
reflecting an ability to ignore the immediate perceptual context, and prioritise vestibular over 
perceptual information. Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough and Karp (1962) state the dimension 
as measured by the tasks thus: 
[the task] requires the person to separate an item from the field or context of which it 
is a part and which therefore exerts a strong influence upon it; to "break up" a field 
or configuration. The person with a more field-independent way of perceiving tends 
to experience his surroundings analytically, with objects experienced as discrete from 
their backgrounds. The person with a more field-dependent way of perceiving tends 
to experience his surroundings in a relatively global fashion, passively conforming to 
the influence of the prevailing field or context. 
The field-dependent subject perceives information in the field as "fused together", whereas field- 
independent individuals experience parts of the field discretely from the structure of the ground. 
This distinction between treating information globally or analytically led to a redescription of 
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the measure in terms of whether the subject has a "global" or "articulated" style of information 
processing. 
Definitions of the FID dimension have therefore focused on two related competences. The first is 
the ability to discriminate parts of the field or break up an organised stimulus so as to separate 
parts of it (Witkin et al., 1971, p.5). This has been termed "analyticity", and relates to Alesandrini, 
Langstaff and Wittrock's (1984) use of the EFT to assess pictorial-analytic abiity. It contrasts 
with "global" processing, where the embedding context is not overcome by the subject, but is 
an inherent part of their perception and problem solving approach. The second competence is 
in terms of applying structure to a field. Witkin et al. (1962) found that subjects scoring high 
on the EFT were more likely to impose structure on inkblots on a page, even if the inkblots were 
entirely random. Whereas the holist-serialist style assesses how the structure of the information is 
developed by the learner, the FID dimension analyses the structure itself. It is thus expected to be 
a measure complementary to the serialist-holist dimension. Indeed, Entwistle (1979) has claimed 
that field-independence co-occurs with serialist learning preferences. To assess similarities and 
differences between these measures, both are used in the empirical studies. 
The FID dimension is classified as a style, rather than an ability measure in that subjects that 
score low on tests such as the HFT or the EFT are good at certain tasks. This reflects the distinc-
tion between styles and abilities as stated in Stenning and Monaghan (in press), where a certain 
style is laudable for one task and lamentable for another. Scoring low on an ability measure, on 
the other hand, is never characterised in an optimistic light. These differences in performance ac-
cording to task requirements for FID styles are exemplified by the range of responses to learning 
programmes and reasoning domains discussed below. Some confounding of ability with style 
does take place, however, as Linn and Kyllonen (1981) found correlations between EFT and the 
paper folding test (r(60) = 0.56). Witkin and Goodenough (1977, cited in Witkin et al., 1971) ad-
mitted that spatial ability and the EFT score overlap. Poltrock and Brown (1984) go so far as to 
use the EFT as a measure of what they term "spatial visualisation" ability (one of the subfactors 
of spatial ability that they propose). Such difficulties in discriminating style and ability led Cron-
bach (1984) to conclude that "there seems to be no point in separating [HD] from the concept of 
fluid ability" and that "it is a variable to match on, not to sort cases on" (p.267). However, spatial 
ability measures have been shown to be vulnerable to strategic variation, and so it may be that 
ability measures demonstrate style differences as much as style measures contain ability factors. 
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Such difficulties advocate for careful assessment of task requirements in order to apply style or 
ability measures in an explanatory framework. 
The FID dimension has been associated with complex problem solving in a number of different 
domains. Most of these concentrate on establishing the connection between field-independence 
and scoring well on reasoning tasks. For example, the EFT correlates strongly with Raven's pro-
gressive matrices (Linn & Kyllonen, 1981), and is strongly associated with a factor that maps onto 
Fluid Intelligence (Cattell, 1963). Heller (1982) found that field-independent students were bet-
ter at solving mathematical or science-based problems than field-dependent students. Davis and 
Haueisen (1976) found that field-independent subjects are more efficient at testing hypotheses 
when learning and solving set-membership problems. The field-independent subjects were bet-
ter at reformulating hypotheses when the data set altered, field-dependent subjects maintained 
hypotheses that they used previously even if these were not appropriate in the changed con-
text. Wise (1980) found that field-independent subjects are better at categorising visual stimuli, 
especially when the stimuli were complex. 
Some studies have investigated the assocation between the FID dimension and strategy use. 
Pascual-Leone, Ammon, Goodman and Subleman (1978) relate the FID dimension to strategy 
selection. They found that field-independent subjects tended to select more appropriate strate-
gies for solving problems. Field-dependence relates to an inability to critically assess and adapt 
ineffective strategies. Phifer (1983) found that field-dependent students tended to use a single 
strategy for a text comprehension task, whereas field-independent students used several. Fur-
thermore, the field-independent students tended to fit their strategies to the style of material 
being presented. If the material was "social", they attempted an overview of the information, 
if the material was "scientific" in content then more attention was paid to terminology. When 
mathematics teaching material was highly structured, this benefitted field-dependent students, 
whereas minimal guidance was most effective for teaching field-independent students (Adams 
& McLeod, 1979). 
The FID dimension presents itself as a potential candidate for investigating issues of represen-
tation and strategy in reasoning due to several qualities. It has been shown to relate to differ-
ent types of information processing: whether information is treated as "fused" or composed of 
analysable parts. This suggests that field-dependent students would be less likely to decompose 
a stimulus in a spatial ability task, for example, and thus less likely to utilise different levels of 
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abstraction in a task, whereas field-independent students may be more inclined to use an ana-
lytic, or abstract representation, approach in their problem solving. Also, though the FID is given 
a moral gloss in several of the studies on problem solving, as with the serialist/holist style it re-
mains a measure of style rather than ability, enabling a disentangling of these issues in reasoning 
task performance. 
3.1.5 Abstraction-concreteness 
The previous dimensions considered have attempted to assess the different processes relating 
to use of representations that vary in terms of the level of abstraction that they employ. How -
ever, use of different levels of abstraction has been examined directly as an individual differences 
dimension. Bruner (1957) and Harvey, Hunt and Schroder (1961) have described human devel-
opment and learning in such terms. Their conception of intellectual and societal advancement 
is in terms of a move from concrete to abstract understanding, which reflects Kemler Nelson's 
(1984; 1988) discussion of development from holistic to analytic processes in concept formation. 
Harvey, Hunt and Schroder (1961) contend that human development and evolution can be char-
acterised in terms of a change from concreteness to abstraction in information representation. 
More concrete information taffies with a structure restricted to, or dependent upon, the physical 
attributes of the activating stimulus (p.3). They relate this distinction to an earlier formulation 
by Bruner (1957) that abstracting means "going beyond the information given" and that personal 
development is a progression towards greater abstraction. Children's development on the num-
ber conservation task is a clear example of this, where the presentation is singularly attended 
to by young children, but abstraction occurs developmentally as quantity is conceived to be in-
dependent of form (Piaget & Inhelder, 1958). Furthermore, Harvey, Hunt and Schroder view 
development not just as a move towards more abstract representations, but towards a greater 
flexibility of approach to problems that accompanies the ability to abstract from stimuli in the en-
vironment. Variation in the level of concreteness-abstractness results in differences in "stimulus-
boundedness", which is the extent to which the receiving and responding individual is restricted 
to or can go beyond the physical characteristics of the immediately impinging stimuli in organ-
ising his evaluation and experience of a situation. The greater the individual's ability to abstract, 
(1) the greater the ability to transcend immediacy and to move more into the temporally and 
spatially remote, and (2) the greater the capability for abstracting relationships from objects of 
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experience and organising them in terms of their inter-relatedness. 
Goldstein and Scheerer (1941) have noted that the ability to abstract from the environment pro-
vides the ability to verbalise accounts of experience, to shift reflectively from one aspect of the 
situation to another; to hold in mind simultaneously various aspects; to grasp the essential of a 
given whole; to break up a given whole into parts, to isolate and to synthesise them; and to ab-
stract common properties reflectively, and to form hierarchic constructs (p.4). They constructed 
tests to assess a subject's "ability to assume the abstract attitude", but these tests were designed 
for patients in a clinical setting who appeared to be pathologically confined to the "concrete", as a 
result of traumatic brain injury'. Such measures, then, are perhaps not appropriate for assessing 
performance of a normal student population. 
Gregorc (1984) distinguishes subjects' predispositions to perceive information either abstractly or 
concretely, and operate on this information either sequentially or randomly. Abstract perception 
of information is the ability to process using reason and intuition, contrasting with concrete in-
formation processing which refers to the physical characteristics of input to the physical senses. 
Sequential processing style means that the subject has a preference for organising information 
in a linear, step-by-step manner, whereas random processing creates a network of information 
where data is related in various ways. 
Stanovich (1999; Stanovich & West, in press) locates the ability to represent information abstractly 
as the greatest determiner to success in education and the modern workplace. The complexity of 
life in a technological age imposes demands such that operating on abstract information is neces-
sary for success (Gottfredson, 1997). Holistic/ analytic processes emerge as indicative of the use of 
abstract and concrete information in discussions of the properties and consequences of working 
with these different types of information. This supports the use of FID and serialist/holist mea-
sures for assessing preferences for using different levels of abstraction in representing problem 
information. 
1 1t is equally possible that patients may demonstrate pathological abstraction. For example, cases of prosopagnosia 
where individual face-recognition is impaired even though, in general, faces are still recognised as such (Sacks, 1985). 
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3.1.6 The GRE test 
The GRE test is included here as a measure of style, as it has been found to relate to variations 
in the use of external graphical and verbal representations to support reasoning. Furthermore, 
differences in the use of graphical abstraction have been observed as relating to this test. A fuller 
consideration of the relationship between the GRE test and use of different levels of abstraction 
in representation will be given later in this chapter in connection to Hyperproof. 
The GRE analytic reasoning test (hereafter, the GRE) presents itself both as a suitable task for 
studying individual differences in reasoning, as well as a potentially useful measure of stylistic 
variation in problem solving in other reasoning domains. It was originally intended as a measure 
to predict students' success at graduate school, introduced in 1977 as a response to requests by 
universities to include a measure of abstract reasoning ability in the GRE. For a comprehensive 
history and review of the analytic reasoning test's conception and development, see Cox (1996). 
The GRE test distinguishes two subscales on the test: analytic reasoning and logical reasoning. 
Examples of each of these are shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. Analytic reasoning items 
"are usually constraint satisfaction puzzles for which diagrams are often useful" (Stenning, Cox 
& Oberlander, 1995, p.6), whereas the logical reasoning problems "involve argument analysis, a 
kind of verbal reasoning problem" (ibid.). 
Analytic problems constrain the number of situations consistent with the given information. The 
problem shown in Figure 3.3, for example, is consistent with only one model: office assignment is 
determined by the information. This is a reason why many students attempt this sort of problem 
by constructing a diagram: concretising information is optimal for solving this sort of problem. 
Logical reasoning problems do not offer such constraints on the situations consistent with the 
information: they are indeterminate and must therefore be solved using a more expressive system, 
so representations will be more abstract. Students tend to solve this sort of problem by using 
verbal external representations (if they use any at all), for example underlining key words, or 
providing verbal summaries of key points of the arguments. 
The analytic reasoning subscale of the GRE (GREA) has been shown to be indicative of stylistic 
preference in reasoning, rather than being a "reasoning ability" measure. Students who score 
well (GREA-Hi) on the GREA and those that score less well (GREA-Lo) learn differently from 
logic courses depending on whether the course has a graphical component, as with Hyperproof, 
or whether the course is traditionally syntactic. GREA-Hi students learn better from a graphical 
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An office manager must assign offices to six staff members. The available offices, numbered 1-6 
consecutively, are arranged in a row, and are separated only by 6-foot-high dividers. Therefore, 
voices, sounds, and cigarette smoke readily pass from each office to those on either side. 
Miss Braun's work requires her to speak on the telephone frequently throughout the day. 
Mr White and Mr Black often talk to one another in their work, and prefer to have adjacent 
offices. 
Miss Green the senior employee, is entitled to Office 5, which has the largest window. 
Mr Parker needs silence in the office(s) adjacent to his own. 
Mr Allen, Mr Parker and Mr White all smoke. 
Miss Green is allergic to tobacco smoke and must have non-smokers in the office(s) adjacent to 
her own. 
The best location for Mr White is in Office 1, 2, 3, 4 or 6? 
The best employee to occupy the office furthest from Mr Black would be Mr Allen; Miss 
Braun; Miss Green; Mr Parker or Mr White? 
The three employees who smoke should be placed in Offices 1,2 and 3; 1, 2 and 4; 1, 2 and 6; 
2,3 and 4; or 2, 3 and 6? 
Figure 3.3: Analytic reasoning item in the GRE test. 
Excessive amounts of mercury in drinking water, associated with certain types of industrial 
pollution, have been shown to cause Hobson's Disease. Island R has an economy based entirely 
on subsistence-level agriculture; modern industry of any kind is unknown. The inhabitants of 
Island R have an unusually high incidence of Hobson's Disease. 
Which of the following can be validly inferred from the above statements? 
• I Mercury in drinking water is actually perfectly safe. 
• II Mercury in drinking water must have sources other than industrial pollution. 
• III Hobson's Disease must have causes other than mercury in drinking water. 
II only; III only; I or III but not both; II or III but not both; or II or III or both? 
Figure 3.4: Verbal reasoning item in the GRE test. 
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course, GREA-Lo students learn better from the syntactic course. This result is returned to when 
Hyperproof is described later in this chapter. In addition, GREA-Hi students construct proofs 
that incorporate a greater degree of graphical abstraction than those produced by GREA-Lo stu-
dents in the graphical logic course. In summary, then, students seem to respond differently to 
the level of abstraction used in their representations and this is captured by performance on the 
GREA test. 
The GRE test provides two-for-the-price-of-one value in that it provides a domain where the 
effectiveness of concretising information is variable, though the presentation of problems is con-
stant (they are all verbal, and all on the same test paper). Furthermore, this variability in effec-
tiveness of different levels of abstraction in representation can be captured in terms of the "deter-
minacy" of the problem. It also provides a diagnostic tool for the use students make of different 
levels of abstraction which can then be used to assess performance on other reasoning tasks. The 
next section highlights the potency of this abstraction-level identification facility by stipulating 
the requirements on appropriate reasoning tasks for considering issues of representational and 
strategic differences in problem solving. 
3.2 Reasoning task requirements 
The tasks discussed in the last chapter - linear syllogisms, the sentence-picture verification task, 
and the compass directions task - are all useful for exhibiting individual differences in reasoning 
in terms of differences in the representations used in strategies for reasoning. However, they 
are limited when it comes to providing computational descriptions of these strategic differences. 
This has the result that the effectiveness of different strategies as the task constraints change 
cannot easily be assessed. The requirements for a reasoning domain that can clarify these issues, 
and consequently address issues of style and ability for using information with different levels 
of abstraction are now listed. 
The level of abstraction in the representations employed in the strategies previously reported for 
reasoning task performance are hard to assess. A domain where representations are externalised 
would assist in analysing the level of abstraction used by the student. The traditional focus on 
"output" of the task also means that use of different strategies are not always clearly determined 
by the data. For example, Sternberg and Weil (1980) had to look at which model fit their subjects 
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best, rather than go on which strategy they were taught to use, and Roberts, Gilmore and Wood 
(1994) indicate the difficulties in using introspection to reflect strategy use. External representa-
tions coupled with greater opportunities for strategic variety would provide more detailed data 
on the processes involved in reasoning. 
Consistent with this difficulty in determining level of abstraction and expressivity is the paucity 
of opportunities for differences to be reflected. Measures in the reasoning tasks considered above 
have (with notable exceptions, such as Wood's (1969) questioning of the relationship between 
non-target individuals in the linear syllogisms task) focused on accuracy or latency measures. 
Errors or delays may be due to a whole panoply of processing differences. A task that can provide 
data from intermediate stages in the reasoning process would be instructive. 
Up to now, only coarse variations in the appropriateness of different strategies to the task have 
been incorporated in reasoning studies. For example, Roberts, Wood and Gilmore (1997) com-
pared strategy change from the one-person to the two-person compass directions task. The pos-
sibility of testing versions of the task that are intermediate in the appropriateness of the different 
strategies was not available. This is in part a result of the underspecification of the task require-
ments in terms of their computational properties, and so existing appeals to changes in memory 
load, or the amount of restructuring of the stimulus required are inadequate as these dimensions 
have not been fully determined. This reflects the primary requirement for a reasoning domain 
that emerged from the discussion of relating psychometrics to reasoning tasks: that preference 
for using different levels of abstraction be distinguished from ability to use abstract or concrete 
information to support problem solving. Developing and defining tasks where the problems 
can be altered so that different levels of abstraction may be equally appropriate for solving the 
problem would enable an assessment of preference for using different types of representation. In 
addition, changes in representation as the task requirements alter could then be assessed. 
One such domain that fits many of these requirements is categorial syllogisms. The next chap-
ter reviews individual differences in syllogistic reasoning, and indicates how it is a suitably rich 
task for exploring issues connecting strategies, representations and algorithms in reasoning. Up 
to now, the suggestion that different strategies reflect choices about the processes operating on 
representations with different levels of abstraction have been glossed over. This perspective on 
strategy variation is given an explicit treatment with regard to syllogistic reasoning. The remain-
der of this chapter discusses another suitable reasoning domain - Hyperproof. The discussion 
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will illustrate how the above requirements for suitable reasoning tasks are realised. In addition, 
the strategy distinction in terms of level of abstraction in representation will be highlighted by 
the domain, and new analyses of students' performance on Hyperproof will go some way to-
wards detailing how cognitive load varies in different ways as problem requirements change 
and strategies vary. - 
3.3 Hyperproof and strategy 
3.3.1 What is Hyperproof? 
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Figure 3.5: The Hyperproof interface. 
Hyperproof is a multimodal, computer-based logic course that aims to teach principles of ana-
lytical reasoning by combining graphical situations and sentential expressions of those situations 
in order to solve problems. Developed by Barwise and Etchemendy (1994) it was a product of 
their belief that reasoning ought to be heterogeneous, and furthermore more semantically- or 
situation-oriented. Larkin and Simon (1987) noted that inferences are often "effortless" from vi-
sual or spatial presentations of information, and Stenning and Oberlander (1995) have proposed 
that this is due to the inferences made during the construction of the diagram. Barwise and 
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Etchemendy intended to "exploit the power of visual representations in reasoning" (1990, p.18) 
by using both graphical situations and sentential propositional logic in order to solve reasoning 
problems. 
Figure 3.5 shows the Hyperproof interface. The left window is the problem presentation. It con-
sists of a graphical situation and below the graphics a list of statements about the situation in first 
order predicate logic (these will be termed "sentential expressions" in the following). The right 
column of this left window indicates that the statements shown are "given" to the student. Proofs 
are constructed in the sentential window using a Fitch-style proof system. Graphical situations 
can be incorporated into the proof by the use of operations that translate information from the 
sentential expressions to the graphical situation, or vice versa. The use of a graphical situation as 
part of the proof is indicated by a diamond icon as a step in the proof. Later in this chapter, when 
proof styles are discussed, a more detailed description of a proof will be given. 
The graphical situation is given more expressive power by enabling the use of graphical abstrac-
tion. This can be done in four ways 2 : 
. Position can be left undetermined by placing the shape to the right of the chessboard. In 
Figure 3.5 the position of two objects is initially unspecified. 
• Shape can be left undetermined by the use of a paper bag. 
• Size can be left undetermined by the use of a cylinder. The cylinder can either be labelled 
with the shape of the object, or this too can be left undetermined. In Figure 3.5, two objects 
have both size and shape unspecified. 
• Items have labels which can be left undetermined. In Figure 3.5, three of the six objects have 
no labels specified. 
Combinations of these indeterminacies can be used to increase the abstractness of the situation. 
On the right of the screen shown in Figure 3.5 are the goals of the problem. In the problem shown 
there are three separate goals that have to be solved. These goals can differ in terms of whether 
they require a graphical situation to be explored, or a sentential expression to be assessed. There 
2A fifth way is possible in HP, using a binary relationship "like/dislike" between shapes. However, this is not used in 
the problems solved by students in the studies reported here. 
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are two graphical goals and one sentential goal that have to be achieved in the problem shown. 
In order to suggest the appropriateness of different levels of abstraction for capturing features of 
the problem in Hyperproof, it is persuasive to imagine a full expression of the graphical situation 
shown in first order predicate calculus. It is equally compelling to think of representing the 
expression 3x3y(Leftof(x, y)) in the graphical situation. 
Studies of strategies and individual differences in reasoning have been conducted in HE The 
following sections report the previous findings. 
3.3.2 Learning and HP 
Learning from HP was assessed by Stenning, Cox and Oberlander (1995) in a study that examined 
the transfer of reasoning skills from following the HP course compared to skills transferred from 
a more traditional syntactic course. This experiment is described in detail as the data from the 
experiment is reanalysed later in this chapter when strategic variation in using HP is discussed. 
The aims of Stenning, Cox and Oberlander's (1995) study were twofold: to provide some empir-
ical observations of real logic teaching, and also to analyse the processes that determine transfer 
to other reasoning domains. 35 first year students from Stanford University participated in the 
study, attending a twelve week course on introductory logic. One group of students (n = 22) fol-
lowed the HP course materials (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1994). Another group (n = 13) followed 
a more traditional logic course based on Bergman, Moor and Nelson's (1990) text. This course 
used the HP interface for proof construction with the graphical window disabled. 
Students were given two pre-tests to assess transfer to other reasoning tasks. One was the GRE 
test, as described above. The other test was a "blocks world" (BW) test which was based on the 
graphics of HP, but was expressed in standard English, so that no formal training was necessary 
in order to solve the problems. A graphical situation is presented along with certain constraints 
on the situation which are expressed in natural language. The BW test is described in greater 
detail in Chapter 7. Versions of these tests were also presented after the logic courses had been 
completed. 
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Learning from HP 
Students were classified as GREA-Hi if they scored well on the GREA scale of the GRE pre-test, 
or GREA-Lo if they scored less well. For the BW test, GREA-Hi students that followed the HP 
course improved their scores on the posttest, but GREA-Lo students showed a decrease. For the 
non-graphical course, the opposite pattern occurred, with GREA-Hi students decreasing their 
score on the BW from pre- to post-test (F(1, 26) = 9.45, p<O.Ol), but GREA-Lo students increasing 
their scores. 
For the GRE logical reasoning subscale (GREy), the non-graphically taught students improved 
significantly more than students that followed the HP course (F(1, 28) = 4.93, p<zO.O5). For the an-
alytic reasoning subscale, students improved their scores no matter which course they followed, 
though there was a suggestion that the HP course increased scores more than the syntactic course. 
The conclusions of this study showed that the HP course taught something different to students 
than did the non-graphical version of Hyperproof: the HP course provided transferable skills to 
analytic reasoning problems, the syntactic course provided skills that help in verbal/logical rea-
soning problems. Furthermore, the susceptibility of students' learning from the course seemed 
to depend on their pre-test profile, i.e., whether they were GREA-Hi or GREA-Lo students. An 
analysis of the different use of HP made by GREA-Hi/GREA-Lo students provides a perspective 
on the way use of abstraction facilities varies for these groups of student. 
Learning within HP 
Observing the proofs that students produced in the exam at the end of the HP course, differences 
in the use of abstraction were apparent (Oberlander, Cox & Stenning, 1996). Figure 3.6 shows two 
alternative proofs that were constructed by students for one of the exam problems. The problem 
has four goals altogether, three of which are graphical, so about the shapes and sizes of the three 
objects that appear on the chessboard. The objects are represented with information only about 
their position. The fourth goal requires a sentential expression to be assessed. The diamond 
icons in the proofs indicate graphical situations that have been constructed by the student. A 
crucial feature of both proofs, and a necessary means for achieving the goals, is that several 
graphical situations are constructed in order to "exhaust" all the consistent extensions of the 
given graphical situation. This instantiates the "reasoning by cases" feature of HP (Barwise & 
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Figure 3.6: Proof styles in HP: exam problem 4. 
Etchemendy, 1994, pp.87ff.). An "exhaustive cases" structure can be seen in the proof in the left 
of Figure 3.6, this is indicated by a black bracket enclosing the diamond icons (each of which is 
a graphical situation). When all these possibilities have been expressed, the commonalities in all 
the situations can be expressed either graphically by the use of a "Merge" rule, or sententially by 
the use of "Inspect". In Figure 3.6, each proof shows use of both "Merge" and "Inspect" following 
the "exhaustive cases" structure. 
A distinctive feature of the two proofs illustrated is the different use made of these "exhaustive 
cases" structures. The proof on the left of Figure 3.6 is very "flat", whereas that on the right 
nests exhaustive cases structures within a larger exhaustive cases structure. The left proof makes 
use of 10 graphical situations (marked by "Assume"), whereas the proof on the right makes 
use of 8 assumed graphical situations. Furthermore, the graphical situations constructed in the 
left-hand proof are more concrete, in that for each situation the size and shape of each object is 
specified. The right-hand proof employs graphical situations that leave several features of the 
shapes unspecified. This is a concomitant property of the nesting structure, where features of the 
objects are specified gradually, with situations in more deeply nested structures defining features 
of the blocks that are previously left unspecified. These two proofs are examples of two general 
proof types: those that use graphically abstract situations and nesting, and those where situations 
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are more concrete and little or no nesting occurs. 
These structural differences have been shown to have correlates in terms of order of rule use 
where certain bigrams and trigrams of rule use are indicative of one or other of the proof styles 
(Monaghan, 1995). These differences were emphasised when use of graphical situations were 
distinguished into those that specify all the graphical information ("full-assume") and those that 
leave some graphical information abstract ("part-assume"). The relative frequency of use of these 
rules both as unigrams, bigrams and trigrams are hallmarks of the two proof styles. The amount 
of nesting in the proofs, the mean concreteness of the situations depicted, and the ratio of full-
assume to part-assume use are all strongly related (Monaghan, 1998b), so the general features of 
the proof that are distinguished in multiple ways can be reflected in a single measure. 
The proof style differences shown in Figure 3.6 are indicative of the proofs produced by GREA-Lo 
and by GREA-Hi students. The left-hand proof is by a GREA-Lo student, the right-hand proof is 
by a GREA-Hi student. GREA-Hi students seem to use more nesting in their proofs than GREA-
Lo students, though this was not found to be significant (Oberlander, Cox & Stenriing, 1996). 
GREA-Hi students use more part-assume rules: 44% compared to GREA-Lo's 36% (Monaghan, 
1995), and their graphical situations contain more graphical abstraction (t(18) = 1.91, p<0.05) than 
those used by GREA-Lo students. 
The link between the aptitude-treatment interaction in learning from the different logic courses, 
and the difference in the strategies used by GREA-Hi and GREA-Lo students led to the formula-
tion of an "abstraction ability hypothesis" (Oberlander, Cox, Monaghan, Stenning & Tobin, 1996). 
This contends that GREA-Hi students benefit from the HP course because they are better able to 
manipulate the graphical abstractions it offers. GREA-Lo students do not use graphical abstrac-
tions to the same extent, and so the level of abstraction in their proofs may not be so optimal for 
solving the given problem. This hypothesis gains support from the proof style analyses reported 
above and by the observation that GREA-Hi students operate over graphical situations when 
reasoning, whereas GREA-Lo students just output graphical situations. Hence, the GREA test is 
a reflection of different uses of levels of abstraction in representation. 
However, as yet the "appropriateness" of the level of abstraction in the representations used to 
solve the problem has not been addressed adequately. This is because no analysis of the task 
requirements of HP problems has been undertaken. In the above studies it was assumed that 
more abstraction in the task is better for solving reasoning problems found in the GREA or the 
62 
HP course, but the previous chapter indicated that developing skills for solving reasoning prob-
lems requires finding the right level of abstraction in the representation, and that this is a balance 
between the effort required to unify and store the information in the problem and the effort re-
quired to operate on more abstract information and reprocess information when necessary. The 
following section analyses two questions from the HP exam that provide a quantifiable assess-
ment of the level of abstraction used and the changing memory load requirements for different 
strategies used by students. The GREA-Hi/GREA-Lo distinction is shown to be a measure of a 
dynamic approach to problems rather than a propensity to use graphical abstraction mechanisms 
in reasoning. 
3.4 Strategy change in HP 
Students following the HP course in the study described above sat an exam that contained two 
problems with different degrees of indeterminacy in the graphical situation. Of the other three 
problems on the exam, two contained little or no graphical abstraction and the other was at the 
end of the exam and few students managed to attempt a solution. No strategic differences in 
proof style were found for the non-abstract problems, so they are omitted from the following 
analysis. 
The two graphically abstract problems differed in the degree of abstraction that the student has 
to work with in order to achieve the goals. One was the problem shown in Figure 3.6. This 
problem (call it high-abstract) requires the student to consider the size and shape for all three 
blocks in order to attain the goals. If no graphical abstraction is used, it requires 10 situations to 
be constructed in order to achieve the goals. If graphical abstraction is used in the situations then 
fewer situations are required. The second problem is shown in Figure 3.5 and though it contains 
the same degree of graphical abstraction (two blocks with size/shape unspecified, and two blocks 
with position unspecified) this problem requires fewer of these variables to be considered for 
achieving the goals. The goals in this question only require the position of the two blocks and 
label of one shape to be considered, and this can be done in three situations. It is therefore referred 
to as a "low-abstract" problem. 
For the high-abstract problem, as previously mentioned, the use of graphical abstraction reduces 
the number of situations required, as then the cases relevant to achieving the goals can be covered 
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at a higher level of "granularity". In addition, a nesting structure means that the information 
presented in the sentential expressions can be applied systematically, and this systematicity is 
externalised. For the GREA-Lo students, the application of information from the sentential state-
ments has to be internalised, and so memory load is greater. The nested structure proofs reduce 
the number of operations that have to be made during situation construction, but may require 
extra effort in structuring the proof prior to construction. Thus, the level of abstraction present 
in representations, and the level of abstraction required in order to solve the problems can be 
expressed exactly in HP, and can be tied to different processing requirements. Also, HP indicates 
the different actual use of abstraction by students in their situation construction, and this satisfies 
the several requirements on a reasoning domain to provide a quantifiable description of level of 
abstraction used in different strategies, one consequence of which is to distinguish issues of style 
and ability in strategy use. 
For the low-abstract problem, in contrast, only two labels have to be considered, so memory load 
is very low and any external structuring of the proof is not offset by a significant reduction in load. 
Thus, an appropriate level of abstraction in the representations for the high-abstract problem will 
be higher than for the low-abstract problem. If the GREA measure relates to appropriate use of 
graphical abstraction then different strategies for the two problems will be seen for the GREA-Hi 
students, and different patterns of inappropriate strategies will be seen for GREA-Lo students. 
In the following analyses, GREA score is treated as a dependent variable, and strategy choice on 
each question as factors 3 . A version of the first part of the following results was presented in 
Monaghan (1998a; 1998b). 
The two proof types depicted in Figure 3.6 can be described in terms of the serialist/holist frame-
work. A proof was classified as being "serialist" if more than half of the graphical situations 
were full-assumes, and being "holist" if half or more than half of the graphical situations were 
part-assumes. These terms are used to reflect the relationship between step-by-step situation con-
struction strategies and the serialist learning style, and between the structured approach which 
uses more abstraction and the holist learning style. The link is theoretically motivated as no tests 
of serialist/holist learning style were administered. 
The flexibility of students in strategy employment related to scores on the GREA pre-test. Stu- 
dents who were flexible in their strategy use scored higher on the pre-test, whereas those that 
31n the previous analyses of this HP data GREA groups were entered as a factor. 
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did not vary their proof strategy scored lower (F(1,20) = 6.42, p<0.05). Not varying strategy 
when that strategy becomes inappropriate reflects the "pathological" learners that Pask (1976) 
observed, and also relates to the inflexible use of strategies by the subjects in Roberts et al.'s 
(1997) study of the compass directions task. 
Strategies used 
low-abstract 	high-abstract N Mean GREA score 
serialist serialist 11 7.27 
holist holist 4 4.00 
serialist holist 5 9.60 
holist serialist 2 5.50 
Table 3.1: Strategy change and GREA score. 
A simple four-way ANOVA proved significant for GREA score by strategy (F(3, 18) = 5.63, 
p<O.Ol). A Scheffé post hoc test indicated that the effect was due to the difference in means be-
tween holist-holist and serialist-holist students (see Table 3.1). This effect must be treated with 
caution due to the small number of students in the holist-serialist group. Students that seem to 
perform best on the GREA test use a serialist strategy on the low-abstract problem and a holist 
strategy on the high-abstract problem. Thus, the GREA scale does not reflect a particular ap-
proach to using graphical abstraction, rather it reflects appropriate use of graphical abstraction: 
GREA-Hi students seem to be able to select an appropriate level of abstraction in the representa-
tions they use. Presumably this skill of selection means that the problems with varying levels of 
abstraction in the GREA test can be solved appropriately, leading to higher scores on this test. 
Students that use the serialist strategy on both problems in HP score high on the GREA, these 
students seem to be limited to using only one strategy type - where graphical situations tend to 
be concrete - but these students use it effectively in solving problems even when extra effort is 
required. It is an unexplored issue as to what would happen if the amount of information that 
had to be considered was even greater, if the number of situations far exceeded working memory 
storage capacity, for example. 
The strategy groupings can also be used to analyse change in test scores from pre- to post-test 
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on the GRE and the BW tests 4 . Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed, with score on the 
test as dependent variable, and time (pre/post) as a within-subjects factor. Strategy types on 
low-abstract and high-abstract problems were entered as between-subjects factors. 
Strategies used GREV 
low-abstract 	high-abstract N Pre-test 	Post-test 	Change 
serialist serialist 7 5.00 5.86 0.86 
holist holist 3 4.67 4.00 -0.67 
serialist holist 4 6.25 4.75 -1.75 
holist serialist 2 6.00 3.00 -3.00 
Table 3.2: Strategy change and GREV score. 
For the GREV test, there were no main effects of strategy type. Time approached significance (F(1, 
12) = 3.38, p=0.09), and an interaction between the two strategy types and time also approached 
significance (F(1, 12) = 3.96, p=0.07). Means for pre- and post-tests are shown in Table 3.2. Only 
students that use little graphical abstraction (serialist-serialist strategy) seemed to improve their 
scores on the GREV test (t(14) = 2.29, p<O.O5). 
Strategies used GREA 
low-abstract 	high-abstract N Pre-test 	Post-test 	Change 
serialist serialist 7 7.43 8.86 1.43 
holist holist 3 3.33 6.67 3.33 
serialist holist 4 9.50 9.75 0.25 
holist serialist 2 3.50 2.50 -1.00 
Table 3.3: Strategy change and GREA score. 
For the GREA test, there is a main effect of strategy on the low-abstract problem (F(1, 12) = 12.29, 
p<0.005). This is a reflection of the low GREA score of students that used an inappropriate holist 
strategy on the low-abstract problem, a tendency that is reflected in low scores on the post-test 
also. No interactions with time were significant, but increases in score were variable among the 
strategy choice groups (see Table 3.3). 
4 Pre- and post-test data was only available for 16 of the 22 students. 
Strategies used BW 
low-abstract 	high-abstract N Pre-test 	Post-test 	Change 
serialist serialist 7 5.14 5.43 0.29 
holist holist 3 3.00 2.67 -0.33 
serialist holist 4 5.25 5.50 0.25 
holist serialist 2 5.00 3.50 -1.50 
Table 3.4: Strategy change and BW score. 
For the BW test, there was a main effect of strategy choice on the low-abstract problem (F(1, 12) 
= 8.40, p<0.02), but no interactions were found with time (see Table 3.4). 
These results show that when variations in strategy in terms of the level of abstraction used 
in the representations is investigated, more subtle changes than were initially proposed can be 
perceived in the transfer of reasoning skills from HE Students that use a serialist, or concrete, 
strategy for both low- and high-abstract HP problems are the only group to find HP training 
beneficial for reasoning on both the GREA and the GREV subscale. The students that used a 
serialist/concrete strategy for the low-abstract and a holist/abstract strategy for the high-abstract 
problem were predicted to benefit most from HE This was not the case, as their score seemed 
to decrease for the GREV subscale. This means that these students learned a particular skill 
which proved detrimental to solving certain reasoning problems, problems where specifying 
information is not so helpful 5 . HP taught these students different ways of approaching problems 
with varying numbers of cases, but it did not seem to teach useful approaches to problems when 
indeterminacy is very high. 
The students that use the holist/abstract strategy on the low-abstract problem and the serial-
ist/concrete strategy on the high-abstract problem have learned a flexible approach from HP 
also, but they have not learned appropriate application of strategy to the requirements of the 
problem. These students get worse on both the GREV and the GREA subscales. Generalising 
from the behaviour of only two students is tendentious, however, so any conclusions regarding 
these students' performance are only suggestive. 
Finally, the students that use the holist/abstract strategy on both low- and high-abstract problems 
5 and may even be detrimental (see Chapter 7). 
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seem to become very good at solving one type of problem: their scores on the GREA increase 
dramatically from being the lowest, to being closer in line with the better reasoners. However, 
this improvement seems to be at the expense of their ability to solve GREV problems, where their 
score deteriorates, as it also does on the BW test. These students seem to have benefitted from 
HP's graphical abstraction facility, which they can use well on one type of problem, but which 
interferes with their ability to solve other reasoning problems where graphical abstraction is less 
appropriate. 
HP teaches different skills to different students. Students that remain impervious to the graphical 
abstraction mechanisms of HP, paradoxically, seem to benefit in a general way from the course. 
Students who learn to apply graphical abstraction appropriately also benefit on the BW and the 
GREA test, but their performance is impaired on the GREV problems where graphical abstraction 
cannot be used. Some students seem to learn to use graphical abstraction to overcome problems 
they initially had with determinate problems and so their score increases on the GREA scale, but 
the price of this is a reduction in their ability to solve GREV problems. 
The GRE test proves to be valuable as a gauge of strategy use with regard to the level of abstrac-
tion employed in graphical situations. It is also useful as a reflection of the effects of learning to 
use graphical abstraction facilities. The GRE in close comparison with HP illustrates how under-
standing of the domain assists in a deeper understanding of the measure. 
The analysis of HP performance indicates that the suggestions of the role of different levels of 
abstraction in representation observed in different strategies for various reasoning tasks is a pro-
ductive approach to classifying the use and development of strategies. Furthermore, it has been 
shown that this can be done in a quantitative way, which shows that different use of represen-
tations relates to different strategies, and that these strategies can be classified in terms of being 
serialist or holist. However, this initial stab at relating psychometric approaches to computational 
accounts of individual differences in reasoning requires further elaboration. In particular, relat-
ing HP performance to psychometrics directly would be useful, providing empirical support for 
the aligning of serialist/holist styles with GREA scores, and, in addition, deriving further data 
for what spatial ability measures are testing. In addition, a more detailed account of exactly what 
the GRE test is actually probing is necessary if a full account of style is to be provided. Also, 
further justification and exploration of the processes required by representations using different 
levels of abstraction is necessary, tying in the strategy - representation accounts with descriptions 
of the algorithms underlying the representation selection. 
One major shortcoming of the HP domain for studying reasoning is that the internal reasoning 
of the student is not directly reflected, only the external representation use is recorded. The 
importance of this becomes apparent when the inflexible, serialist strategy students are shown 
to have learned the most from the HP course. These are students that "output" graphics rather 
than work with the graphical representations, so the degree of their internal structuring is not 
apparent. Two ways of getting round this problem are to use psychometrics to show that patterns 
of response are generalisable. Another method is to stipulate the external representation to be 
used by the student and then assess the reaction of the student to the enforced strategy. This 
approach is taken when methods for teaching syllogisms are given to students. The relation 
between this teaching study and the free-choice environment of HP will indicate the extent to 
which the HP results are generalisable to other reasoning domains, and the relationship between 
internal and external representation in HP and other reasoning domains. 
Chapter 5 discusses the approach to be taken in order to extend this initial HP study, and presents 
the hypotheses to be tested. Chapter 4 discusses categorial syllogisms as a potentially useful do-
main for detailing the processes and preferences dependent upon different representation use. 
This next chapter will also discuss why categorial syllogisms are good for testing style of repre-
sentation selection in addition to measuring ability to use abstract representation. 
ME 
Chapter 4 
Representations, strategies and 
algorithms in syllogistic reasoning 
4.1 Introduction 
Categorial syllogisms offer a useful domain for studying the relationship between strategies, 
representations and algorithms in that, after (or despite) over 2000 years of study, the task is 
relatively well-understood. In addition, they are a fruitful area for individual differences in re-
sponse. For some problems almost no subjects get the problems right, for others almost every 
subject gets the correct answer (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Differences in response are also qualita-
tive, in that different strategies that seem to invoke different representations are spontaneously 
developed by students solving the problems. Stenning and Oberlander (1995) state that there is 
"a quite general weakness of psychological theories of reasoning which generally focus on the 
processes which follow representation selection" (p.32), and this weakness is a failure to analyse 
how and why particular representations are selected or recognised as applicable by the subject. 
Of particular importance is that two diverse strategies develop as a result of exposure to the task. 
In this respect it is distinct from the range of strategies discussed in Chapter 2 for other reasoning 
domains, where use of different strategies have a "privilege of occurrence". This alone suggests 
that the types of strategy used in syllogism solution are equally appropriate for the task, though 
the different strategies are better or worse depending on the exact problem. The range of strate- 
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gies demonstrated in syllogism problem solving is therefore appropriate for investigating style 
of reasoning as well as ability. 
Syllogisms are reasoning problems with two quantified statements, the first statement links prop-
erties A and B, the second links properties B and C. The subject's task is to say what, if anything, 
follows from the information given, i.e., what connection can be formed between properties A 
and C. Statements can take one of four forms: 
. All As are Bs 
. No As are Bs 
. Some As are Bs 
. Some As are not Bs 
and the properties can be in any order. In the standard task, the subject is asked to assume that 
there exists at least one A, B and C. There are 64 different premiss pairs, 27 of which render 
conclusions which can be expressed in the form of one of the four statements. 
Original presentations of the problems presented either multiple-choice answers or lists of state-
ments that the subject had to check. Johnson-Laird and Steedman (1978) presented the problems 
in a novel manner, where the subject was required to "say what follows", without any require-
ment to make a multiple choice response. This change from assessing answers to providing 
answers provided a greater variety of responses. They found that for some syllogisms, such as 
"Some As are Bs, All Bs are Cs" almost all subjects got the right answer ("Some As are Cs"). For 
other syllogisms, such as "All Bs are As, No Bs are Cs" virtually no subjects got the right answer 
("Some Cs are not As"). A variety of accounts have been proposed to account for these variations 
in response. 
Conventionally, there are three different accounts of representations during syllogistic solution. 
One proposes that internal representations are spatial (Erickson, 1974). Erickson suggests that 
subjects use Euler's Circles to represent the relations between properties in the syllogistic pre-
misses. As there are several arrangements of circles that make each premiss true, subjects con-
sider only a limited number of these arrangements. 
A second theory holds that subjects reason by virtue of mental rules, similar to steps in a de- 
ductive proof. No fully explicit account has been postulated, but Braine and Rumain (1983) and 
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Rips (1994) have argued for inference rules in a range of problem solving domains which can be 
extended to syllogisms. 
The third contrasting account states that subjects construct models of individuals having certain 
properties in accordance with the premisses (Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978; Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). 
Subjects construct a set of models of the premisses that makes explicit the minimum 
amount of information; they formulate a parsimonious conclusion based on this set; 
and to test for validity, they search for counterexamples, perhaps fleshing out the 
initial models in order to do so (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, pp.118-9). 
There are several other accounts of syllogistic reasoning which posit that subjects are influenced 
only, or primarily, by the surface features of the premisses, rather than that they attempt to rea-
son about the relations of the premisses. Sells (1936) suggested that subjects respond to syllogistic 
problems according to the "atmosphere" of the premisses. Thus, if one or more of the premisses 
are negative then the conclusion will be negative. If one or more of the premisses are particular 
then the conclusion will be particular. Wetherick (1989) has suggested an even simpler "sur-
face feature" strategy for solving syllogisms which, unlike the atmosphere hypothesis, does not 
involve combining information from both premisses. Wetherick proposes that subjects make a 
conclusion in line with the more conservative of the premisses, where the order of conservatism 
is (from most to least): no, some.. .not, some, all. 
However, all these accounts of responses to syllogisms are qualitative accounts - variation is 
along one proposed dimension. That subjects demonstrate very different strategies as they are 
solving syllogisms provides an argument against such theories of syllogistic reasoning, showing 
that a single-framework theory at best "accounts for how some people reason some of the time" 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, p.139). 
4.2 Strategies in syllogistic reasoning 
There are two principle studies of syllogistic reasoning that have recognised and explored dif -
ferent strategies for solving the problems. The first was Galotti, Baron and Sabini's (1986) inves-
tigation into use of "short-cut" rules for solving syllogisms, which follows on from discussions 
of strategy change in Chapter 2. The second is Ford's (1995) investigation of subjects that solved 
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syllogisms using either a "spatial" or a "substitution" strategy, where use of different strategies is 
best described as a bifurcation of methods as with proof style in HP, rather than a linear progres-
sion as in the studies discussed previously. These strategies bear strong resemblances to the two 
methods for solving syllogisms compared by Stenning and Yule (1997). In addition this study 
provides the strongest evidence for the vulnerability of syllogistic reasoning to strategic varia-
tion, describing strategies which seem to rely on very different forms of representation. This 
evidence suggests the suitability of syllogisms for investigating the relationship between repre-
sentation and strategy and deriving a computational account of the different processes to which 
these representations give rise. 
Galotti, Baron and Sabini (1986) asked their subjects to report on the procedures that they used 
in order to solve syllogisms. Evans, Barston and Pollard (1983) also used protocols of subjects' 
introspections, but their problems were presented with conclusions that had to be assessed, in-
ducing different processes to those in Galotti et al.'s experiment where subjects had to generate 
their own conclusion. They distinguished three groups: poor reasoners who were selected from 
a general undergraduate population and scored low on a pre-test of syllogisms; good reasoners, 
who were selected from the same population but who performed well on the pre-test syllogisms; 
and expert reasoners, who were graduate students with some training in logic. Each subject 
was given all 16 premisses of the first mood (so premisses ordered A-B, B-C). In their first study, 
good and poor reasoners were compared. Good reasoners were more accurate and faster than 
poor reasoners. Comparing discussions on how each subject solved the problems revealed that 
good reasoners were more likely to discuss the use of "short-cut" rules. For example, subject MK 
reports: 
• . .and I realized that, when there's a some and a some, nothing ever follows (Galotti et 
al., 1986, p.19). 
In the standard task, syllogisms with two particular premisses ("two somes") or with two neg-
ative premisses ("two negatives") have no valid conclusion. Galotti et al. suggest that the good 
reasoners' better performance on the problems was due to the use of these short-cut deduction 
rules. Most of the rules stated by subjects were formulations of the "two-somes" rule but some 
instances of "two-negatives" rules occurred. Dividing the syllogisms with no valid conclusion 
into those where the two-somes rule applies, those where the two-negatives rule applies, and 
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other problems did not reveal a difference between good and poor reasoners. However, in a 
second study when expert reasoners were also included, experts were significantly better than 
good and poor reasoners on the "two-somes", "two-negatives" and "other" problems, and good 
reasoners were significantly better on the "two-somes" and the "two-negatives" problems than 
poor reasoners. 
Use of the short-cut rules in syllogistic reasoning fits the observations of Roberts (in press) for the 
general nature of strategic change in a range of reasoning tasks. Expert reasoners are those that 
use short-cut rules when appropriate. But they are also better at problems where these rules do 
not apply. Their ability is selective use of rules when appropriate. As these rules operate on the 
grammatical form of the premisses they can be seen to be verbal, but this classification does not 
serve as a distinction with other methods: the approach of novices in Galotti et al.'s task is under-
specified. Besides fitting the generalisations of experts' patterns of reasoning in a number of 
domains, this study also points to the variety and importance of strategy in syllogistic reasoning. 
Distinguishing problems according to the strategies that operate upon them is instructive in the 
case of syllogisms where the two-somes and the two-negatives rules apply. Different subjects 
respond differently to these problem types. Ford's (1995) study extends the investigation on 
strategic development begun in Galotti et al.'s study, where the "verbal" strategies can be seen to 
be embedded in a more general strategic framework. 
Ford presented all 27 valid syllogisms to her subjects in individual sessions, and asked them to 
speak aloud as they solved the problems. After completing all the syllogisms, the subjects went 
over all the problems again, explaining to the experimenter the method they used to solve the 
problems. During the course of solving the problems, most subjects began to develop sponta-
neously one of two distinct strategies as they solved the problems. Ford terms these "spatial" 
and "substitution" strategies. Of the twenty subjects in the experiment, eight demonstrated "ex-
tensive use" of spatial representations but did not use, or rarely used, substitution. Eight subjects 
used substitution, and never used spatial representations. Two subjects used mixed strategies, 
and two subjects struggled with the task so could not be classified as using one or other strategy. 
The criterion for being classified as using a spatial strategy was "when the subject drew shapes in 
different spatial relationships to represent the relationships in the syllogisms" (Ford, 1995, p.18). 
The criterion for using a substitution strategy was when one of the following occurred: "a sub-
ject spoke of replacing one term with another, a term in a syllogism was crossed out and replaced 
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with another, arrows were drawn between terms in the syllogism, the syllogism was rewritten 
as an equation or as terms connected by arrows" (ibid.). Ford (1995) refers to the substitution 
strategy as "verbal" (p.19) and this will be the term used to describe this strategy from now on. 
The two strategies are now described, and the essence of the empirical results used to support the 
theoretical distinction are summarised. The strategies are presented in detail, as their relationship 
to the theoretical methods for solving syllogisms presented later in the chapter requires this depth 
of analysis. 
The verbal strategy is characterised by some form of substitution, where a term from one premiss 
is implanted in the other premiss. One subject uses an algebra metaphor to describe the proce-
dure: "we can just like plug it right in it's like doing algebra" (Ford, 1995, p.17). Ford proposes 
that this verbal manipulation of the premisses takes the form of one premiss providing the value 
for substitution (premiss relating class C to a property P) while the other premiss provides the 
term that needs to be substituted (containing specific objects 0 whose status with regard to either 
C or P is known). The principle that subjects are struggling to acquire is expressed below: 
A. If a rule exists affirming of every member of the class C the property P then 
whenever a specific object, 0, that is a member of C is encountered it can be in-
ferred that 0 has the property P 
and 
whenever a specific object, 0, that lacks property P is encountered it can be in-
ferred that 0 is not a member of C 
B. If a rule exists denying of every member of the class C the property P then 
whenever a specific object, 0, that is a member of C is encountered it can be in-
ferred that 0 does not have the property P 
and 
whenever a specific object, 0, that possesses the property P is encountered it can 
be inferred that 0 is not a member of C. 
A.(i) and B.(i) use modus ponens whereas A.(ii) and B.(ii) use modus tollens 1 . It will be seen later 
that this method closely resembles the NI) method developed by Stenning and Yule (1997). 
1 1n actual fact, this is not exactly modus tollens, as it permits A -4 -, B and B to give -'A, rather than limiting to the A 
-4 B and -B to give -A case. In the following, by referring to modus tollens I mean this more abstract version of the rule. 
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Syllogisms can either be solved using simple substitution (when the value to be substituted is 
readily available) or using sophisticated substitution, when the premiss containing the value to 
be substituted requires some manipulation. Syllogisms that utilise the same rules given above 
as well as the same type of substitution (simple or sophisticated) tend to be solved to the same 
degree of accuracy by the group using the verbal strategy. Also of great importance is the order 
of terms in the premisses. For example, the syllogism "Some Bs are As, All Bs are Cs" is harder 
for the verbal strategy subjects than "Some As are Bs, All Bs are Cs" (46.6% compared to 93.3%). 
Classifying syllogisms along these lines does not make sense for the spatial group (their strategy 
is described below) as the accuracy of their response to syllogisms that require similar substitu-
tion operations can vary radically, and the order of terms in the premisses, when it does not affect 
the number of models consistent with the premisses, does not influence accuracy in the spatial 
group (accuracy for "Some Bs are As, All Bs are Cs" is 68.7% whereas that for "Some As are Bs, 
All Bs are Cs" is 87.5%, a much smaller difference than that for the verbal subjects). 
The spatial method is characterised by subjects' development and use of graphics to indicate 
different classes and the relationship between these classes. These bear a close relationship to 
Euler's Circles (Ford, 1995, p.41). The difficulty of syllogisms to the spatial group was deter-
mined by the number of possible arrangements of circles resulting from the integrating of the 
information in the premisses. For example, syllogisms where the diagrams are fully constrained 
are the easiest (e.g., "All As are Bs, No Bs are Cs" - the A is contained in the B circle and the C 
circle lies outside the B circle), and responded to homogeneously by the spatial group (for these 
6 syllogisms, the range was 80.0% to 100% accuracy). The verbal group responded with varying 
accuracy to this set of syllogisms (60% to 100%). 
In using graphics to represent the premisses, there is a difficulty in combinatorial explosion in 
the arrangements of circles to represent the premisses, a valid criticism directed towards theories 
of Euler's Circles as internal representations during syllogism solution (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991). However, in order to use graphics effectively to support their reasoning, several subjects 
attempted to use an abstraction mechanism so that one diagram represents several models - this 
is akin to use of the cross-notation in order to represent the minimal model in the Euler's Circles 
method described below. 
The distinction between these two methods has been described by Ford in terms of representa- 
tional differences. Another way of describing the differences between these two strategies is in 
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terms of the verbal strategy being a syntactic approach and the spatial strategy being semantic. 
The verbal strategy is syntactic because it operates on the grammar of the premisses, whereas the 
spatial method is semantic because difficulty in using it is determined by the number of models 
consistent with the premisses. Stenning (1999) provides a sceptical response to this characteri-
sation, indicating that a mechanism for a semantic system is indistinct from that for a syntactic 
system for reasoning. 
An alternative description of the differences is in terms of the strategies, and this begins to ab-
stract away from the representations themselves. The representations induce different processes, 
but the focus is on the process rather than the representation. These different processes will be 
seen to be those required by the algorithm underlying representation use. Clarifying the nature 
of this relationship is one aim of this chapter, and to this end two theoretically motivated methods 
for solving syllogisms are discussed and related to Ford's strategies. This accumulates support 
for the contention that differences between Ford's strategies can be profitably considered in com-
putational as well as representational terms. A thorough description of the two methods is also 
important as they are used in Chapter 6 in the teaching syllogisms experiment, where responses 
to the two methods are compared to the psychometrics considered in Chapter 3. 
4.3 Two methods for solving syllogisms 
Debates over what form the fundamental reasoning mechanism takes have used the syllogistic 
task as its battlefield. The spatial, rule-based, and mental models accounts have all been proposed 
within this context. One major misconception in the debate has been over exactly what are the 
computational differences between seemingly conflicting accounts (see Chapter 1). Stenning and 
Oberlander (1995) developed an Euler's Circles (EC) method for reasoning with syllogisms to 
illustrate that mental models is only one implementation of an abstract algorithm: at the "logic" 
level of description, the EC method and mental models are equivalent, they differ in terms of im-
plementation. Current approaches to studying syllogisms cannot distinguish between competing 
accounts, as data consisting of input-output pairings cannot decide between one implementation 
over another. It is a moot point as to whether intervening in the process of syllogistic reason-
ing can provide any discriminating data to settle the debate (see Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, in 
press). Their study shows that subjects can construct counterexamples to given conclusions that 
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do not follow from premisses, and this counterexample search is an essential part of the mental 
models reasoning process. However, the finding that subjects can construct counterexamples is 
very different to them actually doing so during syllogism solution, the requirements are different 
in the two tasks and may induce different strategic approaches. More critically, these subproce-
dures of mental models reasoning could equally well be implemented in a number of different 
ways. A method using Euler's Circles could be adapted to involve construction of counterex-
amples. The commonality between the EC and the mental models method was further explored 
by Sterining and Yule's (1997) implementation of the same algorithm in an adapted fragment 
of propositional calculus, with a small set of natural deduction rules. Hereafter, this is referred 
to as the Natural Deduction (ND) method. As with the EC method, the ND method can also 
be formulated so that counterexamples are constructed. Stenning and Yule's aim in comparing 
these different implementations of the same algorithm was to indicate that a class of fragments of 
systems are equivalent. However, differences do arise between individuals, and these differences 
were proposed to be in terms of the larger systems the fragments are drawn from. So, the system 
from which the EC method is drawn from will induce different processes, or ways of thinking 
from the system that the ND method is drawn from. Below, the EC and the ND methods are 
shown to be slightly different algorithms, but differences that are the result of being fragments of 
the two larger systems. 
Both the EC and the ND method are implementations of the "identify critical individuals algo-
rithm" (IdA). The details of this algorithm will be discussed with respect to the detailed de-
scriptions of the EC and the ND methods below. Those with a spatial preference are referred to 
the EC method, for those with a verbal preference the ND method discussion ought to be more 
illuminating, whilst for the flexible reader either but preferably both will serve. 
This underlying algorithm provides the computational similarity between the two methods: in 
Stenning and Oberlander's (1995) terms, the logic is the same, it is only the implementation 
that differs. For every operation in one method there is a corresponding operation in one-to-
one correspondence in the other method. This means that differences in response to the two 
methods are due to differences in implementation, rather than differences in the task. As with 
other reasoning domains discussed in the last two chapters, the focus here is on strategic variation 
revealed by use of different representations. 
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4.3.1 Euler's Circles method 
In this method, Euler's circles are used to represent the information given in the premisses of the 
syllogism. Each property is represented by a circle, and each premiss is represented as shown 
in Figure 4.1. For each premiss the characteristic diagram is used which represents the maximum 
number of types of individual consistent with the premiss. Stenning and Oberlander (1995) call 
this the maximal model for the premiss. This representation avoids the combinatorial explosion of 
diagrams that would have to be processed if all Gergonne relations were used for each premiss 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Areas of the diagram that are known to be 
non-empty represent minimal models of the premisses, and are indicated by a cross in the dia-
grams. Hence, the Euler's Circles representations indicate an abstraction of one diagram across 
several models. 
Some As are Bs 	(ICI) 
All As are Bs 	 B( 
nA(3 
No As are Bs U (1J) 
Some As are not Bs ('{) 
Figure 4.1: EC representations of syllogism premisses. 
The two diagrams resulting from translating the premisses then have to be integrated to produce 
the maximal model for the three properties. The two B circles are made to correspond, then the 
A and the C circles are arranged so as to maximise the number of regions which are consistent 
with the premisses. If a minimal region is divided by the third circle, then the cross is removed. 
The remaining crosses indicate the critical regions, corresponding to a maximal type of individual 
which must exist. As the EC method hinges on identifying these critical individuals it is seen to 
be an implementation of the IdA. 
All syllogisms which have valid conclusions have integrated diagrams with maximal types. 
Forming a conclusion requires describing the critical individual. Universal conclusions follow 
if the critical individual is in an unbroken circle which represents an end term, in which case the 
unbroken circle becomes the subject term of the conclusion. If there is no such region, there is no 
valid universal conclusion. 
Figure 4.2 indicates the EC method being used to solve the syllogism "No As are Bs, Some Bs are 
Cs". Note that when the A and the C circles are arranged, they intersect, so that the cross from 
the A circle is removed. There is just one cross remaining, so this translates as a critical individual 
with properties -iABC, and the conclusion is existential as the critical region is not circular. 
No As are Bs D II5 
Some Bs are Cs 
-c inn . 
Some Cs are not As 
Figure 4.2: EC method used to solve the syllogism "No As are Bs, Some Bs are Cs". 
4.3.2 Natural Deduction method 
The syllogistic system can be expressed in monadic predicate form (see Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991, p.117). Omitting quantifiers provides a further simplification which more clearly indicates 
the propositional operations. For further details, see Yule (1995). The premisses are represented 
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premiss 	translation 
All A are B 	A — B 
Some A are B 	A&B 
NoA are B 	A —* --'B 
Some A are not B A & -'B 
Table 4.1: ND representations of syllogism premisses. 
in terms of the expressions shown in Table 4.1. 
The ND rules required to solve all syllogisms are as follows: 
modus ponens If we have A -* B, and we have A, then we can get B. 
modus tollens If we have A -4 B, and we have -'B, then we can get -'A. 
conjunction elimination If we have A & B, then we can get A, and we can get B. 
conjunction introduction If we have A, and we have B, we can get A & B. 
double negation elimination If we have ---A, we can get A. 
Applying rules according to a given procedure means that the method becomes a decision pro-
cedure for solving syllogisms. Such a procedure is given in Table 4.2 (adapted from Stenning & 
Yule, 1997). In the teaching syllogisms study, a method very similar to this was used (though 
terms like "existential", "end-term", "antecedent" were replaced with descriptions that did not 
presuppose logical training). 
The method was given to the subjects for reference as they worked on the syllogisms. Essentially, 
it involves 4 stages: 
• find the source premiss: this refers to the premiss that the initial description of the individ-
ual is made from. A decision has to be made about which premiss to begin with; 
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1. Seek a unique existential premiss: 
If there are two, then respond WC and quit. 
If there are none, then go to 2. 
If there is a unique one, make it the source premiss and go to 4 
2. Seek a unique positive universal-premiss end-term subject: 
If there are none, then go to 3. 
If there is one choose its premiss as the source premiss and go to 4. 
If there are two, conclude NyC. 
3. Seek a unique positive universal-premiss middle-term subject: 
If there are none, then conclude NyC. 
If there is one choose its premiss as the source premiss and go to 4. 
If there are two, choose an arbitrary source premiss. 
4. If the source premiss is existential, then take its two terms as the first two clauses of the 
individual description. If the source premiss is universal, assume its antecedent. Apply 
modus ponens and conjoin the consequent to the antecedent to make the first two clauses 
of the individual description. 
5. Compare middle terms: 
If a source middle term matches (with regard to negation) the antecedent middle term 
of the conditional premiss, apply modus ponens, and conjoin consequent term to in-
dividual description. Go to 6. 
If the source middle term mismatches (with regard to negation) with the conditional 
consequent middle term, apply modus tollens to the conditional premiss, and conjoin 
consequent term to individual description. Go to 6. 
ELSE conclude NVC and quit. 
6. individual description is now complete. 
7. Draw Abstract conclusion from individual description: 
Delete B conjunct from individual description. Quantify existentially for an existential 
conclusion (reordering any positive conjunct into subject position). 
If clause 2b was satisfied, then there is a universal conclusion with the source premiss 
end-term as subject. 
Table 4.2: The 'sentential' algorithm based on the process of constructing an individual description 
by conjoining terms for each predicate or its negation ("no valid conclusion" is abbreviated NVC). 
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translate premisses A -* -i B, B & C 
find source premiss B & C 
B, C 	 conjunction elimination 
B, A -* - B 
-i A 	 modus tollens 
- A, B, C 
make conclusion 	Some Cs are not As 
Figure 4.3: ND method used to solve the syllogism "No As are Bs, Some Bs are Cs." 
• find the individual: describe the individual in terms of the properties by applying either 
the rule conjunction elimination or modus ponens to the source premiss; 
• find out about the individual: use modus ponens or modus tollens on the second premiss in 
order to describe the individual in terms of the third property, if possible; 
• make a conclusion: refer to the forms of the premisses in order to judge whether the de-
scription of the individual is general or particular, i.e., deduce whether the conclusion is 
universal or existential. 
The syllogism "No As are Bs, Some Bs are Cs" is solved using the ND method in Figure 4.3, 
compare this to Figure 4.1 indicating the EC method used to solve this syllogism. 
4.3.3 Similarities and differences between the EC and ND methods 
The similarity of the two methods is based on their implementing the same underlying algorithm. 
Both methods rely on the case-identifiability of the syllogistic system, and both methods require 
the identification of critical individuals and then a quantification of the individual to form a 
conclusion. 
Similarities between the representations of the premisses are apparent. In the EC method partic-
ular premisses are represented by overlapping circles, in the ND method particular premisses are 
represented by the "&" sign. Universal premisses are represented by complete circles or the "-*" 
sign, respectively. Negation is represented differently in the two methods, this will be discussed 
below. 
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Both methods require operations of either modus ponens or modus tollens when integrating the 




B->A 	+ B&C 	 ABC 
Figure 4.4: Modus ponens in the EC and ND methods for syllogism "All Bs are As, Some Bs are 
Cs." 
.0 Q
x + AB B 
A->-B 	+ 	B&C 	 -ABC 
Figure 4.5: Modus tollens in the EC and the ND methods for syllogism "No As are Bs, Some Bs are 
Cs." 
the EC method is when the third circle in the integrated diagram encompasses the critical region. 
Modus tollens is when the third circle is positioned so that it does not overlap the critical region. 
There is a constellation of differences between the two methods, hinted at, but not explored by 
Stenning and Yule (1997). They note that the ND method focuses on the construction of the 
individual description whereas the EC method fully determines which sub-regions appear in the 
final diagram before reading off the conclusion. The ND method is focused on a single x-marked 
region, whereas the graphical method tests all the critical individuals simultaneously. Stenning 
and Yule suggest that the cognitive process of implementing the graphical method may assess 
the several critical regions in the diagram serially, and therefore the distinction may be more 
apparent than real. Indeed, both methods can be adapted so that individuals are either resolved 
simultaneously or focused on singly. 
The ND method requires that the critical individual that is the focus of reasoning is selected at the 
outset. When the critical individual is selected, operations are then made on that individual to ex- 
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press its properties in terms of both premisses. The EC method makes no such requirement on an 
initial selection of the critical individual before operating to integrate the premiss information: 
the critical individual is selected after the integrated diagram has been produced. Comparing 
modus ponens and modus tollens in the EC and ND methods indicates that for the ND method 
which rule is implemented is pre-meditated. For the EC method, whether modus ponens or modus 
tollens is used is post hoc, depending on which individual turns out to be critical. This difference 
in focus is the principle difference in the way the ICIA is implemented in the two systems. As 
this difference in focus means the order and type of operation differs, the representational differ-
ences are underwritten by algorithmic differences. This account does not conflict with the aims 
of Stenning and Yule (1997). The difference in process determining the two algorithms is not 
unrelated to the properties of the systems of which the EC and the ND systems are fragments. 
However, the ICIA is seen to be a class of algorithms, each of which is paired with a representa-
tion. The contrast will be referred to as a focused or a parallel resolution of critical individuals. 
Some resonance with the serialist/holist learning style is suggested by this distinction. 
The two methods also differ in terms of their representation of negation. Consider the translation 
of "No As are Bs" in the two methods. In the EC method two individuals are marked by crosses, 
in the ND method only one individual is available - the individual with property A. To discover 
the other individual directly available in the EC method - the individual with property B - the 
ND representation must be operated upon: contraposition 2 gives B -+ -'A. In the ND method 
negation is propositional, so that the negated properties -iA, -iB, -C are represented explicitly. In 
the EC method, negation is sentential so the negated properties are left implicit in the background 
of the diagram (everything outside the A circle is -A). The EC method can be adapted so that cir-
cles represent -A properties explicitly, and this will then be a focused resolution implementation 
of the ICIA. Thus the differences between algorithms in the ICIA class is modality-independent. 
Consider Figure 4.6 which shows the EC method with propositional negation used to solve the 
syllogism "No As are Bs, Some Bs are Cs". 
In line with the ND method solution for this syllogism (Figure 4.3) the representation of the 
premisses must be changed before the critical individual to be operated upon can be isolated 
- in this case, the individual in the B circle. This adapted EC version removes the represented 
symmetry of the "no" premiss that is found in the EC method. Recognising the symmetry of the 
2along with double negation elimination. 
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-B ,-- 	 -A 
No As are Bs 
Some Bs are Cs 	 1) 
conclusion: 	 C 
Some Cs are not As 
Figure 4.6: Adapted EC method used to solve "No As are Bs, Some Bs are Cs." 
"no" relation is a rich source of individual differences in syllogistic reasoning, and is discussed 
below. 
Bird (1964) explored extending systems of syllogistic logic by introducing propositional negation, 
so including two additional logical forms: "all not A are B", and "some not A are not B". This 
is precisely the system that is expressible if negation is explicit in the representations. Without 
any extension to the language, the ND method can be extended to include these forms: -'A —* B, 
-'A & -'B3 . In the EC method, whereas "Some not As are not Bs" can be expressed with a simple 
extension to the system', the only ways to extend the system to include a representation of "All 
not As are Bs" are either to extend the system to represent the universe, or, as above, to extend 
the system to use explicit, or propositional, negation. Hence, the ND method draws tokens from 
a more expressive language fragment. The EC method draws on a symbolic system that more 
closely respects the constraints of the syllogistic system. This constraint on the representation of 
negation is respected in the conventional first order logic expression of the syllogistic premisses 
(see Table 4.3), and perhaps this is the reason for the manner of representation that has been 
preferred. 
The sequential/parallel and explicit/implicit negation properties of the algorithms underlying 
3 There is a long tradition of considering negative terms in syllogistic premisses, the Medieval logicians considered 
them at length: Pope Leo XXI, in his Logica Grammaticus, provides an infallible guide. However, their use in psychology 
of reasoning research is, as far as I am aware, non-existent. 
'See Stenning & Yule, 1997, for discussion of syllogisms with this "U-conclusion." 
All A are B 
	
Vx(Ax -* Bx) 
No A are B 	 -Rx(Ax A Bx) 
Some A are B 
	
x(Ax A Bar) 
Some A are not B 	-iVx(Ax -+ Bx) 
Table 43: The conventional representation of syllogistic premisses in first order logic. 
the EC and ND methods are related. It is because the focus is on one individual that information 
about the individual is fully specified in the ND method (i.e., negation is propositional). Informa-
tion about individuals is not always explicit in the EC method - only after resolution of the critical 
individuals might negated properties be realised - and this means that more individuals can be 
resolved simultaneously. Schrojens et al. (submitted) considered a phenomenon closely related 
to the propositional /explicit and sentential/ implicit negation distinction when he attempted to 
distinguish between "implicit affirmation" (e.g., "A" affirms "not-B") and "implicit denial" (e.g., 
"A" denies "B") in a propositional reasoning experiment. 
The distinction in properties between the algorithms highlights a dual confusion inherent in the 
mental models literature. The first is over how negation is to be expressed in mental models. The 
second is how and when multiple models are constructed. 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991) describe the initial models that subjects build for "No" and 
"Some.. .not" premisses as representing negation implicitly: 
No As are Bs 	Some As are not Bs 
[Al 	 A 
[A] 	 A 
[B] 	 A [B] 
[B] 	 [B] 
where squared brackets indicate that the individuals having that property are exhausted. How-
ever, models may have to be "fleshed out" by making more individuals explicit, and indicating 
negation explicitly with a "propositional-like tag" (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). Fully explicit 
models of the two negative premisses look like this: 
No As are Bs 	Some As are not Bs 
[A] -B 	A 	-'B 
[A] 	B 	A 	-'B 
-'A [B] 	 A 	B 
-'A [B] 	 -'A B 
-'A -'B 
If a fully explicit model is first constructed, then problems will not require more than one model 
for solution. The unitary model will, however, have many individuals in it. This relates to a 
criticism of mental models theory by Ford (1995), where she indicates that representing "Some 





makes syllogisms with valid conclusion containing this premiss one-model problems instead 
of two-model which are required if the Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) representation is used. 
Hence, if the "right" model is selected initially and, concomitantly, negation is made explicit, the 
number of models is reduced to one. 
This means either that mental models is a sufficiently powerful framework to incorporate the 
difference between the sequential/parallel algorithms in subjects' reasoning, or that it is weak 
due to underspecification of the implementation used. Determining the initial model of the pre-
misses that subjects construct may be a useful means of identifying which algorithm the subject 
is operating. A recent study by Roberts (submitted) on relational reasoning problems lends some 
credence to this processing distinction. Subjects can be distinguished into those that construct 
only one model for relational reasoning problems (e.g., The fork is to the left of the knife. The 
spoon is above the knife. Where is the spoon with respect to the fork?) and those that construct 
more than one model. This seems to be a robust characteristic of subjects regardless of the prob-
lem's characteristics, i.e., whether it is a single-model, a multiple-model, or an indeterminate 
problem. 
A further source of evidence for the different treatment of negation as a symptom of the alter- 
native processes underlying representation selection is whether the symmetry of the no premiss 
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is observed by the subject. The way subjects interpret quantified statements may provide a po-
tential tool for diagnosing representation use. Of particular interest are the negative quantifiers 
"No", and "Some.. .not", as the previous discussion suggests interpretations of these will vary ac-
cording to whether negation is treated propositionally or sententially. Subjects that like to focus 
on one individual, and explicate the description of that individual are more likely to use propo-
sitional negation, as this enables the properties of the individual to be expressed explicitly. The 
alternative interpretation - sentential negation - will be the hallmark of subjects more likely to 
use the parallel resolution algorithm for solving syllogisms. 
Newstead (1989; 1995) devised an "immediate inference" (II) task in order to analyse the extent 
to which errors in syllogistic reasoning could be predicted from errors in interpretation of the 
premisses. He examined two issues of interpretation: illicit conversion errors (for example, er-
roneously converting "All As are Bs" to "All Bs are As") and Gricean implicature, where errors 
are made according to the Maxim of Quantity (interpreting "All As are Bs" as not implying that 
"Some As are Bs" is true, for example). The II task is a questionnaire consisting of four pages each 
with one of the four standard quantified statements (All As are Bs; Some As are Bs; No As are Bs; 
Some As are not Bs) at the top of the page. Beneath this statement, the four quantified statements 
(e.g., All As are Bs) and their converses (e.g., All Bs are As) were displayed. In one version of the 
1995 test, there are three options for subjects to mark next to each statement: "definitely true", 
"definitely false", or "possibly true, possibly false". Subjects were instructed that "Some" does 
not preclude "All" and that "Some ... not" does not preclude "No". 
Newstead found that both types of error (conversion and Gricean) were common, but they failed 
to predict errors in syllogistic reasoning. His explanation for this lack of prediction is due to the 
greater "depth of processing" in syllogistic reasoning, and as a result interpretation errors do not 
commute to this task. His conclusions are unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, his model 
of syllogistic reasoning is tied to a standard version of mental models theory (Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991) and so issues of strategic variation and style are not considered. This chapter has 
argued for the importance of such considerations when analysing reasoning. Second, the depth 
of processing account seems unsatisfactory as errors of conversion, for example, can occur in 
syllogistic reasoning and not in the II task. A student in a small-scale study made no conversion 
errors for "All As are Bs" in the II task, but then reasoned as follows for the syllogism "All As are 
Bs, All Bs are Cs": 
All As are Bs ... and All Bs are Cs, all As are Bs then all Bs are also As, so all As are 
also Cs. 
The student was then asked if it is true that all As are Bs means all Bs are As, and she responds 
"not necessarily". Then she was shown her response to the II task where she had indicated "can't 
tell" and she accepts this as true. However, when she is then presented with the syllogism "All Bs 
are As, All Bs are Cs" she again makes the conversion error (problems were presented as people 
taking courses in architecture, botany and chemistry at a party): 
If all botanist are architects and all botanists are chemists ... then all architects have 
to be chemists ... if all botanists are architects then all architects are botanists ... so 
they all have botany in common so if you spoke to a chemist and they said they were 
a botanist all botanists are architects so all chemists must be architects. 
This dialogue suggests that depth of processing is not greater in the syllogistic task, in fact it is 
perhaps the opposite that is true for this student, as she concedes that "it depends how simply 
you look at each category" as to whether conversion of "All As are Bs" is valid. Later, despair-
ingly, she acknowledges the effort of the task, uttering: "oh my God I have to use my brain!" 
This does not preclude the use of the II task in exposing processes of reasoning, but it does argue 
against depth of processing accounts that omit mention of stylistic preference. It seems to be the 
case that this student varies her interpretation of the premisses, and attempting to understand the 
conditions and strategies influencing this interpretation shift are a topic for individual difference 
research. 
A third problem with Newstead's account is that Stenning and Cox (1995) have shown that 
quantifier interpretation is a matter of stylistic variation and these styles relate to responses in 
syllogistic reasoning. Stenning and Cox used the same test as Newstead (1995), where avail-
able responses to each statement were "true", "false", or "can't tell". Subjects were told to treat 
"some" as meaning "at least one and possibly all". They noted general patterns of response to the 
statements, distinguished in terms of whether the subject responded "rashly" by stating "true" 
or "false" when "can't tell" is correct, or "hesitantly" by responding "can't tell" when "true" or 
"false" was correct. Further, these responses were also determined by whether subject-predicate 
order was the same in the given statement as in the target statement (in-place) or whether it 
was reversed (out-of-place). Responses by subjects were seen to fall neatly into this two-way 
NE 
grouping (rash/hesitant by in-place/out-of-place), enabling a classification of response that is 
independent of particular quantifiers. Several subjects seemed to react consistently according to 
the grammar of the statements more than they did to the individual quantifiers, so whether the 
statement was in-place or out-of-place took precedence over the individual quantifiers. 
Stenning, Yule and Cox (1996) related responses in the II task to syllogistic reasoning, where all 
64 syllogisms were given to subjects. They found that subjects who responded rashly on the II 
task made more "no valid conclusion" responses to syllogisms. Also, subjects who made rash in-
place errors but did not make hesitant out-of-place errors demonstrated the least figural effect: 
the order of terms (As and Cs) in their conclusion was not influenced by the order of terms in the 
premisses. Subjects who did not make rash in-place errors but made hesitant out-of-place errors 
exhibited the strongest figural effect: the effect of grammar on these subjects was greatest and was 
reflected in their II response profile. Subjects who tend not to switch subject and predicate are 
those that are highly influenced by the order of premisses in syllogisms when making a response. 
Of these hesitant/rash in-place/out-of-place responses, those involving the negative premisses 
are especially interesting for reasons discussed above. So, do subjects accept the conversion of the 
"No" premiss, i.e., given "No As are Bs" is true, is it true, false, or not possible to tell whether "No 
Bs are As"? Not accepting this "no-conversion" is an instance of a hesitant out-of-place response, 
and seems to be a good predictor of this tendency. Subjects that respond "yes" to "no-conversion" 
tend to make fewer hesitant out-of-place responses than those that respond "can't tell" (from a 
population of their 20 University of Edinburgh students, mean hesitant out-of-place scores were 
0.45 for "no-conversion" students compared to 6.78 for those that did not accept the conversion, 
t(18) = 7.69, p<0.001). This question also reflects the extent to which critical individuals are left 
implicit or are specified in the algorithm used by the subject. Rejecting no-conversion means the 
individual A-'B is accepted, but the individual B-iA is not specified. Accepting no-conversion 
means that both these individuals are specified. The latter is a hallmark of the focused approach 
where individuals are specified, the former suggests the parallel resolution algorithm. 
No-conversion suggests itself as a useful reflection of general tendencies to response in syllo-
gisms and also as a predictor of use of the different algorithms in reasoning. The connection be-
tween the theoretical methods for solving syllogisms and the empirical strategies of Ford (1995) 
are next discussed to provide some justification for the existence of the different algorithms in 
spontaneously developed approaches to problem solving. After this brief foray, the generality of 
the differences between the sequential and parallel resolution algorithms is explored, linking the 
properties of the algorithms to the strategies used in HP. 
4.4 Linking Ford's strategies to the EC/ND methods 
Rewriting Ford's verbal strategy principle in the representations used in the ND method enables 
a closer comparison between the methods. This translation is shown in Table 4.4. 
A.(i) Given B -* A and C & B, assume C and B and infer A. 
Given B -* A and C -* B, assume C, and infer B and A. 
A.(ii) Given A - B and C & -B, assume C and -'B and infer -'A. 
Given A -+ B and C -* -'B, assume C and infer -'B and -'A. 
B.(i) Given B -* -'A and C & B, assume C and B and infer -'A. 
Given B -* -'A and C - B, assume C and infer B and -'A. 
B.(ii) Given A - 	B and C & B, assume C and B and infer -'A. 
Given A -* -'B and C - B, assume C and infer B and -'A. 
Table 4.4: Ford's verbal strategy rewritten in the ND terminology. 
The substitution feature of Ford's verbal strategy relates to finding the source premiss. In Ford's 
terms, the source premiss is the premiss providing the term to be substituted. Then, the ND 
and Ford's verbal strategy are similar in applying either modus ponens or modus tollens to the 
other premiss - the substitution-in process is the same as the procedure of finding out about the 
individual. This means that direct mappings can be made between using simple or sophisticated 
substitution and the rules in the ND method for finding the source premiss, and between use of 
rules A.(i), A.(ii), B.(i), and B.(ii) in Ford's strategy and use of modus ponens or modus tollens in the 
ND method. In short, Ford's verbal strategy is a focused critical individual implementation of 
the ICIA. 
There are two differences between Ford's verbal strategy and the ND method. The first is that the 
verbal strategy does not provide a procedure for reaching the conclusion, rather it provides the 
principles that Ford perceived to be those subjects were striving to adhere to. The ND method, in 
contrast, does provide a decision procedure for gaining the solution. The second difference is that 
the verbal strategy is affected to a large extent by premiss order during the substitution choosing 
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phase (selecting the source premiss), whereas the ND method abstracts from term order in the 
premisses. So, for Ford's verbal method, principle A(i) will be more difficult to apply when the 
syllogism is "All Bs are As, Some Bs are Cs" than if it is "All Bs are As, Some Cs are Bs" as then 
the second premiss must be re-ordered before the inference or substitution can be made, and this 
is supported by the data from Ford's experiment. This does not mean that such ordering effects 
do not emerge in applying the ND method, indeed it is anticipated that there will be such effects 
during teaching: the influence of ordering seems to be a hallmark of verbal strategies in general. 
The algorithm underlying the NI) method together with requiring an explicit description of each 
individual at a time has this sequential property. In Stenning and Yule's (1997) framework, these 
would be precisely the properties of the larger system of which the ND method is a fragment that 
the method would inherit. 
The spatial strategy and the EC method bear close resemblance, particularly as some of Ford's 
subjects attempt to devise the cross-notation for their set diagrams. Ford's spatial strategy re-
quires operations on several individuals at once, represented in the relationships between circles 
by the subjects. Hence, like the BC method, it is an implementation of the ICIA where all individ-
uals are resolved simultaneously. Ford's spatial strategy and the EC method are also alike in that 
neither predict large effects of term order in the premisses, or of surface features of information 
presentation. 
4.5 Strategies for making reasoning tractable 
Ford's strategies indicate that the differences between the algorithms implemented by the EC 
and ND methods are realised spontaneously without training in any method. The differences be-
tween the algorithms can be described in terms of whether individuals are resolved sequentially 
or in parallel. Parallel resolution obviates the need for full specification of individuals, sequential 
resolution requires fuller specifications of each individual which in turn requires propositional 
negation. The holist/serialist distinction in tandem with this characterisation in terms of speci-
fying properties of individuals suggests a connection with the strategies observed in HP in the 
previous chapter. There, exhaustive cases are constructed either by specifying each case (serialist 
proof) or by constructing nested cases that contain more abstraction (holist proof). The extent to 
which information is specified in the representation discriminates HP strategies as well as syllo- 
93 
gism algorithms. This distinction was developed to describe the alternative methods of solving 
problems in the reasoning tasks discussed in Chapter 2, but HP and syllogisms are domains 
where each approach proves to be equally effective. Therefore, styles rather than abilities for 
representing abstract information are being exhibited. 
Where do these preferences come from? One potential exploration of origins comes from simi-
larities between the strategy - representation - algorithm account above and Levesque's analysis 
of different strategies for making reasoning tractable. Humans are faced with a rather difficult 
computational task - to reason in real time with very large databases of information. Logic, ac-
cording to Levesque, even if it was good psychology, is too demanding computationally. So, what 
is needed is some description of how humans solve tasks where the space of possible inferences 
and cases to be considered is immense. One way to approach an answer to this question is to 
look at the conditions on knowledge-based systems such that they can compute in real-time. 
Of the five alternatives for making reasoning tractable discussed by Levesque (1988), two stand 
out as reflecting the approaches exemplified in the EC and ND methods. The first strategy for 
making reasoning tractable is to make information vivid. The other method is to limit the number 
of cases that are considered. These correspond to making each case fully specified, or by consid-
ering fewer cases that are not fully specified but that cover the space of possibilities. Levesque 
phrases the distinction thus: 
What does this have to do with tractability? The point is this: The more that is left 
unsaid, the more possibilities are allowed by what is said. To determine what is en-
tailed by what is said, all of these possibilities have to be covered one way or another. 
Proof methods may differ on how they do this, but none of them (have been shown 
to) do substantially better in the limit than a case analysis of all these possibilities. 
The problem is that cases do not simply add up, they multiply: with n independent 
binary choices, there are 2 1 cases to consider, too large for all but very small n. 
This suggests one way to keep reasoning tractable: arrange the task so that the num-
ber of cases that have to be (conceptually) considered is kept manageable (Levesque, 
1988, pp.370-1). 
Representing information vividly means that each piece of information is expressed as a "ground, 
function-free atomic sentence" (Levesque, 1988, p.371). To illustrate the approach, Levesque dis-
cusses the representation of negation. A vivid representation of negation "p is not A" means that 
p has the property of being non-A. If "Jane is not married to Jim" is represented vividly, then Jane 
and Jim have the property of being not-married. Coupling this with the information "Jane is mar- 
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ned to John or Jim" will not render the conclusion "Jane is married to John" in a vivid database, 
because the contradiction between being married and being not-married is lost. Levesque found 
that reasoning with vivid representations of negation corresponds precisely to the inferences that 
are licensed by relevance logic: a logic of implicit belief (Levesque, 1984). A database represented 
this way has the property that entailment becomes a table lookup process, making very large 
knowledge bases tractable. The algorithm implemented by the ND representations uses vivid 
information, whereas that implemented by the EC method does not. 
An alternative method of making reasoning tractable, discussed by Levesque, is to limit the num-
ber of cases from the database for consideration. The algorithm implemented by the EC method 
only makes available three cases - A, B and C - whereas the ND method has up to six cases per-
missible, having in addition the three negated properties -' A, B, and -' C. Keeping the number 
of cases to a manageable number requires that the cases are not so specific so that they cover the 
space of possibilities. This is especially the case in the HP strategies: a higher level of abstraction 
means fewer cases have to be constructed, but the cost of this is that "more is left unsaid" and so 
consequently "more possibilities are allowed by what is said." For the holist proof in HP, use of 
a "Merge" step after an exhaustive cases structure has to select between several situations con-
sistent with the set of abstract situations, whereas for the serialist proof the "Merge" step is far 
more constrained. 
The claim is that humans use one or other of these strategies to make their reasoning tractable, 
and these are implemented as algorithms that either specify several cases but do so sequentially, 
or express cases with more abstraction in parallel. The general approach to making reasoning 
tractable is manifested in particular tasks, even if the database is not unmanageably large in 
these constrained domains. 
The preferences for the sequential/ specific or the parallel/ abstract approach to making reasoning 
tractable are hypothesised to be reflected by the psychometric measures discussed in the previous 
chapter. The precise hypotheses connecting the serialist/holist dimension, the FID dimension, 
the GREA test, and response to "no-conversion" with respect to experiments testing learning and 
use of the different algorithms, representations or strategies are considered in the next chapter. 
The next section reviews previous studies of teaching methods for solving syllogisms. This is 
included as background for the teaching syllogisms study to be presented in Chapter 6. 
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4.6 Previous studies of teaching syllogisms 
There have been several studies that have taught subjects to solve syllogisms. Some have offered 
graphical representations to support reasoning, others have used some system of verbal rules. 
Not one of these studies has probed in detail the responses of subjects to the problems, and have 
instead looked at overall acquisition of the method. Also, no studies have directly compared 
teaching with graphics and with sentential representations in an aptitude-treatment interaction 
study. The relationship between subject and strategy remains underspecified from these studies. 
The teaching study detailed in the next chapter aims to expand on these studies. The remainder 
of this chapter serves as a review of the extant teaching syllogism literature. 
Frandsen and Holder (1969) pre-tested subjects on a Verbal Reasoning and a Space Relations test 
taken from the Differential Aptitude Test. 18 pairs of subjects were then matched for being iden-
tical in Verbal Reasoning score, but as disparate as possible in Space Relations score. Subjects 
were then placed into either an instructed group or a control group. All subjects were given a 
test made up of verbal problems, including syllogisms, then one group of subjects were given 
instruction for approximately 50 minutes in graphical methods for solving these problems. For 
syllogisms, subjects were instructed in Venn diagrams. Then in a post-test another set of verbal 
problems were presented of the same type as in the pre-test. They found that for subjects who 
scored low on the Space Relations test, those that were instructed improved significantly more 
than those who did not receive instruction (t = 2.04, p<0.05). Also, these instructed low Space Re-
lations subjects improved their score significantly more than did instructed subjects who scored 
high on the Space Relations test (t = 3.06, p<O.Ol), however the high scoring subjects tended to 
gain close to maximum score on the pre-test, so this group is subject to ceiling effects in the test. 
Frandsen and Holder's study shows that training in graphical methods helps some subjects to 
solve verbal problems, including syllogisms. However, the type of syllogism used is unspecified, 
and whether syllogism solution in particular benefitted from instruction is unclear, as each type 
of verbal problem is not distinguished in the results. Syllogisms made up only four of the fifteen 
verbal problems in each of the pre- and post-tests. This study certainly leaves room for more 
specific studies of teaching and aptitude in syllogistic problem solving. 
A further study that connected syllogistic teaching to aptitudes of subjects was conducted by de 
Leeuw (1980). Two graphical methods for solving syllogisms were taught, one based on Venn 
diagrams provided a decision procedure for solving the problems, the other, based on Euler's 
circles, encouraged generation of counterexample diagrams, but did not provide a step-by-step 
method, but instead "a process of divergent thinking is required" (p.29). 30 tenth grade school 
subjects participated. Problems were presented with conclusions, and the task was to assess 
whether the conclusion was valid or invalid given the premisses. 
The Venn diagram method (described as "algorithmic") represented the syllogism with three 
overlapping circles, with areas shaded to indicate parts of the diagram that are empty regions, 
and a cross to indicate non-empty areas. In the instructional program, the subject was taught to 
operate five subalgorithms: 
• Draw the base diagram and label the circles; 
• represent the first premiss in the diagram (this has to be a universal premiss, if there is one); 
• represent the second premiss; 
• decide whether a + could be placed in the diagram (this has to be placed at the border of 
the two regions unless one of the regions is crossed out) 5 ; 
• decide whether the conclusion is valid. 
The Euler's circles method (the "heuristic" method) instructed subjects in drawing all the possi-
ble relationships for the two premisses (for the selected syllogisms there was a maximum of five 
diagrams and a minimum of one diagram possible). Then subjects were taught to look for a dia-
gram that contradicted the given conclusion. If this was possible, then the conclusion is invalid, 
if search failed, then the conclusion is valid. 
Subjects were pre-tested on a syllogism task composed of problems to be used in the instructional 
programs; the embedded figures test (Witkin et al., 1971); an embedded syllogism test, where syl-
logistic problems were phrased in paragraph form; and syllogisms with three premisses (sorites). 
Delayed post tests (2 to 4 days after the end of the instruction) were also presented. These in-
volved the instructional syllogisms, the embedded syllogisms, and the sorites. These post-tests 
were also given to subjects two months after instruction as tests of retention. 
5Note that this placing of crosses at the border between regions was attempted by several subjects in Ford's (1995) 
study. 
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De Leeuw found that training was fairly successful, with Venn-trained subjects getting 69.3% of 
the instructional problems correct in the post-test, and Euler-trained subjects getting 66.7% cor-
rect. Two thirds of errors for the algorithmic method were caused by incorrect assessment of 
correctly drawn Vain diagrams. Using the algorithmic method increased performance from pre-
test to post-test for universal conclusion problems (+0.5), and slightly decreased performance 
on particular conclusion problems (-0.1). Venn-trained subjects performed better on universal 
conclusion problems than Euler-trained subjects (0.9 compared to 0.5), but did worse on the par-
ticular conclusion problems (0.6 compared to 0.8): F(1, 28) = 12.83, p = 0.001. For the delayed 
instructional syllogism post-test, the Euler method produced better performance (F(1, 28) = 8.01, 
p=0.009). For the sorites in the post-test, the Euler group performed better than the Venn group 
(F(1, 28) = 4.48, p=0.043). The EFT related to performance on the post-test embedded syllogism 
task (F(2,27) = 8.51, p=0.007). Transfer was greater for those subjects that scored high on the EFT. 
Euler-trained subjects tended to use diagrams at a consistent level on the post-test and delayed 
post test problems (31% and 29%, compared to Venn subjects' 35% and 2%, respectively). 
De Leeuw's (1980) study shows that two graphical methods are distinct in terms of the strategies 
that they promote, and that these strategic differences provoke differences in subjects' learning. 
Problem type is sensitive to these strategic differences, as shown by the different performance of 
subjects on particular conclusion problems and universal conclusion problems. The relationship 
between the EFT and performance indicates that psychometric tests have a predictive role in 
complex task performance. It is perhaps not surprising that the high-scoring EFT subjects' ability 
is seen only on embedded syllogisms, but it does suggest that the EFT relates to an ability to 
abstract and apply the taught method as presented in either instructional program. Witkin et 
al. (1977) found that the field-dependence/independence distinction predicted differences in 
learning only if the subject matter is unstructured, so it is perhaps surprising that from two well-
structured teaching methods a difference was found at all. 
Grossen and Carnine (1990) taught learning disabled schoolchildren a method for solving syl-
logisms that was based on Euler's Circles. Their method required the subject to reason with 
Euler's Circle diagrams in their standard form. Thus, the cross-marking facility of Stenning and 
Oberlander's (1995) method was not used and so several arrangements of the circles had to be 
used by the subject. These diagrams were used in conjunction with rules for which diagrams to 
select in order to reach a conclusion, and in what order. The premiss form "Some As are not Bs" 
was not used, and syllogisms with conclusions of this form also did not appear. There were two 
treatments: one where subjects had to construct diagrams in collaboration with the computer-
based instruction, and one where subjects were not required to construct diagrams themselves. 
They found that the diagram-construction subjects took the same time to get through the mate-
rial, but required fewer questions by the instructor (t(24) = 2.17, p=0.035). Subjects were divided 
into those that were proficient on using the Euler's Circles and those that weren't. The profi-
cient group scored significantly higher on a transfer task that required the subject to solve sorites 
(Wilk's lambda = 0.38, p=0.008). 
Grossen and Carnine's (1990) study shows that subjects learn a graphical method for solving syl-
logisms to differing degrees of success. Their analysis also supports use of measures of instructor 
intervention in order to assess acquisition of the method. Their study does not, however, ad-
dress issues of learning style, and nor is there any comparison with how subjects may learn from 
sententially-based materials (indeed, their Euler's Circles method seems to compound graphical 
and sentential operations). 
Giihooly, Logie & Wynn (in press) in a study of the role of working memory in reasoning, at-
tempted to teach their subjects a method for assisting with solving syllogisms. This was due to 
the predominance of strategies that operated on the surface features of the syllogistic problems 
(atmosphere, matching, or guessing). Such strategies are not affected to any great degree by 
dual-tasks, whereas subjects who used a "logic" strategy (i.e., those that solved more syllogisms 
correctly than the other methods predicted) deteriorated in performance or changed their strat-
egy as a result of loading on working memory. As the teaching method was not the principle 
reason for the study, it is only discussed briefly by the authors: 
The general method of solution ... was to try to convert problems into the form S-M, 
M-P (i.e., Figure 1) and then to reason in terms of set membership. To achieve the 
desired Figure, premises may need to be re-ordered by conversion, e.g., from "All P 
are M" to "Some M are P" (Gi]hooly et al., in press, p.21). 
The method invokes aspects of the identify critical individuals algorithm - converting the pre-
misses to Figure 1 is akin to the process of selecting the source premiss in the ND method for 
many problems. Reasoning about set membership leaves open the possibility of spatial or verbal 
operations, so it is possible that subjects in their study either used a sequential/specific or a par-
allel/abstract approach to the problems. Subjects were trained by solving 20 syllogisms which, 
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if they got one wrong, had the solution for that problem explained to them verbally. The trained 
subjects scored higher on another set of 20 syllogisms than a control group: 11.39 compared to 
3.83 for the untrained group (t(32) = 54.80, p<0.00001). 
Bauer and Johnson-Laird (1993) instructed subjects in using diagrams in order to solve disjunc-
tion problems of the form: 
Raphael is in Tacoma or Julia is in Atlanta or both. 
Julia is in Seattle or Paul is in Philadelphia or both. 
What follows? 
This study is included here as it raises issues concerning the use of graphics to assist with reason-
ing, and the importance of finding a "good" representation. Also, disjunctive reasoning has been 
closely compared to syllogistic reasoning by mental models theorists (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991) who argue that this form of reasoning relies on the same processes as syllogistic problem 
solving. 
Bauer and Johnson-Laird's study compared subjects' conclusions when premisses were repre-
sented graphically to when they were presented just verbally. The diagrams used boxes linked 
by lines either with a circle to indicate inclusive disjunction or a square to indicate exclusive dis-
junction. No difference was found between graphical and verbal presentations. They concluded 
that this was because "the diagrams failed to make sufficiently explicit the alternative states of 
affairs" (p.373). In addition, the inclusive /exclusive disjunction distinction was depicted in an 
arbitrary fashion. Their second experiment remedied this by representing disjunctions using dia-
grams reminiscent of electronic circuit diagrams. For diagram representations, subjects drew 74% 
correct conclusions, compared to 46% correct for the verbal problems. Subjects also responded 
faster to the diagrams (F(1, 44) = 8.59, p<zO.Ol). The authors conclude that the diagrams help 
subjects by making all the possibilities explicit. But this does not determine whether the sub-
jects' initial difficulties were because all the individuals to be specified were not exhausted with 
a sequential/specific approach, or because the individuals were not explicit enough (and so a 
problem with the parallel/ abstract approach). A graphical representation may assist in either 
approach, and so the data from task performance has to be more detailed in order to settle this 
issue. 
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4.7 Summary of chapter 
The literature reviews in this chapter indicate the fruitfulness of syllogisms for examining issues 
of strategy, representation, algorithms and connections between accounts using these terms. Syl-
logisms are a domain where psychometric and computational accounts are complementary. The 
reviews also consolidate an approach that deals with stages in representation use. Lastly, a re-
view of teaching syllogism studies indicates the paucity of such studies, particularly absent are 
controlled comparisons of teaching using different representations and assessment of individual 
difference variations. 
The theoretical work shows that the EC and ND methods developed by Stenning and Oberlander 
(1995) and Stenning and Yule (1997) can be distinguished in terms of the implementation of the 
ICIA: whether they are a sequential/specific or parallel/abstract approach. These differences are 
symptomatic of the larger representational systems that the fragments used in the methods are 
drawn from. This is a theme further explored in Chapter 8 when theories of thinking and theories 
of reasoning are discussed. 
Furthermore, distinguishing methods in terms of strategy, representation and algorithms high-
lights and resolves confusions over formulations of the mental models theory and captures the 
differences between several theories of internal representation in reasoning. Such a framework 
allows the generation of testable hypotheses that enable an empirical distinction of syllogistic 
reasoning in terms of preferences for certain representations. These hypotheses for the teaching 
studies are presented in detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Aims of the empirical studies 
5.1 General aims of the empirical studies 
The studies on strategy use in reasoning suggest that there are differences in the use of abstraction 
in representation, and that this is one way of classifying the different strategies used. Ability 
to develop a more appropriate level of abstraction is related to scoring high on spatial ability 
measures. The HP studies show that use of abstract or concrete representations is a matter of 
style as well as ability: some subjects stick to using abstract representations, even when this is 
not optimal for the task. One main purpose of the studies to be conducted is to distinguish styles 
from abilities for subjects' selection and use of different representations. This will be done by 
relating psychometrics to performance on syllogisms and on HP. The syllogism study reported in 
Chapter 6 compares students' learning to solve syllogisms using either the EC or the ND method. 
Students are grouped according to their scores on the psychometrics discussed in Chapter 3. The 
HP experiment, reported in Chapter 7, relates students' learning from and learning within HP to 
their performance on psychometric measures. 
The psychometrics will be interpreted from the perspective of propensities and preferences for 
using different levels of abstraction, and their relation to well-defined tasks will have the sub-
sidiary aim of illuminating what it is they are testing. Psychometrics are used to discriminate 
performance, but are also a topic of investigation themselves. 
The spontaneous use of different strategies in categorial syllogisms suggests that this is a good 
102 
domain for studying issues of style. The two methods for solving syllogisms indicate that both 
are equally appropriate for solving the problems, but vary over the treatment of individuals in 
constructing descriptions of them. HP reveals this property of different levels of abstraction 
in representation in common with the methods for solving syllogisms: abstract representation 
strategies limit the number of cases considered, concrete representation strategies limit the oper-
ations that can be performed on the set of cases once constructed. 
These links require some support from empirical studies. Relating performance on different 
methods for solving syllogisms with performance on HP via psychometrics will enable these 
connections to be tested. Hence, generalising the aptitude-treatment interaction observed in HP 
to other reasoning domains is an important aim of the studies. 
Finally, unpacking the nature of the transfer of skills from the HP course will be undertaken. 
This requires a reappraisal of the GRE test, and this necessitates the development of a gener-
alised taxonomy of problem types. Relating psychometrics to the transfer of skills particularly 
associated with different problem types will contribute to the debate on what is learned through 
following logic courses. In addition such a connection will provide finer-grained analyses of the 
effects of teaching with different types of representation, representations that vary in terms of the 
level of abstraction they employ and the different styles of computational process induced by the 
representations. 
This is a summary of the four most general aims of the empirical studies. The next sections of 
this chapter present hypotheses particular to the syllogism study and the HP study, cashing out 
specific predictions relating the reasoning domains to the psychometric tests. 
5.2 Styles and strategies in syllogisms 
The discussion of different implementations of the same task, with the same underlying algo-
rithm enables a more precise comparison of teaching methods than has been available to other 
investigations of learning problem solving skills. The close analysis of differences in the two 
methods suggests ways in which the graphical and sentential representations may relate to dif-
ferent strategic performance, and these differences are founded on alternative styles of computa-
tional processing. 
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The similarity of the two methods enables an empirical comparison of the two methods in terms 
of controlled differences which result from differences in implementation of the logic of the task. 
In particular: 
. The ND method processes each individual sequentially, providing specific descriptions of 
each individual in terms of properties A, B, and C. The EC method resolves all individuals 
in parallel and only then provides a full description of the critical individual. 
Relatedly, negation is represented differently in the two methods, either propositionally or 
sententially and this is a concomitant property of the two styles of processing. 
For purposes of analysing responses to the two taught methods, three stages are easily distin-
guished and isolable in learning to use the BC and ND methods: 
• translating in: translating from the premisses into the represented form; 
• manipulating the represented forms in order to isolate the critical individuals; 
• translating out of the final representation in order to form a conclusion. 
The correspondence of these stages in the two methods mean that different key stages in the 
use of external representations can be assessed. The differences between the methods discussed 
above feature differences in manipulating the representations. However, similarities or differ-
ences in responses to the other stages in the method illuminate particular features of external 
representation use and help to specify the nature of strategic differences in using different types 
of representations in order to support reasoning. 
Different responses to the translation in stage will reflect the extent to which the representations 
promote different styles of processing: the EC translations are conducive to a parallel/abstract 
implementation of the ICJA, ND representations have more affinity with a sequential/ specific 
implementation. 
Differences in response to the manipulating stages hinge on the strategic differences discussed at 
length above. This stage directly reflects the students' propensity for either sequential or parallel 
resolution implementations. 
Finally, differences in response to the methods in the translation out stage again reflect the stu- 
dents' reaction to representations that reflect sequential or parallel processing. Such differences 
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will also reflect the extent to which students maintain a trace of the form of the premisses during 
reasoning: the ND method requires reference to the initial form of the premisses in order to judge 
whether the conclusion is particular or universal. The EC method requires no such anaphoric ref-
erence. 
Justification for examining different stages in syllogistic reasoning can be drawn from the litera-
ture. Fisher's (1981) approach distinguishes performance on syllogisms in terms of (i) interpret-
ing or encoding the premisses (translating into some sort of mental models representation); (ii) 
processing models of these interpretations (working memory limitations); and (iii) what Fisher 
terms "the operation of the deductive strategy" (p.496). The first stage has been the focus of New-
stead's (1989; 1995) examination of Gricean errors in interpreting the premisses. Fisher examined 
the information processing stage by providing students with syllogisms to which they had to 
mark a series of conclusions as true, false or possibly true (this is the manner of presentation 
of syllogisms prior to Johnson-Laird and Steedman's (1978) study). Difficult problems are those 
where many individuals are compatible with the combination of premisses. However, certain 
types of error were not compatible with processing resource difficulties (they cite as an example 
subjects' responses to the syllogism "No Bs are As, No Cs are Bs" saying "No As are Cs" is neces-
sarily false). Fisher attributes this sort of error to the final stage: errors in applying the deductive 
strategy, which is considered to be the process of construction and assessment of mental models 
(Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978). This is because the construction of models to show that "No 
As are Cs" does not exceed the resources of the student: two models are sufficient, and used 
by these students for some of the other problems. It is worth mentioning, however, that such 
responses could equally be explained in terms of matching effects (Wetherick, 1989). 
In the framework adopted in the current study, Fisher's interpretation stage matches the trans-
lation in stage, and the other two stages map onto the manipulating stage of reasoning, though 
perhaps errors in using a deductive strategy also incorporates errors in translating out of the 
representation. 
Polk and Newell (1988; 1995) have modelled syllogistic reasoning using SOAR (Newell, 1990). 
Their model uses repeated encodings of verbal information, and can be interpreted as a staged 
investigation of problem solving. Their model, termed VR for "verbal reasoning", initially en-
codes a model of the first premiss, and then adds the information from the second premiss to 
this model, encoding only the "direct" knowledge from the premisses (i.e., the model respects 
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the order of terms from the premiss). Following this translation stage, the algorithm generates 
conclusions based on the ordering of properties in the model. If no conclusion that is legal is 
generated (i.e., no conclusion that links the end-terms), then re-encoding of the premisses about 
one property occurs, and a new model is built. The property chosen is the most recently selected 
property from the premiss encoding. Different versions of VR have been built, which vary in 
terms of what types of re-encoding they permit. VR1 only encodes direct knowledge, no re-
encoding is permitted. VR2 allows the premisses "Some X are Y" to be re-encoded as "Some Y 
are X", and "No X are Y" as "No Y are V. A third version, allows re-encodings of other pre-
miss forms, including invalid transformations, such as "All X are Y" becoming "All Y are X" and 
"Some X are not Y" becoming "Some Y are not X". So, in terms of a staged investigation, the 
VR models all have some distinction between translation in, manipulation and translation out, 
though the process is not unidirectional. 
The different models (VR1 and VR2 - I exempt VR3 due to its invalid re-encodings) fit the frame-
work of theories resulting from the distinction between the properties of the implementation 
employed in the EC method and that in the ND method, i.e., when and how the critical indi-
viduals are selected. VR1 and VR2 both require some identification of the critical individual to 
begin with, but then VR1 will reach an impasse if the grammar of the problem does not provide 
a conclusion (this is akin to simple substitution in Ford's verbal method). VR2, on not reaching 
a conclusion, will re-encode the premisses. If a conclusion is then reached then this is akin to 
sophisticated substitution. It may be the case that certain re-encodings actually produce mod-
els where more than one critical individual is represented, but for a majority of syllogisms, the 
process is close to the sequential/specific class of implementations (note further that negation is 
propositional in the VR models). 
All the studies previously discussed have been directed towards discovering the stages of inter-
nal problem solving with syllogisms. The studies to be discussed will examine stages in the use 
of external representations, which means that these stages are much more apparent to the exper-
imenter. The relationship between internal and external representation will be addressed later, 
when the results of the syllogistic and Hyperproof experiments are considered in tandem. 
These benefits of the syllogistic domain for studying individual differences in reasoning (con-
trolled implementational differences, stages in representation use, and externalised representa-
tions) mean that more detailed features of what the psychometrics are testing can be revealed. 
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The GREA subscale has been seen to relate to different use of representations in HP. The syl-
logism replication of the aptitude-treatment interaction hinges on the use of this test in both 
domains. GREA-Hi students should find the EC method easier, GREA-Lo students should utilise 
the ND method with greater ease. Using few, abstract cases is consonant with parallel implemen-
tations and so GREA-Hi students, as they produce such proofs in HP, ought to prefer a method 
that implements the parallel/ abstract approach to syllogism solution. GREA-Lo students should 
demonstrate the reverse tendency, as their preference is for generating specific cases. If this re-
lation holds, then it suggests that stylistic influences are at least as important as ability in using 
abstract representations. There is, however, still the question of whether GREA subscale relates 
to flexible use of different levels of abstraction. As the syllogism study does not require students 
to learn various representations, this question will not be addressed, though the HP study will 
consider this issue directly. 
The relationship between scores on the GREV subscale and reasoning domains are little explored. 
GRE V-Hi students benefit from a logic course where the form of representation is uniformly ab-
stract (Stenning, Cox & Oberlander, 1995). However, GREV-Lo students do not seem to respond 
well to any teaching method, so unlike the GREA subscale it does not seem to be a style mea-
sure. The GREV test is included in the syllogism study in order to fully replicate the HP study in 
another reasoning domain, and also in order to attempt to illuminate what the test is assessing. 
Again, the HP study, with a generalised taxonomy of problem types, will assist in clarifying the 
measure. 
The serialist/holist learning style has been predicted to be a reflection of sequential or parallel 
implementation preference: serialist students should find the ND method easier, and holist stu-
dents should find the EC method easier. Such a finding would support the relationship between 
representational differences and computational styles. There is a slight tension between accounts 
in terms of the analytic /holistic and serialist/holist styles with regard to the two "computation-
al" styles that distinguish the different algorithm types for solving syllogisms. Both the analytic 
and serialist approaches are sequential, but the analytic approach tends to use more abstract rep-
resentations for solving spatial ability tasks, whereas a serialist strategy will produce concrete sit-
uations or hypotheses. So the analytic method presents as a sequential/abstract method, whereas 
the serialist method is sequential/specific. This is perhaps a difficulty with being able to charac-
terise the nature of the representations used during spatial ability task solution, though. Exactly 
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how concrete is the holist's representation during a cube-rotation task, for example? Again, this 
points toward the usefulness of external representation as a window on cognition, it also fur-
ther indicates the difficulties there are in stipulating performance in psychometric tests. Relating 
spatial ability test performance to the serialist/holist dimension and performance on the two 
syllogism teaching methods will enable some resolution of this apparent conflict. 
The FID dimension as measured by the HFT will also be measured against learning from the EC 
and the ND methods. It is anticipated that field-independent students will be better at using 
more abstract representations to support their reasoning, and field-dependent students will be 
better at using more concrete representations. This is not at issue in the syllogisms study, as the 
type of representation is given and fixed in the method. Relatedly, field-independent students 
were shown not to differ from field-dependent students when the learning procedure was highly 
structured (de Leeuw, 1980), and so the HFT may not indicate differences between the two meth-
ods. However, the extent to which FID maps onto preference for the styles implemented in the 
EC and ND methods will be indicated by the study. 
The relationship between "spatial ability" measures and performance on the EC/ND methods 
will be tested by using the PFT. Roberts, Gilmore and Wood (1997) found that a "spatial ability" 
test reflected flexibility in using graphical representations. If spatial ability tests measure flexibil-
ity then PFT-Hi students ought to perform better on both the EC and the ND teaching methods. 
If the PFT is a style measure in the terms defined, then PFT-Hi students will learn one or other of 
the teaching methods more easily. 
The immediate inference (II) task has been proposed as a measure of different treatments of nega-
tion that relates to different styles of implementing the ICIA. Subjects who are hesitant out-of-
place are those that are least likely to accept the conversion of the "no" premiss. If the relationship 
between teaching syllogisms and the II task as a gauge of stylistic preference holds, then those 
that do not accept no-conversion will be more at ease with the EC teaching method that promotes 
sentential negation as part of the parallel resolution implementation. If students that do accept 
no-conversion prefer the sequential/ specific implementation induced by the ND representations, 
then this points towards these two strategies as covering the space of possibilities. 
Due to similar considerations, students that accept no-conversion are more likely to score high 
on the GREA test. Such a finding would support the link between parallel/ abstract case use as a 
general strategy in the HP and in the syllogistic domain. 
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With regard to the other stylistic psychometric measures, it is predicted that no-convertors will 
have a preference for holist strategies, whereas those that do not convert "no" premisses will be 
serialists. If the HFT and the PFT relate to the II task then this suggests these measures are stylis-
tic, though there are no specific predictions raised regarding the link between these measures. 
5.3 Styles and strategies in HP 
The aims for the HP study are to replicate the original aptitude-treatment interactions findings, 
but also to extend this study in several ways by presenting problems in order to assess the differ-
ential effects of varying level of abstraction present in the problems. A further extension and clar-
ification of the original HP study will come from relating performance on HP to the established 
psychometric measures. The reasoning tasks used to assess transfer of skills from following the 
HP course can be reclassified in terms of the level of abstraction required by the problems for their 
effective solution. This level of abstraction can be directly related to that used in the situations 
constructed by students in HP. Such studies extend the teaching syllogisms study to embrace is-
sues of transfer of skills, the robustness of learned approaches to problems, and the development 
of representational use. 
The HP study will use the same tests as were employed in the original HP study, but performance 
will also be related to the HFT and the PFT. Unfortunately, the serialist/holist dimension and 
the II task suggested themselves as useful tools only after the study began, so these will not be 
used to reflect performance on HP. The range of problems in the exam taken by the students on 
this course includes a greater range of abstraction than in the original study. This enables a more 
detailed investigation of the extent of an individual's variation in representation use. In addition, 
this broader range of problems means that individual goals can be assessed in the HP exam for 
the appropriateness of different levels of abstraction in representation, along the lines of the initial 
investigation into strategy change in HP conducted in Chapter 3. The goal-type investigation is 
a finer-grained analysis than the problem-level assessment that has been presented in previous 
studies. 
With regard to the psychometrics, it is anticipated that the HFT and the PFT will relate to different 
use of abstraction in the representations for HE If the PFT relates to appropriate use of abstraction 
in representation, then for high-abstract problems a higher degree of abstraction will be used than 
for low-abstract problems. If, on the other hand, high PFT scores relate to use of a higher level 
of abstraction regardless of the problem's requirements, then this will be indicated by response 
to the HP problems also. The level of abstraction used by students that score high or low on the 
HFT can also be indicated by situation construction in HP. 
Chapter 6 presents the teaching syllogisms experiment. Chapter 7 reports the classification of 
problem types and the new HP study. 
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Chapter 6 




22 first year undergraduates from the University of Edinburgh participated in the experiment. 
All subjects were undertaking a first year modular course in Linguistics, which attracts students 
from a wide variety of academic backgrounds. Subjects were paid £5 for participating in the first 
session and £8 for participating in each of the last two sessions. 
6.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
The experiment consisted of three one hour sessions: the first session involved the paper and 
pencil pre-tests, the GRE test was taken in the second session, and the teaching of syllogisms 
occupied the final session. 
22 students participated in the first session, 21 subjects took the GRE test in the second session, 
and 17 students participated in the last session. 
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6.1.3 Pre-tests 
As spatial ability has been seen to be an indicator of, or an influence on, learning strategy, a stan-
dard measure was included in the pre-tests. The PFT (Ekstrom, French & Harmon, 1976), was 
used as it has been established that this test demonstrates strategic flexibility in manipulating 
spatially presented information, as discussed in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.3). The test is adminis-
tered in a short time, students having 6 minutes to solve the 20 items. 
The Ekstrom et al. HFT was used to measure the FID dimension (see Figure 3.2). The test requires 
the student to disembed a figure from a background of lines, which is subject to the student's 
preference for processing information with or without reference to the context that it appears 
within. 
As Pask's tasks for measuring the serialist-holist learning style are protracted in their application, 
a questionnaire-based measure was used. Ford (1984) designed a 16 item study preference ques-
tionnaire (SPQ) which required students to state their preference for one of two approaches to a 
learning situation. An example of a question is shown in Figure 6.1, where subjects mark their 
preference for one statement over the other by marking a box between the two statements. Ford 
found that five items were good reflections of strategies in Pask's Martian animal classification 
task. Clarke (1993) found that one of the questions in the SPQ was a good indicator of Pask's 
learning styles, and this one question is used to discriminate students in the current study. In 
Figure 6.1, responding with an agreement for the statement on the left indicates holistic tenden-
cies, whereas serialists agree with the right statement. However, if the student did not state a 
preference for this question then learning style was determined by the five items used by Ford. 
The presentation of the SPQ differed from that of Ford and Clarke in two ways: 
• Ford and Clarke present their statements in the same order, both within-item and between-
item, for each student. In the current study, the order of the items is randomised, as is 
the order that the statements occur within each item. Some rephrasing of the items was 
required, as occasionally the second statement relied on the previous reading of the first. In 
each case where phrasing was changed, the alterations were minimal. 
• Ford and Clarke use a numbered scale for students to indicate their preference for a par-
ticular statement. The current design used boxes for the student to mark, this avoided any 
unconscious weighting as to "1" being "good" and higher numbers "bad", or vice versa. 
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When I'm reading a book (or other 
When I'm reading a book (or other 
	 information source) for my studies, I 
information source) for my studies, I 
	 prefer to get quite soon into a fairly de- 
prefer to spend quite a long time skim- tailed reading of it once I know that it's 
ming over and dipping into it to get =going to be useful, in the knowledge 
a clear picture of what it's about and 
	
that its precise relevance and contribu- 
how it will be relevant. 	 tion will become clear from a detailed 
reading. 
Figure 6.1: Example of an item from the SPQ. 
The GRE test was constructed from items derived from a GRE test primer (Duran, Powers & 
Swinton, 1987) by Cox, Stenning and Oberlander (1995). It contains two kinds of item which 
have conventionally been termed as verbal reasoning/ argument analysis problems, and model, 
or analytic reasoning, items. There were several problems of each type, many of which had 4 or 
5 questions and students had 35 minutes to work through the test. The verbal scale (GREV) was 
out of a maximum 10, and the analytic reasoning scale (GREA) was out of 12. 
Stenning and Cox's (1995) version of the immediate inference task was used, which, like New-
stead's (1995) version offers three response categories: "yes", "no", and "can't tell". In Stenning 
and Cox's version, there was also a graphical section, where statements had to be determined as 
true, false, or independent of various Euler's Circles representations'. This part of the test was 
omitted, because indicating ways of representing syllogism premisses may have biased students 
towards using these diagrams in their syllogism solution before teaching and may also have af -
fected the learning of the methods for solving syllogisms. 
In addition, a short questionnaire designed to gauge the current and past academic background 
of the student was devised. Students were asked about their current course of study, their previ-
ous studies, and whether they had ever studied formal logic, Venn diagrams, or Euler's Circles. 
Median splits were performed on the GREA, the GREy, the PFT, and the HFT in order to dis-
tinguish groups of students who scored low and high on each test. Students were classified as 
"no-convertors" or "non-convertors" on the basis of their response to no-conversion. 
1 The graphical section originated with Newstead (1989), however there was only response categories true and false in 
this study. Stenning and Cox (1995) also offered the opportunity for responding "can't tell" in the graphical test. 
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6.1.4 Teaching strategies 
On the basis of results in the pre-tests, students were matched in pairs and assigned to either the 
EC method or the ND method for solving syllogisms. This meant that there were no main effects 
of any pre-test score between the two teaching groups. The pre-tests were marked anonymously, 
so the scores of the individual were unknown to the instructor as the syllogism method was 
taught. 
Before being shown the syllogism solution strategy, all students were given 8 syllogisms and 
asked to "voice their thoughts" as they solved these. 5 syllogisms had valid conclusions, and 
3 had no valid conclusion. The 5 syllogisms with valid conclusions were chosen to represent a 
range of difficulties according to the studies of Johnson-Laird (1983) and Ford (1995). In addi-
tion, these syllogisms were chosen to include some items that "spatial" reasoners found easier to 
solve than "verbal" reasoners, and some items that "verbal" reasoners found easier than "spa-
tial" reasoners, according to Ford's criteria and data. Table 6.1 indicates the percentages of correct 
responses for students in each study. Ford did not study syllogisms with no valid conclusion, but 
a study by Bara, Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird (1995) did study adults responses to these prob-
lems. Numbers for these rows relate to percentage of subjects correctly responding "no valid 
conclusion." In the instructions to the student it was stated that "some" was to be taken to mean 
syllogism Johnson-Laird Bara et al. 
Ford 
spatial verbal 
All Bs are As, Some Bs are Cs 65 80 43.7 
All As are Bs, All Bs are Cs 95 86.7 60 
All As are Bs, Some Bs are Cs - 10 - - 
No As are Bs, Some Bs are Cs 5 40 13.3 
All Bs are As, No Bs are Cs 0 13.3 18.7 
No Bs are As, No Bs are Cs - 70 - - 
Some As are Bs, Some Bs are Cs - 15 - - 
Some As are Bs, No Bs are Cs 20 37.5 66.7 
Table 6.1: Percentage of correct responses to syllogisms by study. 
"at least one and possibly all". Following the student's first response, but only at the student's 
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request, the "correct" answer to the syllogism was given by the experimenter. The pre-test syllo-
gisms were coded for first response and final response, if this differed, and the response times in 
seconds were recorded. 
Then students were either taught the EC method or the ND method. After the students were 
instructed in the method, the same 8 syllogisms used in the pre-instruction test were solved using 
the taught method. Not all students completed all 8 syllogisms, as the student was not allowed 
to proceed to the next problem until they had come to the correct answer, and the session was 
concluded after a one hour time limit. 
Students were videoed as they worked through the teaching task, and the dialogues between stu-
dent and instructor were transcribed. In a separate study (Monaghan & Sterining, 1998), speed 
of solution of syllogisms was not related to accuracy, so for assessing the effectiveness of ac-
quiring a particular method these measures seem to be inappropriate'. In the results section, 
latencies and the number solved are only reported to provide a general indication of the range of 
response in the group. In order to detail the students' responses to the teaching method and to 
partial out this effect of speed, the protocols were marked for errors and interventions. An error 
was recorded when the student incorrectly applied the method to the problem, and interventions 
were instances where the instructor offered assistance to the student. Interventions only occurred 
when the student had not spoken or written for some time, or when the student asked for help 
and seemed unable to continue unassisted. 
6.2 Results 
The results section is divided into three parts. The first part reports the pre-test measures, includ-
ing the responses to the II test. The second section analyses syllogism solution prior to instruc-
tion, comparing responses to the pre-tests. The third part compares the two methods of solving 
syllogisms and relates them to the pre-test measures. 
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Measure I Mean (SD) 
PFT 	12.82 (3.35) 
EFT 	18.19 (7.99) 
GREA 	8.10 (2.34) 
GREV 	4.62(l.96) 
Table 6.2: Mean and SD for pre-test measures. 
Correlations EFT GREA GREV 
PFT 	0.45* 0.37t 	0.26 
HFT 	 0.03 	0.02 
GREA 	I 	 0.49* 
Table 6.3: Correlations among pre-test measures. 
6.2.1 Pre-tests 
Table 6.2 shows means and standard deviations for the pre-test measures. Table 6.3 shows the 
correlations between scores on the pre-tests 3. 
The GREA and GREV scores are roughly commensurate with those for the Stanford University 
students that participated in the original HP study (see Chapter 3). In the HP study, mean GREA 
score was 7.05 (2.72) and mean GREV score was 5.32 (1.25). 
The significant correlation between the HFT and PFT is in accord with the literature (Jonassen & 
Grabowski, 1993). However, the lack of correlation between the GREA and the HFT is contrary 
to general expectations of finding a positive manifold among any "ability" measures (Carroll, 
1993). This lack of correlation is perhaps due to the small sample size, but is not problematic in 
the context of the current study, due to the current emphasis on stylistic variation rather than 
measures of ability. Due to the high concentration of data, the microgenetic approach to studying 
problem solving does not rely so heavily on such generalisations. 
For the serialist/holist questionnaire, one student did not express a preference for any learning 
2This study investigated students' vicarious learning of the EC method as a result of watching video clips of other 
students using the EC method. These video clips were selected from the current study. 
3 For the I-lIFT, one subject's data was lost due to a misprinted test, so n=21 for all correlations except for GREA/GREV 
by I-lIFT, where n=20. Throughout the results section, f stands for p<O.l, • stands for p.(0.05, and" stands for p<0.01. 
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style, 12 students were classified as holists, and 9 as serialists. Holists scored higher on the HFT 
than serialists, with mean scores of 21.55 and 13.00, respectively (t(18) = 2.83, p<0.02). Holists 
also seemed to score higher than serialists on the PFT, with means of 13.83 and 11.22, respectively 
(t(19) = 1.85, p = 0.08). Holists seemed to score higher on the GREA than serialists: 8.55 to 7.33, 
but the difference is not significant (t(18) = 1.15, p = 0.27). Scores for holists and serialists on the 
GREV scale did not differ (means of 4.45 and 4.78, respectively). 
For the academic background questionnaire, all students reported little or no exposure to Venn 
diagrams, Euler's Circles, or logic training, therefore all students can be considered naive with 
regard to the syllogism method they were to learn. Academic background did not relate to any 
of the other pre-test measures, so it is not considered further in this study. 
Eleven students responded "true" to no-conversion (hereafter, this group is termed "Con-
vertors"), two students answered "false", and nine students responded "can't tell" (Non-
convertors). The two students that responded "false" are omitted from further analyses. 
No significant difference in PFT score was found between Convertors and Non-convertors 
(means of 12.00 and 14.00, respectively, t(18) = 1.32, p=0.21). No difference was found for HFT 
score, either (the mean for Convertors was 20.55, and that for Non-convertors was 16.63, t(17) = 
1.10, p=0.29). In line with the predictions, Convertors scored lower on the GREA test than did 
Non-convertors (means of 7.45 and 9.38, respectively, t(17) = 1.97, one-tailed p<0.05). 
Table 6.4 compares the serialist/holist classification with the Convertor/Non-convertor distinc-
tion. Though not significant (X 2 (1) = 2.77, p<O.l), there is a suggestion of a result conforming 
with predictions: students that are classified as serialists tend to be Convertors, and students that 
are holists tend to be Non-convertors. 
serialist holist 
convertor 	6 	4 
non-convertor 2 	7 
Table 6.4: Comparing serialist/holist preference to no-conversion. 
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6.2.2 Performance on the syllogisms prior to instruction: spontaneous strat-
egy development 
The 8 syllogisms given to the students prior to their instruction provides an opportunity to assess 
their style of reasoning prior to training. Responses to the syllogisms indicated a broad range of 
accuracy and speed of solution. The mean number of syllogisms solved "correctly" was 5.7 out 
of 8, with a maximum of 7, and minimum of 3. For syllogisms that the student responded to 
"correctly", the slowest student averaged 137 seconds, while the quickest student averaged 22 
seconds. The mean over all subjects and problems was 76 seconds. 
Besides offering an indication of the baseline performance for the student's ability to solve syl-
logisms, the pre-treatment data provide an opportunity to describe the spontaneous strategies 
developed by the students in solving syllogisms. The students's protocols were analysed for 
behaviour that resembled the "spatial" or the "verbal" strategies as described by Ford (1995). 
Unfortunately, several of the subjects could not be classified as using one of these strategies, as 
their descriptions of the method they used to solve the syllogisms did not provide a very com-
pelling sense of direct access to the processes in operation. For example, one student when asked 
how he came to the conclusion "all As are Cs" from the syllogism "All As are Bs, All Bs are Cs" 
says: 
it just seemed obvious to me because all the architects are botanists and all the 
botanists are chemists . . . it's just the way they are. 
Using Ford's criteria, three students can be classified as using a spatial strategy, and 7 students as 
using the verbal strategy. 7 students' methods remained unclassifiable. The difficulty in assessing 
the strategies used by the students is not surprising due to the small number of problems used 
in the current experiment. In Ford's study, some students do not demonstrate use of one or other 
of the strategies before solving several problems. One of Ford's subjects, for example, does not 
indicate use of the verbal strategy until explaining the method she used on the 21st problem 
she attempted. It may be that students take time either to develop their strategies, or to become 
aware of the strategy they are using. 
An alternative way of deciding a student's solution strategy is by assessing whether their answer 
patterns correspond more closely with predictions from the spatial method or the verbal method. 
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According to Ford's data, the syllogisms can be ranked according to how difficult they ought to 
be to a student using the spatial strategy, or using the verbal strategy. Data is only available 
for the syllogisms with valid conclusions. Then, for each student, the syllogisms can be ranked 
according to the response time in getting to the correct conclusion. This analysis assumes that 
syllogisms that are more difficult for a particular strategy require longer processing time in order 
to reach a conclusion. If the correct conclusion was not produced for one or more syllogisms these 
syllogisms were ranked joint lowest in the student's profile. Spearman's correlation coefficient 
then provides a "distance" measure of the ranking of the student's responses to the syllogisms 
with that of the two proposed scales generated from the strategies. That Spearman's coefficient is 
not reliable for such small sets of data does not matter in this case, as the test is a measure of the 
"nearness" of the student's ranking to the predicted results from one of two strategies, therefore 
confidence parameters are not relevant. A student whose ranking more closely resembles that of 
the spatial method is judged to be using this method predominantly, even if the student does not 
indicate explicit awareness of this strategy use. 
Assessing performance in this way, 6 students were classified as using a spatial method, and 11 
students were classified as using the substitution method. This way of assessing pre-instructional 
strategy did not relate to that derived from the students' explanations: of the 10 joint classifica-
tions, only 4 were in agreement (binomial test p>0.7). The classifications derived from the Spear-
man's correlation coefficient were then measured against the psychometric scores from the pre-
tests. No comparisons reached significance, though 5 of the 7 serialists fitted the verbal profile, 
whereas only 4 of the 9 holists fitted this profile (x2 = 1.17, p=0.28). No relationship was found 
between no-conversion and the spontaneous strategies (x2 = 0.00, p>0.9). The pre-teaching syl-
logisms do not seem to reveal much in the way of different strategies in reasoning. 
6.2.3 Learning the methods for solving syllogisms 
The EC group 
Generally, the group learned the task well, solving a mean of 6.89 syllogisms in the time allowed. 
The minimum number of syllogisms solved using this method by a subject was 4, and four sub-
jects managed to solve all 8 syllogisms. Response times varied from a mean minimum of 66 
seconds to 285 seconds, with the average time across all students for all syllogisms being 154 
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seconds. 
Number of errors in applying the method varied greatly for the students. Mean number of errors 
was 7.9, with minimum of 1 and maximum of 20. There was no correlation found either with 
the number of problems solved with the method or the mean response time of using the method 
to solve a problem. As anticipated, this measure was not found to relate to the pace that the 
student works at. There is, however, a negative correlation between the number of syllogisms 
correctly solved in the pre-instructional syllogisms and the number of errors made in the course 
of applying the method (r = -0.70, p<0.05). This means that the student's pre-instructional ability 
seems to have some effect on the ease with which the new method is applied. 
The ND group 
Students were generally slower at using the ND method: the mean number of syllogisms solved 
using this method was 3.88, with the range varying from 3 to a maximum of 5 syllogisms solved. 
Response times varied from a mean minimum of 169 seconds for each question to a maximum of 
525 seconds, with an average of 351 seconds for all students for all problems for the ND method. 
Comparing the two groups 
Comparing the spontaneous strategies used by students to their performance on the teaching 
methods did not reveal much of interest. Those that were classified as using Ford's "verbal" 
strategy solve more syllogisms with the ND method than do Ford's "spatial" strategy students 
(means of 4.5 syllogisms and 3.25 syllogisms, respectively, t(7) = 2.18, p<0.02). When errors made 
in using the method are the dependent variable, the result approaches significance': "verbal" 
students made 3.75 errors on average, whereas "spatial" students made 5.5 errors (t(6) = 2.18, 
p=0.07). However, no interaction was found between teaching method and pre-instructional 
strategy, as "verbal" students seemed to make fewer errors on the EC method as well (though 
this was not significant). 
The pre-test groups were compared to the teaching methods by using 2-way unrelated ANOVAs, 
with teaching method and pre-test grouping as factors, and the number of errors or interventions 
as the dependent variable. The means for each grouping are shown in Table 6.5. 
4 This is significant as a one-tailed t-test (p<0.05). 
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Table 6.5: Comparing EC and ND methods by pre-test groupings. 
Overall, the PFT-Hi group made fewer errors and required fewer interventions than the PFT-Lo 
group. For errors, there was a main effect of PFT group (F(1,13) = 6.87, p<0.05), and an interaction 
approaching significance between PFT group and teaching method (F(1,13) = 3.84, p<O.l). For 
interventions, there were no main effects, but there was a significant interaction between PFT 
group and teaching method (F(1,13) = 6.33, p<z0.05). These interactions are shown in Figure 6.2. 
PFT-Hi students make fewer errors and need fewer interventions than PFT-Lo students on the EC 
method (errors: t(7) = 2.58, p<O.OS; interventions: t(7) = 3.20, p<0.02). PFT-Hi students require 
more interventions on the ND method than the EC method (t(8) = 3.67, p<O.Ol). PFT-Lo students 
seem to make more errors on the EC method than the ND method (t(5) = 2.05, p<O.l). 
For serialist-holist group, for errors, there was a main effect of serialist-holist group (F(1,12 5) = 
9.32, p<0.05), and an interaction between serialist-holist group and teaching method (F(1,12) = 
8.39, p<0.02). For interventions, there are main effects of serialist-holist group (F(1,12) = 5.54, 
p<O.OS) and of teaching method (F(1,12) = 11.05, p<O.Ol), and an interaction between group and 
teaching method (F(1,12) = 10.12, p<O.Ol). Figure 6.3 indicates the interactions. Serialists make 
5The one student that did not demonstrate a preference for one learning style was omitted from the analyses. 
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Figure 6.2: Number of errors and interventions by PFT group for the teaching methods: F(1, 13) 
= 3.84, p<O.l, and F(1, 13) = 6.22, p<0.05, respectively. 
more errors and require more interventions than holists on the EC method (for errors: t(6) = 
3.11, p<0.05; for interventions: t(6) = 3.82, p-<O.Ol). Holists seem to make fewer errors on the EC 
method than the ND method (t(5) = 2.21, p=0.08) and require many fewer interventions for the EC 
method than the ND method (t(5) = 5.08, p<0.005). Conversely, serialists make fewer errors on 
the ND method than the EC method (t(7) = 2.58, p<0.05), though the difference in interventions 
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Figure 6.3: Number of errors and interventions by serialist/holist group for the teaching meth-
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Figure 6.2: Number of errors and interventions by PFT group for the teaching methods: F(1, 13) 
= 3.84, p<0.1, and F(1, 13) = 6.22, p<0.05, respectively. 
more errors and require more interventions than holists on the EC method (for errors: t(6) = 
3.11, p<0.05; for interventions: t(6) = 3.82, p<O.Ol). Holists seem to make fewer errors on the EC 
method than the ND method (t(5) = 2.21, p=0.08) and require many fewer interventions for the EC 
method than the ND method (t(5) = 5.08, p<0.005). Conversely, serialists make fewer errors on 
the ND method than the EC method (t(7) = 2.58, p<0.05), though the difference in interventions 













EC 	 ND 	 EC 	 ND 
Teaching method 	 Teaching method 
Figure 6.3: Number of errors and interventions by serialist/holist group for the teaching meth-
ods: F(1, 12) = 8.39, p<z0.02, and F(1, 12) = 10.12, p<O.Ol, respectively. 
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For GREA group, for errors, there were no main effects but an interaction of GREA group and 
teaching method (F(1,13) = 5.64, p<0.05). For interventions, there was a main effect of teaching 
method (F(1,13) = 5.26, p<0.05), and an interaction of GREA group and teaching method (F(1,13) 
= 6.33, p<0.05). The interactions are shown in Figure 6.4. GREA-Hi students seem to make fewer 
errors than GREA-Lo students on the EC method (t(7) = 2.31, p=O.OS).  For the NI) method, GREA-
Hi students require more interventions than GREA-Lo students (t(6) = 2.91, p<0.05). GREA-Hi 
students require fewer interventions on the EC method than the ND method (t(6) = 2.80, p<0.05), 











EC 	 ND 	 EC 	 ND 
Teaching method 	 Teaching method 
Figure 6.4: Number of errors and interventions by GREA group for the teaching methods: F(1, 
13) = 5.64, p<0.05, and F(1, 13) = 5.26, p<0.05, respectively. 
For no-conversion, there was an interaction with teaching group that approaches significance 
(F(1, 12) = 3.25, p=0.10). For interventions, there is a significant interaction with teaching group 
(F(1, 12) = 6.38, p<0.05). Convertors perform equally on both teaching methods, but Non-
convertors require very few interventions on the EC method and many more on the ND method 
(see Figure 6.5). 
6.3 Discussion 
The correlation between the PFT and the GREA test and the relation between each of these tests 
and the measure of serialist/holist learning style were as hypothesised. This supports the per- 
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Figure 6.5: Number of interventions by No-conversion by teaching method (p<0.05). 
spective taken of these tests as reflecting similar styles of processing underlying representational 
differences. The serialist/holist measure requires the student to state how they believe they ap-
proach learning situations, and somewhat surprisingly, they seem to be able to do this with some 
degree of accuracy. The GREV test was not found to relate to any measure other than the GREA, 
due in part at least to the fact that both subscales of the GRE occurred on the same test. What this 
test is assessing is not illuminated by the correlations. This is true also for the HFT, which relates 
only to the PFT. 
In accord with the predictions, no-conversion related to the psychometric measures. Non-
convertors score higher on the GREA test than Convertors, and seem also to be those students 
with a holistic preference for learning. This points towards the usefulness of the II as a stylistic 
indicator. 
For spontaneous strategies, gauging strategies in Ford's (1995) terms was found to be difficult 
from such a small sample of problem answers. The results were not very fruitful. This high-
lights the advantage of using "enforced" strategies for examining the response of students in a 
short time-scale. Nonetheless, there was a link between using Ford's spatial strategy and easily 
acquiring the EC method, which supports claims of their similarity. 
From the graphs of the interactions, it can be seen that number of errors and number of inter -
ventions seem to measure slightly different aspects of performance, though they are correlated 
(across both EC and ND groups, r(15) = 0.51, p<0.05). Number of errors is taken to be a mea-
sure of the safety of a method - a high score means the student is more likely to go wrong in the 
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method. The number of interventions is taken to reflect the students ease of applying the method 
- how much direction they require in following the method correctly. Either measure can be used 
to assess the ease with which the student acquired the method. 
A successful outcome of the teaching study was that the two theoretically motivated taught meth-
ods seemed to be comparable. There were very few main effects of teaching group for number 
of errors and interventions in the ANOVAs, but there were several interactions with the pre-test 
groups. The relationship between acquiring the EC method and prior use of Ford's spatial strat-
egy also supports claims for the analysis of learning strategies as reflecting the propensities and 
preferences of students. 
The specific hypotheses raised with regard to teaching syllogism solution will be discussed first. 
The extent to which the more general aims of the study, as presented in Chapter 5, were achieved 
will then be considered. 
The GREA was predicted to relate differently to the two teaching methods, with GREA-Hi stu-
dents acquiring the EC method more easily and the GREA-Lo students finding the ND method 
more in keeping with their reasoning style. GREA-Hi students made few errors on both meth-
ods, and required fewer interventions for the EC method than the ND method. GREA-Lo stu-
dents were found to make more errors on the EC method than the ND method, but were not 
distinguished in terms of number of errors made on each method. The predictions regarding 
the relationship between the GREA measure and the teaching methods were generated by the 
original HP studies, where GREA-Hi students were those that prefer fewer, abstract cases, and 
GREA-Lo students prefer to generate several specified cases. This distinction seems to carry into 
syllogistic reasoning also. 
There were no specific predictions made with regard to the GREV subscale, and the teaching syl-
logisms experiment has done little to illuminate this measure. This lack of relationship between 
the measure and response to the teaching methods is encouraging for one reason, however, indi-
cating that it is a very different measure to the GREA test, which highlights robust differences in 
learning the two methods. 
It was predicted that serialist students would find the ND method easier, and that holist students 
would find the EC method easier. Even though the ND method was not distinguished accord-
ing to this grouping, it was still the case that holists found the EC method easier than the ND 
method, and serialists found the EC method harder to acquire than the NT) method. This lends 
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further support to the connection between the serialist/holist style and preference for the differ-
ent implementations of the ICIA in syllogism solution. The serialist/holist distinction is founded 
on preferences for different learning strategies, and is not formulated in terms of representations. 
Yet a strong connection emerges between the style measure and use of methods invoking differ-
ent representations. 
The HFT did not distinguish response to the two teaching methods, this is perhaps due to the 
high level of structure in the two methods. The HFT is a measure of differences in the way 
students build up the structure of the stimulus. In the teaching methods this structure is already 
present. 
If "spatial ability" reflects flexibility in using different strategies for solving problems, then PFT-
Hi students were predicted to acquire both methods more easily than PFT-Lo students. There 
was a main effect found of PFT group on error, but this difference seems to be mainly due to 
performance on the EC method, where PFT-Hi students make fewer errors and require fewer 
interventions. PFT-Hi students' greater ability and flexibility seems to be only for graphical ma-
terial. This suggests that the PFT may be a style rather than an ability measure. The extent to 
which the PFT measures flexibility in translating between representations that differ in terms of 
the level of abstraction they employ has not been addressed by this study. This will be pursued 
in the HP study in the next chapter. If spatial ability is this ability to translate, then it may reflect 
on the EC method and not on the ND method due to the EC method using different levels of 
abstraction in representation to the ND method. Conventionally, it has been assumed that graph-
ical representations are more specific, and in the comparison between the EC method and the 
ND method it was shown that the ND method draws on a more expressive system. So, the EC 
method demonstrates a larger difference in level of abstraction employed in the representations. 
An analysis relating the psychometrics to different stages in using the two solving syllogism 
methods will contribute towards this debate. 
As predicted, Non-convertors made fewer errors and required fewer interventions on the EC 
method, but required more on the ND method. However, Convertors did not find the ND method 
easier, nor did they find the EC method harder. Non-convertors more easily acquire a method 
where the symmetry of the "no" premiss is represented, but find a method that does not respect 
this symmetry (the ND method) harder. This seems to suggest that students that do not initially 
accept the symmetry are more comfortable with a method that indicates this symmetry. This 
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may be because the graphics make explicit cases that the student was unsure held previously 
(see Bauer & Johnson-Laird, 1993). This is not inconsistent with the view that Non-convertors 
have an affinity with parallel/ abstract approaches to problem solving - the critical individual 
still must be specified, but only after parallel resolution of all individuals. Convertors, however, 
were not found to respond differently to one or other method. Thus, some support is gained for 
no-conversion relating to the sequential or parallel implementation distinction. Non-convertors 
are those that respond better to representations that implement the parallel/ abstract algorithm. 
In terms of the general aims of the study, there were several successes. The aptitude-treatment 
interaction in the HP experiment between GREA group and teaching method for transfer was 
replicated in the syllogistic domain. Here, in a shorter intervention the same effect is found for 
acquiring a method as was found in HP for transfer of skills from a method. In both syllogistic 
teaching and HP it proves to be important to fit the method to the style of the student as gauged 
by the GREA test. The success of the replication supports the contention that the abstract char-
acterisation of the different strategies that are used by students underly both reasoning domains. 
Stenning and Monaghan (in press) argue that ATIs are seldom found to replicate because tasks 
and the processes brought to bear on those tasks are not well understood. The replication here is 
due to locating the relevant similarities between the domains: similarities in terms of strategies, 
representations and algorithms that characterise the distinct approaches. 
The GREA can therefore be seen as a linchpin connecting accounts in terms of strategy, represen-
tation and algorithms that underly performance on reasoning tasks in the syllogistic and HP do-
mains. For a full explanatory account, a more detailed investigation into the GRE test is required. 
The GREA seems to be very much a measure of style rather than ability - the GREA-Lo students 
are good at learning from certain presentations, and the GREA-Hi students are poor at learning 
from the same ND method. This was a second main aim of the study: to distinguish issues of 
style from ability, by relating the psychometrics to processing styles. For the other measures, too, 
this approach meets with some success. No-conversion was found to be a useful diagnostic tool 
for reflecting strategic differences, as was the serialist/holist dimension. The PFT groups were 
found only to relate differently to the EC method, so some style dimension is relevant here. How-
ever, severing the link between the PFT and ability is by no means complete, and the approach 
of the next section is to refine the link rather than replace it. The study has not contributed to 
understanding the relationship between strategy and the HFT or the GREV measures. 
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First, though, the psychometric measures can be given a more detailed profile by assessing the 
different stages in using the two methods. This may help to tease apart the different measures 
and assist in the subsidiary aim of providing computational accounts of the psychometrics, as 
well as offering a more detailed investigation into the two teaching methods. These finer-grained 
distinctions in performance for different stages in the task are presented for consideration in 
tandem with the general interactions observed across the whole method. 
As mentioned in the last chapter, the two methods can be directly compared for three stages: 
translating into the representation, manipulating the representations, and translating out of the 
representation to make a conclusion. Distinguishing these stages and relating errors and in-
terventions for each stage to the psychometric groupings enables a distinction between the mea-
sures for reflecting translating between representations and manipulating representations. For 
the translating-in stage, if the pre-tests interact with teaching method then this suggests that the 
representation is an important determiner in the strategy, and then the representation can be seen 
to promote and precede certain strategic approaches. The differences in the two implementations 
of the ICIA centre around the manipulating stage, so the pre-tests are expected to distinguish be-
tween the taught methods in this stage insofar as they reflect these alternative approaches. Most 
of the general interaction effects are anticipated to be due to differences on the manipulating 
stage. As with the translating-in stage, the translating-out stage will reflect the extent to which 
the representation reflects the strategy that it invokes. 
Errors and interventions for each of the three stages were measured, and analyses for each stage 
are presented in the next section. 
6.4 Comparing different stages in the two methods 
Two-way unrelated ANOVAs were performed, with teaching method and pre-test group as fac-
tors and the number of errors or interventions for each stage in using the methods as dependent 
variable. Only significant interactions of teaching method and pre-test group are reported below. 
As with the general comparison between responses to the two methods, both the GREV test and 
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Figure 6.6: Number of interventions for translation-in stage by GREA group for the teaching 
methods: F(1, 13) = 5.30, p<0.05. NA, different x-axis scale to the other intervention graphs. 
6.4.1 Translating-in stage 
On the translation-in stage, there were few errors made or interventions required, as this stage in 
the procedures can be accomplished by reading off the translations. One interaction was, how-
ever, significant for this stage: GREA group by taught method on the number of interventions 
required (Figure 6.6): F(1,13) = 5.30, p<0.05, with no main effects. For the EC method, GREA-Hi 
students require fewer interventions than GREA-Lo students (t(7) = 2.92, p<0.05). GREA-Hi stu-
dents require fewer interventions on the EC method than for the ND method (t(7) = 3.82, p<O.Ol). 
6.4.2 Manipulating stage 
For the manipulating representations stage, both serialist/holist group and GREA group inter-
acted with taught method for both dependent variables. No-conversion also interacted with 
taught method for interventions, and approached significance for an interaction with taught 
method for errors. 
For the serialist/holist group, the interaction with taught method for number of errors on this 
stage was significant (Figure 6.7): F(1, 12) = 5.89, p<Z0.05, with a main effect only of learning style 
(F(1, 12) = 7.12, p<0.05). For number of interventions, F(1, 12) = 5.46, p<0.05, with a main effect 
only of taught method (F(1, 12) = 15.05, p<O.Ol). Serialists make more errors and require more 
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Figure 6.7: Number of errors and interventions for manipulation stage by serialist/holist group 
for the teaching methods: F(1, 12) = 5.89, p<0.05, and F(1, 12) = 5.46, p<0.05, respectively. 
= 3.68, p<O.Ol). Holists require fewer interventions on the EC method than they do on the ND 
method (t(5) = 5.20, p<0.005), whereas serialists seem to make more errors on the EC method 
than they do on the ND method (t(7) = 1.93, p<zO.l). 
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Figure 6.8: Number of errors and interventions for manipulation stage by GREA group for the 
teaching methods: F(1, 13) = 7.45, p<0.02, and F(1, 13) = 5.50, p<0.05, respectively. 
GREA group and taught method interacted both for number of errors (Figure 6.8) (F(1, 13) = 7.45, 
p<0.02, with no main effects) and interventions (F(1, 13) = 5.50, p<0.05, with a main effect only 
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of taught method: F(1, 13) = 11.84, p<O.Ol). GREA-Hi students make fewer errors on the EC 
method than do GREA-Lo students (t(7) = 2.43, p<O.OS). For the ND method, GREA-Lo students 
seem to require fewer interventions (t(6) = 1.95, p<O.l). GREA-Hi students make fewer errors 
(t(7) = 2.54, p<0.05) and require fewer interventions on the EC method than they do on the ND 
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Figure 6.9: Number of interventions for manipulating stage by no-conversion group for the teach-
ing methods: F(1,12) = 6.80, p<0.05. 
For the no-conversion groupings, number of errors by taught method approached significance 
(F(1, 12) = 4.20, p=0.06), and there were no significant main effects. Convertors make fewer errors 
on the ND method than do Non-convertors (t(6) = 2.83, p<0.05). For interventions there was an 
interaction between no-conversion group and taught method (F(1, 12) = 6.80. p<O.OS), and a main 
effect only of taught method (F(1, 12) = 13.76, p<O.00S). Non-convertors seem to require fewer 
interventions on the EC method and more on the NI) method than do Convertors (Figure 6.9). 
For the ND method, Non-convertors require more interventions than Convertors (t(6) = 2.37, 
one-tailed p<0.05), and Non-convertors require more interventions on the ND method than the 
EC method (t(5) = 5.29, p<z0.005). 
6.4.3 Translating-out stage 
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Figure 6.10: Number of errors and interventions for translating-out stage by serialist/holist group 
for the teaching methods: F(1, 12) = 5.23, p<0.05, and F(1, 12) = 9.82, p<0.01, respectively. 
For the serialist/holist groups, number of errors were significant (Figure 6.10): F(1, 12) = 5.23, 
p<0.05, with a main effect only of learning style (F(1, 12) = 5.23, p<0.05). Also for number of 
interventions, F(1, 12) = 9.82, p<0.01, with a main effect again only of learning style (F(1, 12) = 
5.89, p<0.05). Holists make fewer errors and require fewer interventions than serialists on the 
EC method (for errors: t(6) = 2.59, p<0.05; for interventions: t(6) = 3.21, p<0.02). Serialists make 
fewer errors on the ND method than they do on the EC method (t(7) = 2.52, p<0.05). Holists, on 
the other hand, require more interventions on the ND method than they do on the EC method 
(t(5) = 3.27, p<0.05). 
For PFT group there was an interaction with taught method both for number of errors (Fig-
ure 6.11): F(1, 13) = 4.90, p<0.05, with a main effect of taught method (F(1, 13) = 9.96, p<O.Ol) 
and PFT score (F(1, 13) = 9.31, p<0.01)) and number of interventions: (F(1, 13) = 7.16, p<0.02, 
with a main effect only of PFT score: F(1, 13) = 6.66, p<0.05). FFT-Hi students make fewer errors 
and require fewer interventions than PFT-Lo students on the EC method (for errors: t(7) = 3.31, 
p<0.02; for interventions: t(7) = 3.33, p<0.02). PFT-Lo students make more errors and require 
more interventions on the EC method than they do on the ND method (for errors: t(5) = 3.26, 
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Figure 6.11: Number of errors and interventions for translating-out stage by PFT group for the 
teaching methods: F(1, 13) = 4.90, p<0.05, and F(1, 13) = 7.16, p<0.02, respectively. 
6.5 General discussion 
Individuating different stages in using the two methods indicate points where the psychometric 
measures diverge, and this contributes to the aim of aligning psychometric with computational 
investigations of individual differences in reasoning. Each of the four measures that revealed 
individual differences over use of the whole method related to different stages in using the two 
methods. 
Only one measure - GREA - related to the translating-in stage. Here, GREA-Hi students find 
translating into the EC method easier than translating into the ND method, and GREA-Lo stu-
dents seem to find the EC harder and the ND translations easier. This suggests that GREA 
grouping reflects the sensitivity of students to representations that promote certain strategic ap-
proaches. The representations themselves are semi-independent of the algorithms that underly 
them (the algorithm can, at least, be implemented in one of several ways), yet still ease of use is 
stylistically determined by the same dimension that determines differences in acquiring use of 
the strategies. 
Most differences between the taught methods were predicted to be evident in the manipulating 
stages, as this stage in using the two methods implements one or other of the two strategies. 
These expectations were supported by the results. The serialist/holist groups did not seem to 
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distinguish performance on the ND method. However, taking response to the ND method as 
a benchmark indicates that serialist/holist group does distinguish response to the EC method. 
Serialists make more errors on the EC method than on the ND method, and holists make fewer 
errors and require fewer interventions on the EC method than on the ND method. This suggests 
that response to the parallel/ abstract approach is strongly predicted by serialist/holist group. Se-
rialists find parallel/ abstract approaches difficult to acquire and utilise, whereas holist students 
find this approach fits well with their style. 
GREA grouping also distinguishes performance on the manipulating stage, and performance 
differs on both teaching methods. For the EC method, GREA-Lo students find it more diffi-
cult than GREA-Hi students. For the ND method, the reverse is found: GREA-Lo students find 
this method easier than do GREA-Hi students. This pattern is confirmed by both errors and in-
tervention measures. Though the serialist/holist dimension does not distinguish both teaching 
methods, the GREA groupings do. 
No-conversion is the third measure that relates to the manipulating stage in using the two meth-
ods. Non-convertors required fewer interventions on the EC method than the ND method, and 
Convertors required fewer interventions than Non-convertors on the ND method for this stage. 
This measure relating to the manipulating stage may be particularly surprising, as the group-
ing is determined by response to interpreting premisses, so it might be thought to reflect only 
translating-stages. This adds further support to the claim that what is required for a full account 
of the phenomena of individual differences is a consideration of strategic, representational and 
algorithmic variation. 
PFT grouping was only found to relate to the translating-out stage in using the two methods. 
PFT-Lo students make more errors and require more interventions on the EC method than the 
ND method. They also make more errors and need more interventions on the EC method than 
PFT-Hi students. There is no evident difference in response on the ND method, so the PFT group-
ings can be seen to relate to translating from the graphical to sentential representations. Trans-
lating between sentential representations does not distinguish performance. Perhaps it is this 
ability to translate that relates to ability to switch strategies within a task, as the availability of 
representations is greater. 
For the translating-out stage, the serialist/holist grouping distinguishes performance on both 
methods. Serialist students make more errors than holists in translating from the EC method. 
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Serialists also make more errors on the EC method than they do on the ND method. Holists and 
serialists do not make a different number of errors or require different numbers of interventions 
on the ND method, but holists do require more interventions on the ND method than they do 
on the EC method. Serialists find the ND method more conducive to their style, whereas holists 
seem to find the EC representations easier to translate into a conclusion. - 
The general interactions between pre-test grouping and the taught methods can be seen to be 
largely accounted for by interactions for particular stages in using the two methods. The GREA-
effect is due to interactions with method for translating-in and manipulating stages. The seri-
alist/holist dimension determines differences for manipulating and translating-out stages. No-
conversion determines differences in the manipulating stage. Finally, the PFT distinguishes per-
formance on the translating-out stage. 
The absence of significant results with the HFT and the GREV groupings mean that no insight 
into these measures has been achieved by linking psychometrics to a reasoning task. As previ-
ously mentioned, the HFT may be a better predictor when the task is less structured and freedom 
for strategy selection is given. The GREV remains a mysterious measure, but the contrast with 
strong effects for the GREA scale suggest that it is a very different kind of problem to the analytic 
reasoning problems. This distinction will be explored further in the next chapter. 
The results of this study have indicated that reasoning is stylistic: interactions between teaching 
methods and psychometric groups together with the absence of main effects show that certain 
groups respond favourably to different methods. Different representations have been charac-
terised as relying on alternative processes, and these relate to cognitive styles. Constructing 
representations and translating from representations - stages in the procedure that might be 
expected to be independent of process if differences can be defined as purely representational 
- have also been shown to be stylistic, in that certain students seem to acquire one method 
more easily than the other for each stage in using the methods. The results also indicate that 
translating-in and translating-out of representations are very different processes. GREA group 
relates to the former only, PFT group was found only to relate to the latter. Studies of using exter-
nal representation to support reasoning must not assume skills of translating are symmetrical. A 
consequence of this study is to indicate that use of external representations must be distinguished 
into (at least) these three stages in order to assess and identify their use for supporting reasoning 
(Scaife & Rogers, 1996; Cox & Brna, 1995). 
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How does the current study relate to Ford's (1995) study on the development of spontaneous 
strategies for syllogistic reasoning? Unfortunately, due to the small number of syllogisms used 
in the pre-instructional test, it was difficult to categorise students as using either Ford's verbal or 
spatial strategy. A rough attempt to make such a categorisation resulted in a paucity of results, 
with the only significant relation being between using a verbal strategy and more easily acquiring 
the ND method. Thus, connections to Ford's study remain, on the whole, theoretically motivated. 
It is hypothesised that the development of Ford's verbal strategy is due to a preference for a 
sequential/ specific approach, and developing Ford's spatial strategy is based on a preference for 
a parallel/ abstract approach. This contrasts with accounts that presume the differences are in 
terms of preferences for representing in a particular modality. This may be the case apparently, 
but the differences must be described also in terms of strategies and algorithms. Describing the 
two strategies in terms of the differences in the implementation of the same class of algorithms 
highlights the ties between representations and strategies. 
What does the current study contribute to understanding strategic variation and development 
in other complex reasoning tasks? The three studies reviewed in Chapter 2 found that strategies 
developed to express an appropriate level of abstraction for the task. These tasks demonstrated 
variation in the effectiveness of acquiring different strategies. In contrast, the methods for solv-
ing syllogisms taught to students seem to be equally effective for solving the task, though this 
is modulated by cognitive style. The other reasoning tasks were initially presented to justify the 
generality of strategic variation in terms of abstract/ concrete properties of the representations 
used. One principle design of this study was that both strategies should be equally appropriate 
for solving the problems, and thus differences between students should be in terms of the pro-
cesses that underly the apparent representational differences. The styles that have been shown 
to be important predictors of learning from each method are not just to do with the level of ab-
straction in the representation, but also address the different processes elicited by an approach 
that either specifies properties of individuals or leaves them abstract. The current study shows 
the plausibility of this interpretation, particularly when the links to the HP study discussed in 
Chapter 3 are considered. There, the relationship between level of abstraction and strategy is 
explicit, and the overlap with the syllogistic study is manifested in terms of the GREA test, and 
the serialist/holist distinction. 
As yet, nothing has been added to the investigations of strategy development, but this important 
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and illuminating issue will be addressed in the next chapter. The only source of a direct empir-
ical link between the teaching syllogisms study and the reported studies on strategies in other 
reasoning domains is the measure of "spatial ability" used in each. Subjects that scored high on 
spatial ability tests were those that were good at developing and assessing strategies that invoked 
an appropriate level Of abstraction. In the teaching syllogisms study, PFT-Hi students had less 
difficulty in translating out of both types of representation to form a conclusion. Stenning and 
Monaghan (in press) suggest that this is due to the PFT reflecting the ability to compare verbal 
"folding narratives" and spatial patterns (see Snow, 1980). It does not appear to be a general 
ability to use representations that employ different levels of abstraction, but it may be the abil-
ity to translate from a specific into a more expressive system. In the syllogism study, students 
that use the EC method must translate from the EC representations into "natural language"; the 
ND method requires translations from a more expressive system than the EC diagrams - a frag-
ment of first order logic. In the other reasoning domains discussed in Chapter 2, spatial ability 
relates to the use of non-spatial representations, which can be seen as the translation of informa-
tion from a specific, spatial representation system to more expressive systems of representation. 
Further investigations into the PFT as a strategic indicator are discussed in the next chapter. 
The replication of the HP aptitude-treatment interaction adds credence to the generality of the 
observed stylistic behaviour. It also means that a more general account is required so that similar-
ities across domains can be established and accounted for. The replication rests on the assumption 
that learning transferable skills from the HP courses relates to easily acquiring taught methods 
for solving syllogisms. This equivalence is supported by comparing the different algorithms 
underlying the EC/ND methods with the holist/serialist proof styles in HE But the GREA test 
remains a black box in the account. It seems to predict stylistic preference for sequential/specific 
versus parallel/ abstract approaches, but the test itself has not been analysed in the current study. 
One aim of the next chapter is to unpack the GRE test, both GREA and GREV items, and attempt 
to understand why it relates to stylistic variation in terms of use of abstract/concrete representa-
tions. It is clear, though, that it is not a measure of flexibility, as certain strategies are more easily 
acquired by GREA-Lo students. Similarly, in the Stenning, Cox and Oberlander (1995) study of 
transfer of problem solving skills from logic courses GREA-Lo students benefitted from the non-
graphical version of HP, whereas GREA-Hi students got worse at certain sorts of problem after 
following the course. When representations that promote parallel/ abstract approaches are avail- 
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able (EC method/HP), GREA-Hi students seem to excel. When representations that channel se-
quential/specific approaches are only available (ND method/non-graphical HP), these students 
perform less well than GREA-Lo students. 
6.6 Holes in the scholastic sieve 
There are two main issues arising from the syllogism teaching study. One is the necessity of 
an account of the GRE test, in order to determine the nature of the overlap between HP and 
syllogisms. The results thus far have indicated that the GRE is a useful test of strategic preference, 
but what is it about the problems it presents that provides this strong indication of cognitive 
style? 
Second, an explicit investigation into the relationship between abstract/concrete representation 
use and different computational styles would be a useful extension of the syllogism study. Re-
lating psychometrics to HP would provide such a link. Furthermore, this would provide an 
account of strategy development, relating the use of enforced strategies in the syllogism experi-
ment to those developed spontaneously. A study that assesses the way students learn will also 
help to finesse the hypotheses about what and why certain students learn from certain presenta-
tions of information. The transfer of skills from following the HP course is underdescribed as yet. 
Such an assessment of strategy change would also assist in providing a more detailed account 
of what spatial ability tests are really testing. Why do certain students change the level of ab-
straction in their problem solving strategies, and how does this relate to the sequential/ specific 
parallel/ abstract distinction? 
HP is chosen as the domain for further study because it is fruitful for spontaneous strategies, 
and also enables detailed assessment of the level of abstraction used in representations. Also, 
its shared perspective with the teaching syllogisms experiment allows for some generalisation of 
the results. The next chapter presents a further investigation into problem solving in HP, relating 
performance to various psychometric measures. In particular, the GRE is considered in terms of 
the appropriate levels of abstraction to be used to effectively solve each problem. This occupies 
the first part of the chapter. The second part of the chapter reports the experiment as a replication 




A continuum of problem types and 
developing strategies: Hyperproof II 
7.1 A taxonomy of problem types 
The motivation for providing a taxonomy of problem types is to distinguish reasoning prob-
lems in terms of the level of abstraction required in representations appropriate for solving them. 
Hence, problems solved effectively using concrete representations will be distinguished from 
those that are better solved using representations with greater abstraction. 
This taxonomy will have two applications: 
• It will distinguish the problem types in the GRE test, and ability to solve these different 
problems will emerge as the difference between students that score high and low on the 
two subscales of the GRE. Scores on this test relate to differences in the selection of repre-
sentations of varying levels of abstraction. 
• It will provide a way of distinguishing the different types of goal in HP, and enable an 
assessment of proof strategies in terms of choosing varying levels of abstraction in solving 
problems. This will provide a finer-grained insight into the mechanisms of strategy change 
as a result of following the HP logic course, and provide a means of assessing the use of 
these strategies for different problem types in the tests of transfer of reasoning skills. In this 
way, the initial explorations of Chapter 3 will be extended. 
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In addition, the classification of problem types indicates the varying appropriateness of strate-
gies that employ a sequential/ specific or parallel/ abstract approach. Problems that are better 
solved using a more abstract level of representation may actually be better solved using a par-
allel/abstract approach, whereas those best solved with concrete representations are almost cer-
tainly better solved using a sequential/specific approach. 
7.1.1 Problem types in the GRE 
The GRE is traditionally divided into two subscales: the GREA and the GREy. To reiterate, GREA 
problems are those that are often solved by using diagrams (Cox & Brna, 1995) and have explicit 
constraints on the number of models consistent with the given information. GREV problems 
are infrequently solved by using diagrams, and the variety and number of models is difficult 
to see from the problem, as they seem to be more about comparing argument structure than 
constructing models in order to solve the problem. This immediately suggests that problems on 
the GRE test vary in terms of the level of abstraction required in the representations used to solve 
these problems. This level of abstraction is the basis of the classification of problems. 
Consider Figure 7.1 (reproduced from Figure 3.3). This is one problem from the GREA subscale. 
The information in the problem constrains a single model, so fully concrete representations are 
useful for solving this problem'. This problem will be called a single-case problem, and can be 
found both in the BW test and in HE For the GRE test, it is referred to as a GRES problem. This 
problem is appropriately solved by constructing the fully constrained model and then reasoning 
with this concrete representation. 
An alternative approach to solving this problem is to assess the potential arrangements of offices 
and people, and then testing these arrangements for consistency with the given information. 
For this problem, there are 6 people to be arranged in 6 offices, offering 120 permutations. This 
number of cases is going to make such a strategy very inappropriate. One linguistics student 
when presented with this problem in a discussion class on the uses of representation in problem 
solving started to panic, and said she just couldn't begin to solve this sort of problem. This would 
certainly be the case if an attempt to operate on all possible arrangements was undertaken. 
Consider now the GRE problem shown in Figure 7.2. This problem is consistent with many 
1 Though every student may not use external representations to solve this problem (Cox, 1996). 
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An office manager must assign offices to six staff members. The available offices, numbered 1-6 
consecutively, are arranged in a row, and are separated only by 6-foot-high dividers. Therefore, 
voices, sounds, and cigarette smoke readily pass from each office to those on either side. 
Miss Braun's work requires her to speak on the telephone frequently throughout the day. 
Mr White and Mr Black often talk to one another in their work, and prefer to have adjacent 
offices. 
Miss Green the senior employee, is entitled to Office 5, which has the largest window. 
Mr Parker needs silence in the office(s) adjacent to his own. 
Mr Allen, Mr Parker and Mr White all smoke. 
Miss Green is allergic to tobacco smoke and must have non-smokers in the office(s) adjacent to 
her own. 
The best location for Mr White is in Office 1, 2, 3, 4 or 6? 
The best employee to occupy the office furthest from Mr Black would be Mr Allen; Miss 
Braun; Miss Green; Mr Parker or Mr White? 
The three employees who smoke should be placed in Offices 1,2 and 3; 1, 2 and 4; 1, 2 and 6; 
2, 3 and 4; or 2, 3 and 6? 
Figure 7.1: Analytic reasoning item in the GRE test. 
different situations, however students often construct graphical representations in order to solve 
this problem. There are 6 poets, and students can assume one of two attitudes to each poet. This 
means that there are 26 = 64 different possibilities for students' poet-liking profile. The different 
universal rules in the problem limit the number of possible profiles. The first clause outlaws 
16 situations, as does the second clause. The fourth clause outlaws a further sixteen situations, 
2 of which coincide with situations outlawed by the first clause, and a further 2 coincide with 
situations outlawed by the second clause. The seventh clause reduces the possible situations by 
16, of which 4 have previously been ruled out by clause 1 and four by clause 2. This means 
that after the constraints have been in place, there are 28 outlawed situations leaving 36 possible 
situations. This is far more than the GRES problem, but it is further reduced by the statement 
in the question. "Enjoying the poetry of Browning" reduces the number of situations by 32, of 
which 16 have already been ruled out. This means that to solve the problem presented requires 
the assessment of 20 situations, so a more appropriate representation for this problem would 
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Professor Kittredge's literature seminar includes students with varied tastes in poetry. 
All those in the seminar who enjoy the poetry of Browning also enjoy the poetry of Eliot. 
Those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot despise the poetry of Coleridge. 
Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Eliot also enjoy the poetry of Auden. 
All those who enjoy the poetry of Coleridge also enjoy the poetry of Donne. 
Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Donne also enjoy the poetry of Eliot. 
Some of those who enjoy the poetry of Auden despise the poetry of Coleridge. 
All those who enjoy the poetry of Donne also enjoy the poetry of Frost. 







Figure 7.2: Multiple case problem in the GRE test. 
employ a greater degree of abstraction than that required for the GRES problem. As several 
situations are consistent with the given information, this is called a "multiple-case" problem, in 
the GRE context: a GREM problem. 
An alternative approach could avoid using abstraction in the representations by assessing each of 
the 64 different possible poet-liking/disliking combinations. Though there are not as many cases 
as with the office allocation problem, this would still be extremely inefficient as an approach. 
Figure 7.3 (reproduced from Figure 3.4) indicates a problem originally from the GREV subscale. 
This problem does not present immediately specifiable constraints on the number of models con-
sistent with the given information. One possibility is that there are three binary properties in the 
problem shown in Figure 7.3: safe/dangerous, industrial Hg/other sources of Hg; and Hg in wa-
ter/other sources. Together these define 2 3 = 8 possible situations, and the statements determine 
which of these situations turn out to be the case. This means that a strategy that assessed each 
possibility would be much more plausible for this type of problem than for the office allocation 
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Excessive amounts of mercury in drinking water, associated with certain types of industrial 
pollution, have been shown to cause Hobson's Disease. Island R has an economy based entirely 
on subsistence-level agriculture; modern industry of any kind is unknown. The inhabitants of 
Island R have an unusually high incidence of Hobson's Disease. 
Which of the following can be validly inferred from the above statements? 
• I Mercury in drinking water is actually perfectly safe. 
• II Mercury in drinking water must have sources other than industrial pollution. 
• III Hobson's Disease must have causes other than mercury in drinking water. 
II only; III only; I or III but not both; II or III but not both; or II or III or both? 
Figure 73: Verbal reasoning item in the GRE test. 
or poets problem. Attempting to construct a representation that respected the constraints of the 
problem would, however, be rather difficult for this problem, as the cases are extremely difficult 
to identify, and the information would have to be disembedded from the problem. A greater 
degree of abstraction would be appropriate for this problem. Perhaps the linguistics student 
was attempting to go through each case exhaustively regardless of the structure of the problem, 
which would explain her panic at the office allocation problem, and the relative ease with which 
she solved the mercury poisoning problem. 
Problems on the GRE test present a dual continuum depending on how the complexity of the 
problem is assessed. If the size of the problem space is considered then the office allocation prob-
lem will be harder than the poet's problem, which in turn is harder than the mercury problem. If 
the number of situations consistent with the constraints are considered then the GRE problems 
present a continuum running in the other direction: ranging from single case through multiple 
case problems, which vary over the number of cases consistent with the given information, to the 
most verbal that offer only a few, difficult to determine constraints on the possible situations. This 
classification system ignores other ways that the problem types differ. For example, the extent 
to which content is buried in form, or the extent to which induction or deduction plays a role in 
problem solution may also be contributory factors. But these other ways of describing different 
problem types in the GRE may well be concomitant properties of the different representational 
systems. 
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A hierarchical cluster analysis of responses to the various problems in the GRE test reflect intu-
itions about the different problem types. The clustered responses from the 21 students that took 
the GRE test in the teaching syllogism (see Chapter 6) study are shown in Figure 7.4. 
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Figure 7.4: Clustering of responses to the GRE test. 
Clustering shows for which problems students tended to answer the same way. This means that 
problems that are closely clustered together meant the same students did well on both, or poorly 
on both. "Office" is the GRES problem shown in Figure 7.1. "Poets" is the GREM problem shown 
in Figure 7.2. Note that these two problems are closely clustered. The "interviews" problem 
was initially in the verbal subscale of the GRE test, but it does provide several constraints on 
the number of situations that are consistent with the given information and many students use 
external representations to assist with their problem solving for this question. "Verbal set 1" 
refers to three questions, including the verbal problem in Figure 7.3 as well as two other problems 
that seem similar in requirements to this question. "Gubernatorial" is a single case problem, and 
"verbal set 2" is a second set of verbal problems. These last two problem groups occur at the end 
of the test, so responses to these are closely clustered primarily because most students failed to 
complete any of these problems. For the other four questions, no relation between position in the 
test and response emerges. 
The clustering suggests the following ordering of problems in terms of the number of situations 
they determine consistent with the given information, from fewest on the left to most on the right: 
office (—) poets —* interviews —* verbal set 1 
The alternative conception of the problems as ranged along a continuum according to the size of 
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the problem space they are presented in offers the same ordering, from largest problem space on 
the left to smallest on the right. 
This supports the assumption that solving problems that require abstract representations and 
solving problems that require more concrete representations is prone to stylistic variation: stu-
dents respond similarly to "analytic" items, but differently to "verbal" items. There is also sup-
port for conceptions of the dual-scale of the GRE test (Stenning, Cox & Oberlander, 1995; Yang 
& Johnson-Laird, 1999), in terms of the expressivity and specificity of representational systems. 
However, a further subdivision of the "constraint-satisfaction" problems distinguishes the GRE 
into three scales: single-case (GRES), multiple-case (GREM), and verbal (GREV) problems. 
There is some empirical support for the taxonomy of problem types in terms of the level of ab-
straction required for solving the problem. However, for the system of classification to be useful 
it has to be shown to be general, and to reflect performance in other problem solving tasks. The 
next section indicates that the distinction can be extended to different problems in the BW test. 
7.1.2 Generalising the taxonomy: problem types in the BW 
A BW test problem is shown in Figure 7.5. A diagram is given and abstraction is present in the 
situation in terms of labels being unspecified for the blocks. There are verbal statements that 
present restrictions on the way labels are assigned to the objects in the diagram. 
As with the GRE test, there are problems that fully specify the situation that must be assessed 
in order to answer the question - these are the single case problems (BWS). There are also prob-
lems that require several situations to be assessed, and these are multiple case problems (BWM). 
These are likened to the GREM problems rather than the GREV problems as the given graphi-
cal situation presents immediate constraints on the possible situations consistent with the given 
information. There is not a corresponding problem type in the BW to the GREV problems. 
Two additional types of problem are distinguishable in the BW test. The first of these are ques-
tions about logical independence rather than logical consequence. An example is Statement B in 
Figure 7.5. The situation where "b is a medium dodecahedron" is not determined by the given 
information, as a state of affairs where b is one of the small dodecahedrons is also consistent with 
the given information. These are called non-consequence problems (BWN). 
The final type of problem in the BW test is a class of questions about possible situations consistent 
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i446A 
Suppose you are given the following information about the blocks shown above. 
Block b is a dodecahedron and block a is closer to the front than b. 
Block a is not small. 
Block d is closer to the left side of the grid than a. 
If block d is a tetrahedron, then it is not small. 
Based on the above information, which of the following statements must be true? 
Block a is a large tetrahedron. 
Block b is a medium dodecahedron. 
Block d is a small cube. 
Both A and B. 
Both A and C. 
A, B, and C. 
Figure 7.5: Example of a BW problem. 
with the given information. They are generally phrased in the form: "which of the following 
statements might be true". These are classified differently to the other goal types, and are termed 
BWmodal problems. 
So, in the BW test, the following problem types are distinguished: singe-case (BWS), multiple-
case (BWM), non-consequence (BWN), and the "might follow" problems (BWmodal). 
Justification for the taxonomy spanning different tasks will arise if the same students find, for 
example, single case problems easy in both tests. However, there are differences between the 
GRE and the BW and these generate hypotheses about potential differences in use of abstraction 
in problem solving. The first is a difference in the surface features of the test, the second is more 
fundamental to different strategies based on constructing representations using abstraction to 
varying degrees. 
One difference between the BW and the GRE test is that problems in BW have multiple choice 
responses, and this means that each problem may simultaneously involve solving different prob- 
lem types. This is a surmountable obstacle, however, and the solution provides a rich data set. 
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Consider the BW problem in Figure 7.5. The correct answer is (A). Statement (A) requires only 
one situation to be constructed to prove it, so it is classified as a BWS problem. Statements (B) 
and (C) do not follow from the given information, so these are classified as BWN problems. This 
means that responses from (A) through to (F) score differently on the BWS and BWN scale. Ta-
ble 7.1 shows the scores for each response. 
Response I BWS score I BWN score 
A 	 1 	2 
B 	 0 	1 
C 	 0 	1 
D 	 1 	1 
E 	 1 	1 
F 	 1 	0 
Table 7.1: Scoring system for the BW problem. 
The more basic difference between the GRE and the BW is that the BW presents a graphical situ-
ation to the student which is then augmented by applying sentential information to the problem. 
For the GRE test, no such situation is given, and if a graphical representation is used by the stu-
dent then it has to be constructed from scratch. Cox (1996) has identified this "constructivist" 
difference in the use of external representations by students: use of a given situation and genera-
tion of a situation are different skills. 
7.1.3 Problem types and strategies in HP 
The different problem types in the GRE and the BW test are also identifiable as different goal 
types in HP. For each problem in HP, there may be several goals that have to be achieved. The 
requirements of these goals vary in terms of whether it is a sentential expression or a graphical 
situation that has to be assessed, and whether proofs of consequence or non-consequence are 
required. Of the proofs of consequence, it may be that a single situation is determined by the 
given information, or that several situations that have to be constructed are required. These 
different goal types are considered in more detail below, along with a discussion of the range of 
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Figure 7.6: The Hyperproof interface - Problem 4. 
Figure 7.6 (Figure 3.5 shows different strategies used to solve this same problem) is a HP problem 
with four goals indicated on the right of the Figure. 
Goal 4 requires the student to assess the validity of a given sentential statement: xy(Cube(x) A 
Cube(y) A x 54 y). These are termed S-goals. The method for achieving S-goals varies according 
to whether the sentence has to be shown to be a consequence or a non-consequence of the given 
information. In each instance, however, the S-goal is achieved either by using natural deduction 
rules in HP, or by using rules that support the translation of information from graphical situations 
to a sentential expression. This goal type is distinguished from those that require the assessment 
of a graphical situation as translating is a key feature, potentially placing different requirements 
on the level of abstraction appropriate to achieving the goal. 
Goals 1 to 3 require the student to assess graphical situations: whether the shape of each of the 
three objects can be determined. Goals 1 and 3 are about situations that are not determined by the 
conjunction of graphical and sentential information, i.e., they are proofs of non-consequence (GN-
goals). These are akin to BWN problems. One situation consistent with the given information is 
where the leftmost block is a small tetrahedron and the other two blocks are small cubes. Another 
consistent situation is where the rightmost block is a small tetrahedron and the other two blocks 
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are small cubes. Constructing these two situations and justifying their consistency with the given 
information by invoking a rule called "check the assumptions" is sufficient for achieving goals 1 
and 3 in HP. Alternatively, students may prove each of goals 1 and 3 separately, constructing two 
situations for each goal. Varying use of situations to solve these problems does not necessarily 
indicate different use of graphical abstraction, but rather illustrates whether goals are achieved 
in parallel or successively. 
Goal 2 requires a proof of consequence. This class of problem is called a CC-goal. In goal 2 in 
question 4 this is done by exhausting the possible situations consistent with the given informa-
tion and then indicating their commonality: that the middle block is a cube. Variability in the 
number of situations used reflects the "granularity" of the representations covering the space of 
possible situations. An alternative method for achieving this goal is to create situations which 
show the three possible shapes of the middle block and indicate that two of the possible shapes 
mean a contradiction with the given information. This results in a shorter proof, and one that in-
volves a greater degree of abstraction in the situations, as more information is left unexpressed. 
Another method for solving this problem is to translate the critical information into sentential 
expressions and use the natural deduction rules of HP. This results in an even shorter proof, 
using representations that are more abstract. This goal is one type of the CC-goals, one which 
requires splitting into multiple cases (GCM-goal). This proof by splitting into cases is a feature of 
HP promoted by its designers, who see case-based, heterogeneous reasoning as a natural way of 
approaching problems (Barwise and Etchemendy, 1992). Proofs by constructing graphical cases 
is an alternative and complementary strategy to using proofs composed of sentential rules, for 
example. 
Another type of CC-goal is one that can be achieved by the application of sentential information 
to a situation in a single step (GCS-goal). An example of this type of goal is shown in Figure 7.7. In 
this question, the GCS-goal is Coal 1, as the information in the problem is sufficient to determine 
the labelling of the leftmost block as "c". Students can use different strategies for solving these 
problems. One way of solving the problem is by invoking a rule called "apply" that justifies 
the application of sentential information to a graphical situation. Applying the information of 
the 2nd, 3rd and 4th sentences means that this can be achieved in one step, but labels for all 
objects have to be applied (so the rightmost block has to be labelled "a" in the same situation). 
An alternative method is to apply labels one at a time. Several students construct a situation 
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supported by an "apply" rule that names the rightmost block "a" invoking the 1st, 3rd and 4th 
sentences. They then construct another situation that adds the label to the leftmost block using 
"apply" supported by the 3rd and 4th sentences. Objects remaining unlabelled means that the 
abstraction of the situations is greater, so students that achieve the goal using one situation (i.e., 
one use of "apply") utilise more concrete external representations to support their reasoning. 
Students that use staged "apply" rules use more abstract representations. 
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Figure 7.7: GCS goal in HP. 
Another strategy used to solve the GCS-goal in Figure 7.7 is to exhaust the two different ways 
that labels can be applied, and to indicate that one application of labels is inconsistent with the 
given information, and the other application of labels is consistent. This is a property of the 
particular structure of this problem, so for most other GCS-goals the comparison is between an 
"abstract" strategy where the required situation is built up gradually, and a "concrete" strategy 
where the situation is achieved in a single step. 
To summarise, GCS-goals are problems where the information constrains a single situation suffi-
cient for achieving the goal. GCM-goals are problems where the information does not constrain a 
single situation: there are several situations consistent with the given information, each of which 
must be constructed in order to achieve the goal. These are comparable to the single-case and 
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multiple case problems as described in the GRE and the BW test. HP offers a window into the 
use of level of abstraction in representation, and this is reflected in the number of situations used 
by the student in order to achieve the goal. For GCS-goals, few situations in a proof reflects 
use of less abstraction in the graphical representations, and use of more situations reflects use 
of more abstract representations. For GCM-goals, this is reversed, with few situations reflecting 
more abstraction in the situations used, and more situations indicating that each situation is more 
concrete. 
7.2 Aims and expectations 
The syllogism study left the GREV subscale a mystery. It did little better in terms of illuminat-
ing the GREA subscale, but indicated that the GREA aptitude-treatment interaction was robust 
across different reasoning domains. The analysis of the GRE test in this chapter relates the differ-
ent question types to use of different levels of abstraction, and advocates a triple partition of the 
measure. The HP study presented in this study will address these issues directly, by distinguish-
ing different problem types in the GRE, as well as in the BW task, and relating them to strategic 
performance in HP. This not only extends the investigation of the psychometric measures, but 
also broadens the study to involve spontaneous strategy use and development as well as use of 
given strategies. 
7.3 Method 
84 Philosophy students at the University of Gothenberg participated in the experiment, taking a 
logic course as part of their studies. Students at this university come from a broader academic 
background than generally found at Edinburgh University or Stanford University (the previous 
subject populations). There are also fewer academic prerequisites for courses. The pre-tests and 
post-tests were taken voluntarily by students. 
Students followed the HP course using Barwise and Etchemendy's (1994) materials as part of 
a logic course, which also exposed students to a more traditional natural deduction method of 
logical proof (Bennet, Haglund, Westerstâhl & Sönströd, 1997, derived from Mates, 1965). 
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At the end of the course, students were set six HP problems. Each problem was designed to be 
"indeterminate", so that the graphical situations given in each problem were graphically abstract 
to varying degrees. Each problem contained several goals, so that several tokens of each goal-
type as discussed above were given to the students'. Students were free to solve problems in 
their own time. The proofs were computer-logged. 
7.3.1 Pre-tests and post-tests 
Pre-tests and post-tests were chosen in an attempt to directly replicate the original HP study, and 
also to extend it to include psychometric measures for comparison with proof styles. 
As in the original study, a version of the BW test was given pre- and post-course. The BW test 
was marked for overall score as with the original study, as well as marked in order to assess 
response to the different problem types within the test. The GRE was also administered pre-
and post-course, and was marked for scores on the GREA and the GREV subscales as well as for 
each problem type. All versions of the BW and the GRE tests were identical to those used in the 
original study. Students had 30 minutes for the GRE test and 15 minutes for the BW test. 
In the pre-test students were also given the PFT and the HFT (French, Ekstrom & Price, 1963), 
as used in the teaching syllogisms study. As previously mentioned, the SPQ for testing serial-
ist/holist learning style was not used as the experiment was begun before the SPQ emerged as 
an interesting gauge of variation in problem solving approach. All pre- and post-tests were pre-
sented in English. The course coordinator felt the students' grasp of English was sufficient for 
this not to be an issue in the results. 
7.4 Results 
61 students did the HFT and the PFT, 57 students did the pre-course BW test, and 59 students 
did the GRE test; 72 students completed the HP exam problems; and 27 students did the BW 
and GRE post-course test. Some of the HP records were lost due to bugs in the logging program, 
so n-values vary throughout the analyses. Full data for all questions and pre-tests exists for 39 
students. Full data for all questions, pre-tests and post-tests exists for only 20 students. 
2 Grateful thanks to Cecilia Sönströd for collecting the data, and to Jon Oberlander for creating the HP exam problems. 
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The results are divided into three sections. The first examines the overall scores from the BW 
and the GRE tests, to explore the extent to which the original HP study is replicated with this 
different population. The second section distinguishes scores on the different problem types in 
the BW and the GRE and examines the relationship between these scores and the psychometric 
measures. The third section relates different strategies used in HP to the psychometrics and to 
the transfer of reasoning skills to the BW and the GRE tests. 
7.4.1 Replicating the original HP study 
Measure I Mean (SD) 
PFT 	12.66 (3.28) 
HFT 	14.02 (7.28) 
GREA 	4.86 (2.57) 
GREV 	2.71(l.87) 
Table 7.2: Mean (SD) for pre-tests. 
GREV 	HFT 	PFT 
GREA 0.30*  (57)  0.34*  (55)  0.27*  (55) 
GREV 	 0.22 (55) 0.22 (55) 
HFT I 0.26'(59) 
Table 7.3: Correlations between pre-tests. 
Table 7.2 shows mean and standard deviation for the group. GREA and GREV scores are lower 
than for the Stanford and Edinburgh students, whereas PFT and HFT scores are more closely 
comparable. Table 7.3 indicates the correlations among the pre-test measures of GREA and GREV 
subscale scores, and the HFT and the PFT. The correlations are similar to those found in the 
teaching syllogisms study, which lends some authority to comparing student groups across these 
different subject populations. 
As with the original study on learning from HP, students were divided into those that scored 
higher and lower on the GREA test according to a median split. The pre- and post-test scores on 
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the BW as a whole were then compared for these groups. As with the original study, the GREA-
Hi students improved their score on the BW more than did the GREA-Lo group (t(23) = 1.80, 
one-tailed p<0.05). This interaction is shown in Figure 7.8. Again, the robustness of the aptitude-
treatment interaction effect supports comparison between the different experiments, paving the 
way for an extension and more detailed study of the intricacies of strategy development and 





pre-course 	 post-course 
Time 
Figure 7.8: Change in BW score by GREA group. 
Another result from the original HP study was that GREA-Hi and GREA-Lo students were dis-
tinguished by the style of the proofs that they constructed. A primary feature of these different 
proof styles was that GREA-Hi students employed more abstraction in the graphical situations 
they used, i.e., they used fewer fully concrete situations than GREA-Lo students. Does this repli-
cate in the current study? 
The GREA-Hi students used fully concrete situations 40% of the time, whereas GREA-Lo stu-
dents used them slightly less at 37% of the situations they constructed. However, the HFT group-
ing reflected this stylistic difference better. HFT-Hi students use concrete situations only 32% 
of the time, whereas HFT-Lo students' proofs are considerably more concrete, using 51% fully 
concrete situations, which is significantly more (t(51) = 2.29, p<0.05). 
The proof styles in the current study do not replicate those found in the original HP study. There 
are two potential explanations for this. One possibility is that the GREA subscale is testing some-
thing slightly different in the Swedish student group. As they are taking the test in their second 
language, an additional component of "verbal" ability may have been in place. Another pos-
sible explanation is that the effects of differences in teaching (in particular, the inclusion of a 
natural deduction method in teaching) may have influenced learning. However, there are still 
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differential effects of GREA-Hi/GREA-Lo groupings in terms of how well skills are transferred 
to the BW test, so the former explanation seems less likely. This suggests that the latter is the key 
explanation, and so more detailed examination of the range of strategies used in HP is required. 
Examining the proofs of one particular question, one that was also used in the original HP study 
and that produced a broad range of problem solving strategies (shown in Figure 7.6) indicated 
a different range of strategies to those found in the original HP study. In the original study, 
proofs varied in terms of the use they made of graphical abstraction. GREA-Hi students used 
proofs that employed a greater degree of abstraction, building up concrete situations in stages 
by applying sentential information gradually. GREA-Lo students used concrete situations more 
readily. In the current study, the concrete graphical strategy was very much in evidence, but the 
abstract graphical situation was much rarer than in the original study (6 out of 69, compared to 
the original 9 from 22). In addition, a third method for solving the problems was used by 11 
students in the new study. This employed the sentential rules of HP, meaning that very little use 
of graphical situations was made. This will be called the "sentential" strategy. The sentential 
HP strategy is like an extreme version of the abstract graphical strategy, as it employs a more 
abstract form of representation to achieve the goals. Empirical justification for this continuum 
may be drawn from scores on the pre-test measures, as these are taken to represent different 
attitudes to the use of representations employing different levels of abstraction. Table 7.4 shows 
pre-test scores for each strategy used for the problem shown in Figure 7.6, that is used in both 
HP studies. 
Pre-test Strategy  
sentential abstract concrete 
graphical graphical 
GREA 5.00 4.25 4.67 
GREV 2.00 1.75 2.97 
HFT 19.10 16.40 12.56 
PFT 13.50 12.80 12.36 
BW improvement 1.50 1.00 0.76 
Table 7.4: Pre-test scores for students classified by use of the three strategies for the problem 
occurring in both HP studies. 
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This continuum of strategy types is reflected in the mean scores on the HFT and the PFT: those 
that use most abstraction in their strategy seem to score higher on both these measures. The 
sentential strategy students also seem to score higher on the GREA, but the continuum is not 
respected for this measure. Of interest is the lack of match between scoring well on the GREV 
subscale and using the sentential strategy. Those that do well on GREV problems tend to use 
concrete graphical strategies for their HP proof. 
The differences in HFT score between the sentential and the concrete graphical strategy groups 
are significantly different (t(44) = 2.65, p<0.02). The group including both sentential and abstract 
graphical strategies scored higher on the HFT than the concrete graphical strategy group (t(49) = 
2.64, p<0.02). However, the HFT score for the abstract graphical group alone was not found to 
differ significantly from either other strategy group, partly due to the small number of students 
that use this strategy (n = 5). 
The results indicate a partial replication of the original HP study. The general transfer of skills 
to the BW according to GREA group are the same, but the strategies are variable. Monaghan et 
al. (1999) argue that in order to justify and explain aptitude-treatment interactions, it is neces-
sary to attend to the exact task requirements. In addition, the use of the psychometric pre-tests 
lends credence to the claim that these psychometrics reflect attitude to using different levels of 
abstraction in representation. The use of a different type of strategy in the current study for 
solving HP problems can be seen as a more extreme version of the abstract graphical strategy 
within this framework. The next section provides more detailed results pertinent to the aim of 
distinguishing the skills learned by students as they follow the HP course. 
7.4.2 Performance on the BW and GRE problem types 
For the BW test, all problem types in the pre-test are significantly correlated (see Table 7.5). In 
the post-test, BWS problems are significantly correlated with all other problem types, but BWM, 
BWN and BWmodal problems do not intercorrelate. Significant correlations between the pre-
and the post-tests were found for BWS problems, and for BWM problems, but were not found 
for BWN problems or for BWmodal problems. 
PFT group distinguished scores on several of the BW problem types. Repeated measures 
ANOVAs were used with problem type score as dependent variable and time as within subjects 
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BWM pre BWN pre BWino pre BWS post BWM post BWN post BWmo post 
BWS pre 0.31 0.49" 0.60" 0.40 0.44* 0.36 -0.13 
BWM pre 0.63" 0.54" 0.02 0•43* 0.15 -0.28 
BWN pre 0.68** 0.25 0.46* 0.17 -0.26 
BWmo pre 0.27 0.40* 0.30 -0.09 
BWS post 0.56 0.56 0.40 
BWM post 0.38 0.20 
BWN post 0.24 
Table 7.5: Correlations between BW goal-type scores. 
factor and psychometric group (PFTLo/Hi, EFTL0/Hi) as between subjects factors. 
For BWS problems, PFT group related to score overall (F(1, 21) = 7.29, p<0.02): PFT-Hi students 
were better at these problems. Time also interacted with score (F(1, 21) = 11.69, p<O.005): students 
tended to get worse at this kind of problem. No interactions were found between time and PFT 
group. 
For BWM problems, HFT group seemed to predict overall score (F(1, 21) = 3.94, p=0.06), with 
HFT-Hi students scoring higher. Time did not have a significant effect, but time by HFT group 
interacted (F(1, 21) = 4.81, p<z0.05). HFT-Lo students did not improve (scoring 4.87 and 4.50 on 
the pre- and post-tests respectively), but HFT-Hi students did improve (scoring 5.15 and 6.83, 
respectively). 
For BWN problems, PFT-Hi students score higher overall for pre- and post-test (F(1, 21) = 17.02, 
p<0.001), as do HFT-Hi students (F(1, 21) = 5.27, p<0.05). Overall, students tended to score 
higher on the post-test than on the pre-test (F(1, 21) = 6.73, p<0.02). There is a suggestion that 
time and PFT group interact for this problem type (F(1, 21) = 3.51, p=0.08), with PFT-Hi students 
improving their scores more than PFT-Lo students (increasing from 4.90 to 7.45, and from 4.16 to 
4.55, respectively). 
Do students with certain psychometric profiles change score more on one BW problem type than 
another? Is change in the same direction for all problem types? To answer these broader ques-
tions, a 2 by 4 repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with problem type nested under time 
as within subjects factors, and psychometric groups as between subjects factor. 
157 
HFT predicted general difference in scores across all BW problem types and tests (F(1, 21) = 9.95, 
p<O.Ol), with HFT-Hi students scoring higher than HFT-Lo students. Similarly, PFT-Hi students 
scored higher overall (F(1, 21) = 13.66, p<0.005). A general effect of time approached significance 
(F(1, 21) = 3.87, p=0.06), but no general interactions between time and HFT or PFT group were 
found. An effect of problem type was found (F(1, 21) = 131.45, p<O.00l) with students scoring 
highest on BWS problems, and lowest on BWM problems. No interactions between goal type 
and HFT/PFT group across time were found. 
When time and goal type were considered, a significant interaction was found (F(1, 21) = 10.26, 
p<O.00l). As a general result of following the Hyperproof course, students improve their perfor-
mance greatly on BWM problems, improve slightly on BWS and BWmodal problems, but seem 
to get worse on BWN problems. This shows that the increase that students indicate on the BW 
test as a result of following the HP course is due only to certain types of problem: in particular, 
the BWM problems. These are problems that require a certain level of graphical abstraction to 
be employed in their solution for them to be solved optimally, and HP assists in teaching the use 
of this graphical abstraction. Presumably, this is only for certain students (the "DetHi" students 
in the original study), and this is reflected in the interactions between time and psychometric 
group for the different problem types. Although there were no interactions between time, prob-
lem type and psychometric group, when the problem types were distinguished such interactions 
were observed. The HFT-Hi group improved on BWM problems, but the HFT-Lo group did not, 
and the PFT-Hi group improved on BWN problems, but the PFT-Lo group did not. Equating 
the HFT-Hi/PFT-Hi groups with the GREA-Hi group, an equation that depends on conceiving 
of each measure reflecting development of appropriately abstract representations, indicates that 
only certain students develop skills in HP that assist on BWM problems which are not detrimen-
tal to BWN problem solution. 
Table 7.6 summarises the changes in scores according to psychometric group. The GRE test is 
also open to such an investigation into the development of different types of problem solving 
skill as a result of following the HP course. 
Correlations for pre- and post-test problem types in the GRE test are shown in Table 7.7 (as with 
the BW data, n=51 for pre-tests, and n=25 for post-tests). Unlike for the BW problem type data, 
no significant correlations were found between pre-test and post-test problem types, nor between 
any of the pre-test and post-test scores. This suggests that GRE problem types seem to distinguish 
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Change I BWS BWM BWN BWmodal 
	
overall 	+ 	+ 	- 	+ 
PFTLo 	 - 
Hi 	 + 
HFTLo 	 - 
Hi 	+ 
Table 7.6: Summary of score changes in the BW test. 
GREM pre GREV pre GRE post GREM post GREV post 
GRES pre 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.17 0.18 
GREM pre 0.21 0.33 0.18 -0.15 
GREV pre 0.18 0.01 -0.01 
GRES post 0.19 0.13 
GREM post 0.38 
Table 7.7: Correlations for GRE goal-type scores. 
responses more than BW problem types. The BW test's provision of a graphical situation may 
lead to more homogeneity among responses to different problem types in the BW. 
As with the BW problem type scores, GRE problem types were analysed using ANOVAs with 
problem type score as dependent variable, time as within subjects factor, and psychometric 
groups as between subjects factors. 
For GRES problems, PFT-Hi students score higher than PFT-Lo students (F(1, 20) = 14.28, 
p<0.005). Time also predicted differences, with post-test scores lower than pre-test scores (F(1, 
20) = 10.12, p<O.Ol). 
For GREV problems, there was a significant interaction between time and PFT group (F(1, 20) = 
5.48, p<0.05). PFT-Lo subjects increased their score (from 0.70 to 0.90), whereas PFT-Hi students' 
scores decreased slightly (from 1.07 to 1.00). 
Analysing the data with a 2 by 4 repeated measures design with problem type nested under time, 
the psychometric groups predicted different changes for each problem type from pre- to post-test. 
There was an effect of PFT group over all problem types (F(2,40) = 9.54, p<O.Ol): PFT-Hi students 
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score higher than PFT-Lo students. There was also an effect of time (F(2,40) = 5.29, p<0.05), the 
post-test was generally found to be more difficult than the pre-test. An effect of problem type 
was found (F(2,40) = 9.85, p<O.00l), with scores on GREM problems higher than those on GRES 
problems, which are higher than those on GREV problems. 
An interaction between PFT group and problem type approached significance (F(2, 40) = 2.79, 
p=0.07), reflecting the large difference in summed (pre- and post-test) scores for GRES problems 
(PFT-Lo: 3.20, PFT-Hi: 5.72), slight difference for GREM problems (PFT-Lo: 5.20, PFT-Hi: 6.57) 
and smaller difference for GREV problems (PFT-Lo: 1.60, PFT-Hi: 2.07). An interaction between 
time and problem type was found (F(2,40) = 4.65, p<0.02). There is a large decrease in GRES 
scores (2.65 to 2.15), a similar decrease for GREM scores (3.59 to 2.92), and a slight increase for 
GREV scores (0.92 to 0.96). 
An interaction between time, problem type and HFT group was also found (F(2, 40) = 4.93, 
p<0.02). Figure 7.9 shows the change in score for each HFT group by problem type. 
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Figure 7.9: Change of scores for GRE goal types by HFT group. 
HFT-Hi students decrease their score on GRES problems dramatically, register a slight increase 
in score on GREM problems, and improve their score on GREV problems most. HFT-Lo students 
increase their GRES problem score slightly, but they also get worse at GREM and GREV prob-
lems. The interaction between GRE problem type and time indicates that the skills used to solve 
different types of problem are differentially affected by the HP course. As with the BW results, 
transfer occurs between domains, but not always in a beneficial mariner. In general, following 
the HP course is good for promoting the solving of GREV problems, but the course also seems 
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to interfere with successful solution of GRES problems. The results also support interpreting 
multiple-case problems as being somehow "in-between" verbal and single-case problems in the 
GRE test: for GREM problems no effect on their solution was observed as a result of following 
the HP course. 
There seem to be interesting and important differences between the BW and the GRE problem 
types, the correlations between them are shown in Table 7.8. Multiple-case problem scores were 
correlated for BW and GRE pre-tests, but just fail to reach significance in the post-test (p=0.07) 
GREM pre-test score also correlates with BWS and BWN pre-test scores, and correlates negatively 
with BWmodal post-test. GRES pre-test score correlates with BWS post-test score, and also with 
BWN post-test score. GREV pre-test score correlates negatively with BWmodal post-test score 
but with no other variable. Performance on multiple-case problems seems to be consistent across 
reasoning domains, but single-case scores do not demonstrate such a clear connection. 
These similarities and differences will be returned to in the discussion section. The results of 
analyses of strategies for the different problem types in HP are now reported. 
GRES pre GREM pre GREV pre GRES post GREM post GREV post 
BWS pre -0.04 0 .30* 0.14 0.37 0.21 0.21 
BWM pre -0.03 0.39** -0.06 0.03 0.30 -0.31 
BWN pre 0.11 0 .38** 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.12 
BWmo pre -0.08 0.26 0.13 0.32 0.33 -0.05 
BWS post 0.43* -0.13 -0.32 0.05 0.22 0.12 
BWM post 0.33 0.23 -0.22 -0.09 0.36 -0.11 
BWN post 0.56** 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.27 0.02 
BWmo post 0.10 0.40* 0.39t -0.03 0.19 0.19 
Table 7.8: Correlations between GRE and BW problem types. 
7.4.3 HP strategies and transfer of reasoning skills 
Overall proof length did not predict learning from HP (with one exception) - the distinction 
into different goal types in HP is necessary for highlighting the skills learned from following 
the course. There was no correlation between overall proof length and the pre-test measures. 
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For GREA, GREy, HFT and PFT, all p>0.4. Students were divided into those that produced 
longer proofs and those that produced shorter proofs overall by a median split. A repeated 
measures ANOVA with GREA score as dependent variable with time as within subjects factor 
and long/short proof length as between subjects factor was performed. Time by proof length 
interacted significantly (F(1, 22) = 8.12, p<0.01, with a main effect of time (F(1, 22) = 7.46, p<0.02). 
Students that produced long proofs decreased their GREA score from pre- to post-test (7.23 to 
4.56), whereas students that produced shorter proofs did not decrease (6.44 to 6.82). When HFT 
and PFT were also entered as between subjects factors, the interaction did not hold. Repeated 
measures ANOVAs with BW as dependent variable did not indicate any interactions or main 
effects of proof length. 
In order to assess interactions between using different strategies for each type of HP goal, median 
splits were performed on the number of situations used to solve each type of goal. So, there is 
a GCS-short proof and a GCS-long proof group, a GCM-short and GCM-long group, and so on. 
The next sections report analyses of changing scores in the GRE and the BW tests measured by 
the different HP strategy groups: comparing strategies on sentential HP goals to graphical HP 
goals; comparing consequence goals and non-consequence goals; and finally comparing single-
case with multiple case goals in HP. 
S-goal and C-goal strategies 
No students were in the G-long and S-short strategy group, and only two students were in the 
G-short S-long group, so these groups are omitted from the following analyses. So, compar-
isons are between students that either used shorter strategies overall, or longer strategies overall. 
Figure 7.10 shows the performance of the S-short G-short strategy group and those that were 
classified as being in the S-long C-long group on the GRE problem types. 
The S-short C-short students seem to improve their scores on the GREV problems from pre-
to post-course, but their scores reduce on the GRES problems. This pattern is reversed for the 5-
long G-long group. A repeated measures ANOVA with single/verbal problem type nested under 
time interacted significantly with these strategy groups (F(l, 17) = 5.36, p<0.05). There were no 
significant interactions when GREM problem scores were included in the ANOVA. GREM pre-
test score did, however, relate to the strategy groups: the S-short C-short group scored lower 
initially on GREM problems (t(14) = 2.13, p=0.05). 
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Figure 7.10: Change of scores for GRE problem types by HP S-goal and G-goal strategy groups. 
Developing strategies that improve scores on the GREV problems seems to have a detrimental 
effect on scores in the GRES problems. Strategies that maintain or improve GRES scores seem 
to impair performance on GREV problems. Long strategies tend to use less abstraction in the 
representations, and, as anticipated, this is good for the single case goals in the GRE test, but 
damaging to the solution of GREV problems as these require a greater degree of abstraction than 
that practiced by these students. Using short strategies seems to be an effective approach for 
solving GREV problems, but not good for GRES problem solution. Students seem in general to 
develop strategies that are either abstract or concrete and these are only appropriate for solv-
ing one type of GRE problem. Furthermore, these strategies seem to have been developed to 
counteract weaknesses in representation use before the HP course was taken. 
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Figure 7.11: Change of scores for BW problem types by HP S-goal and G-goal strategy groups. 
163 
Comparing performance on BW goal types for these groupings, the effect of single case problems 
is reversed (see Figure 7.11). The S-short G-short group increased their score on BWS problems, 
whereas S-long G-long students decreased their score for these problems (the change in BWS 
problem score was significant: t(18) = 2.57, p<0.02). Similarly, for BWN and BWmodal problems, 
the S-short G-short group increased their scores, whereas the S-long G-long group decreased their 
performance on these problems (for differences in score, t(18) = 1.88, p=0.08 for BWN problems, 
and t(18) = 3.26, p<0.005 for BWmodal problems). Unlike with the GRE problem types, there is 
no interaction between different types of BW problem and the strategy groups which means there 
is no indication that the different strategies developed in HP affect BW problem types differently. 
In general, following the HP course seems to be good for all students for solving BW problems 
regardless of their strategy choice. 
Short proofs for a given goal type should mean that students use a level of abstraction appropriate 
to that problem. This is supported by the BW test results where S-short G-short students improve 
in general, whereas S-long G-long students do not show a general improvement, only increasing 
scores on BWM problems. S-short G-short students improve their GREV scores, whereas S-long 
G-long students do not, meaning that the predictions are supported for abstract problems. But 
generally shorter solutions in HP do not relate to improving GRES problem score, in fact the 
reverse holds. Further discriminations of G-goal types are required to cash out this puzzling 
finding. 
The current analysis also offers clues to the psychometric profiles of students that develop dif-
ferent types of strategy in HP. Students that develop short strategies for both 5- and G-goals in 
HP score lower on GREM, BWS and BWmodal pre-test problems. There are no significant dif -
ferences between these two strategy groups in terms of PFT or HFT score. Students that develop 
shorter strategies for HP goals are initially less able at solving problems that require more ab-
stract representations, and seem to develop these more abstract strategies as a response to this 
initial weakness in their reasoning. 
CC-goal and GN-goal strategies 
There are no non-consequence goals in the GRE test, so direct comparison with the different GN- 
goal strategies used in HP are not available. But the possibility still remains that distinctions 
in terms of GN- and GC-goal strategies may relate to different GRE problem types. Figure 7.12 
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shows mean scores for GRE problem types by these strategy groups. 
Both the GC-long GN-short and the GC-long GN-long groups did not seem to improve their 
performance on any of the GRE problem types. The CC-short GN-short and the GC-short GN-
long groups both demonstrated a decrease in GRES score and an increase in GREV score from 
pre- to post-test. This suggests that different strategies for CC-goals alone reflects differences 
in learning to solve the various types of GRE problems. A repeated measures ANOVA with 
GRES/GREV problem type nested under time interacted significantly with CC strategy group. 
CC-short strategy students increase their score on GREV problems and decrease their score on 
GRES problems. The CC-short group end up scoring higher on GREV problems (one-tailed t(20) 
= 1.85, p<0.05) having improved their score on GREV problems by a larger amount (t(18) = 2.91, 
p<0.01). CC-long strategy students decrease their GREV score, and indicate no change on GRES 
problems. This reflects the interaction found for the S-short G-short group compared to the S-
long G-long group. 
Developing CC-short strategies are good for GREV problems, but bad for GRES problems. Short 
proofs use situations that are more abstract overall which is better for verbal problems, but not 
good if the task is to produce a single concrete situation. There is no perceptible effect of different 
strategies for solving CN-goals. This is perhaps because the different strategies do not relate to 
use of abstraction or concreteness in representation, but rather refers to whether GN-goals are 
solved simultaneously (CN-short) or successively (GN-long). 
For BW problem types, again CC strategy group seems to reflect differences in score more than 
GN strategy group (see Figure 7.13), and CC strategy seems to influence changes in BWN score 
more than GN strategy does. The CC-short strategy group increase their scores on BWS, BWN 
and BWmodal problems, whereas the CC-long group decrease their scores (t(19) = 2.50, p<O.OS; 
t(19) = 2.22, p<O.OS; and t(19) = 3.06, p<O.Ol, respectively). For BWM problems, all strategy 
groups seem to increase their scores, meaning that following the HP course is good for all stu-
dents for these problems. 
The CC-short strategy group scored lower initially on BWS, BWN and BWmodal problems (t(18) 
= 2.76, p<z0.02; t(19) = 1.98, p=0.06; and t(17) = 2.99, p<O.Ol, respectively). Different strategy 
groups do not score significantly differently on the HFT or the PFT tests. 
As with the S-short C-short strategy group, CC-short students tend to score lower on abstract 
problems before following the HP course, and seem to develop strategies to cope with this weak- 
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Figure 7.12: Change of scores for GRE problem types by HP GC and GN strategy group. 
ness. The psychometric measures do not, however, relate to different strategy use. 
GCS-goal and GCM-goal strategies 
It was predicted that GCS-long GCM-short students would increase their GRES score but de- 
crease their GREV score, but GCS-short GCM-long students would demonstrate the reverse pat- 
tern. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA, with single/verbal GRE problem score nested 
under time revealed a significant interaction between these two groups (F(1, 10) = 6.16, p<0.05). 
GCS-long GCM-short students increased their score on GREV problems more than GCS-short 
GCM-long students (t(10) = 3.55, p<O.Ol), resulting in them scoring higher on the GREV prob- 
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Figure 7.13: Change of scores for BW problem types by HP CC and GN strategy group. 
lems in the post-test (t(11) = 2.65, p<0.05). Including GREM problem scores in the ANOVA does 
not reveal an interaction, and change in GREM score is not distinguished by these two strat-
egy groups. Figure 7.14 shows GRE problem means for GCM short/long and GCS short/long 
strategy use. 
Considering strategies in HP as reflecting different use of abstraction/concreteness in represen-
tation enables a more detailed characterisation of GCM- and GCS-goal strategies in these terms. 
GCM-long proofs use representations that are more concrete than GCM-short proofs. GCS-long 
proofs use representations that are more abstract than GCS-short proofs. Thus, GCM-long GCS-
short strategy users are those that have an affinity for concrete representations in their problem 
solving, whereas GCM-short GCS-long students are ineluctably drawn to use abstract represen- 
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Figure 7.14: Change of scores for single/multiple/verbal GRE problems by HP GCM and GCS 
strategy group. 
tations. 
The suggestion that GCS-long GCM-short strategy students develop one strategy good for GREM 
problems but poor for GRES problems, whereas GCS-short GCM-long strategy students develop 
a strategy good for GRES problems but poor for GREM problems is only half-supported by the 
current investigation, as GREM problems are not significantly different for the two groups. How-
ever, considering GREV problems against GRES problems reveals that these HP groups seem to 
develop a strategy that is only appropriate for one problem type, and actually inefficient for solv-
ing problems of the other type, where inefficiency is determined by the number of situations used 
to solve the goal. This supports a taxonomy of problem types that characterises verbal problems 
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as an extreme version of multiple case problems. 
Distinguishing groups by GCS-short/long strategy indicated that the GCS-long strategy group 
score higher initially on GRES problems than those that use GCS-short strategies (t(19) = 2.12, 
p<z0.05). Also, the GCS-long group end up scoring higher on GREV problems than the GCS-short 
group (t(21) = 2.04, p=0.05), as a result of improving their GREV score whereas the GCS-short 
strategy group decrease their score (t(19) = 1.91, p=0.07). The GCM-short group also increase 
their GREV score whereas GCM-long students decrease their score (t(19) = 2.44, p<O.OS). This 
results in the GCM-short group scoring higher on the GREV post-test score (t(21) = 1.86, p:=0.08 3 ). 
So strategies that use abstract representations seem to be developed in order to compensate for 
initial difficulties over abstract GRE problems. Equally, concrete strategies seem to be developed 
to compensate for low pre-test score on GRES problems. 
Students that are adaptive in their strategy for different goal types in HP (the GCS-short GCM-
short group) indicate a general deterioration in scores on the GRE from pre- to post-test, though 
not significantly worse than any other strategy group. This is intriguing, and suggests that a more 
strait-jacketed approach to problems in HP may be better for transferring reasoning skills to other 
domains. The GCS/GCM-long group and the GCS/GCM-short group learn something from HP, a 
general approach that is very useful in some situations, and operable, even if inefficient, in other 
situations. 
For BW problems, all four strategy groups seemed to perform differently (see Figure 7.15). The 
GCS-long GCM-short strategy group seem to improve their BWS score more than GCS-short 
GCM-long strategy group (one-tailed t(10) = 1.71, p=0.059), suggesting the reverse of the GRES 
problem performance. These groups do distinguish change of score on the BWmodal problems, 
however, with the GCM-long GCS-short group decreasing their scores, but GCM-short GCS-long 
students increasing scores (t(10) = 2.51, p<0.05). 
Distinguishing students by GCM-short/long group revealed several differences. GCM-short stu-
dents scored lower in the pre-test on BWS, BWN and BWmodal problems than the GCM-long 
group (t(19) = 2.92, p<O.Ol; t(20) = 1.75, one-tailed p<0.05; and t(18) = 2.87, p<0.02, respec-
tively). The GCM-short strategy group improved scores on BWS, BWN and BWmodal problems, 
whereas the GCM-long group decreased their scores on the BWN and BWmodal problems and 
3Significant as a one-tailed test, p(0.05. 
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did not indicate an increase in score on the BWS problems from pre- to post-test (for change in 
BWS by GCM-long/short group: t(20) = 2.36, p<0.05; for BWN: t(20) = 1.78, one-tailed p<0.05; 
and for BWmodal: t(20) = 2.69, p<z0.02). GCS-short/long groups did not distinguish any of the 
BW problem type scores. 
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Figure 7.15: Change of scores for BW problem types by HP GCM and GCS strategy group. 
If the psychometric tests are reflections of flexibility in selecting appropriate levels of abstrac-
tion for different problems, then it was predicted that the GCS-short GCM-short strategy group 
should score highest on the PFT and HFT tests. In fact, the reverse seems to be true. These are 
students that score low on the PFT and HFT (see Table 7.9), though one-way ANOVAs were not 
significant (F(3,17) = 2.00, p=0.15 for }-WF score; and F(3,17) = 0.95, p=0.44  for PFT score). From 
the table it looks like these measures reflect styles of abstraction use rather than abilities. Students 
that use abstract representations score highest on both measures, and significantly higher than 
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the GCS-short GCM-short group (for HFT: t(8) = 2.42, p<0.05; and for PFT: t(8) = 2.06, p=0.07 4 ) 
Mixed Concrete Abstract 
GCS-s GCM-s 	GCS-1 GCM-1 GCS-s GCM-1 GCS-1 GCM-s 
PFT 11.80 13.50 13.57 14.40 
HFT 8.20 13.75 14.29 19.00 
Table 7.9: PFT/HFT scores for GCS/GCM strategy groups. 
7.5 Discussion 
This second HP study succeeded in replicating the aptitude-treatment interactions found in the 
original HP experiment and the syllogism teaching study. This means that the finer-grained 
analysis carried out in this study infuses these previous studies - the findings here apply beyond 
the HP domain. 
In contrast to the original study, though, a new range of strategies were identified - the senten-
tial strategy for HP problems had not occurred in the original study. This new strategy sits on a 
continuum with the strategies previously observed in HP, and the dimension they differ on is the 
level of abstraction employed in the representations used. The level of abstraction relates to the 
parallel/abstract and sequential/ specific implementations of the ICIA in syllogistic reasoning. 
As with the syllogistic algorithms, cases are either fully specified in sequential order, or cases 
have properties that remain unspecified until all are resolved. Using more abstract representa-
tions reduces the number of cases to be considered, as the level of "granularity" is greater, but 
the operations (i.e., possibilities for the "merge" steps in HP) that can be made on these cases is 
more complex. 
The HVF relates to use of these different strategies in HP, reflecting the level of abstraction used by 
the students. Using more abstraction in the HP representations corresponds with scoring higher 
on the HFT. The HFT was predicted to be an indicator of preference for different strategies in 
domains where there is less structure, and more freedom to pursue alternative approaches to 
problems. HP provides sufficient freedom for the HFT to emerge as a measure of abstraction use. 
4 Significant as a one-tailed test: p<0.05. 
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One of the principal aims of this chapter was to "demystify" the GRE test, by interpreting it in 
terms of the strategy - representation - algorithm framework presented in previous chapters. The 
extent to which this has been achieved is tied to the success of the taxonomy of problem types as 
empirically substantive and theoretically useful. 
With regard to the GRE problem type classification, there was some support for the distinctions 
from the clustering analyses - the responses of students reflected the ordering of problems ac-
cording to the level of abstraction required to solve the problem efficiently. The GRE problem 
classification also helped to cast light on the ATIs, illuminating who learned what and, to a cer-
tain extent, why there were these effects in transfer. Students with previous weaknesses for a 
particular problem type seemed to develop strategies that dealed with their weakness, but this 
was an over-compensation which affected their ability to solve other problems effectively. Stu-
dents that scored low initially on GRES problems, for example, developed a strategy in HP that 
used more concrete representations (GCS-short GCM-long proofs) and this led to an increase in 
their GRES problem score on the post-test, but a reduction in their GREV problem scores. The 
taxonomy of problem types applied to HP and the GRE revealed that there was a general rigidity 
about the strategies developed by students. Most students used abstract or concrete representa-
tions regardless of the requirements of the particular goal. This rigidity was seen in terms of the 
"holist" and "serialist" strategies used by students in the original HP study - holist proofs relate 
to use of more abstraction, serialist proofs relate to use of more concrete situations. Pask's "patho-
logical" problem solvers, then, emerge in the HP course. The problem type taxonomy indicates 
that the "determinateness" of a problem relates to the effectiveness of alternative strategies, and 
these strategies can be described in terms of the level of abstraction used in the representations. 
However, the success of the taxonomy of problem types is not without constraint. Single case 
and multiple case problems are shared across the BW and the GRE tests, and there are some 
differences in response by students to the same type of problem on the different tests. 
Multiple case problems are related in these two tests: BWM and GREM pre-test scores correlate 
highly, but the single-case problems are not so related. Furthermore, students that improve on 
certain types of GRE problem as a result of following the HP course do not indicate the same 
change in the BW test. The example of strategy groups on the GCS and GCM HP goal types is a 
case in point. The GCS-short GCM-long group increase GRES scores but decrease GREM scores. 
The same group exhibits little change in BWS score and shows an increase in BWM score. The 
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GCS-long GCM-short group decrease GRES score and increase GREM score, and the same group 
increases BWS score and increases BWM score. 
It was previously mentioned that perhaps constructivism could explain these differences, so to 
what extent is this true? The hypothesis was that the BW test gives a situation to the student, 
whereas in the GRE test, the situation has to be constructed from scratch. Therefore, it is plausi-
ble that the provision of a situation may encourage strategies that use concrete representations, 
which could override a student's preference for using more abstract representations. The GCS-
short GCM-long group use concrete representations in HP. The BW format is already promoting 
concrete representations and so little change will be seen in the students that are learning to 
use such concrete representations for problems that require the construction of situations from 
scratch. The general increase in BW scores for all students accounts for the BWM increase when 
GREM scores do not increase, suggesting that solution of BWM problems is not susceptible to 
strategic variations. The post-test BWM problems may have been easier than the pre-test prob-
lems of this type, for instance. The GCS-long GCM-short group use abstract representations in 
HP and decrease their GRES scores but increase their BWS scores. Again, the promoting of more 
concrete representations by the BW test means that BWS performance is not impaired by the 
student learning to use more abstract representations. 
The taxonomy of problem types is supported by the empirical results, and helps to indicate the 
transfer effects from learning a flexible system of problem solving using representations employ-
ing various levels of abstraction. How does this relate to the syllogism teaching study? Two 
psychometric measures overlapped between the HP study and the syllogism study. 
In HP, PFT group indicates an effect for single case problems, with PFT-Hi students solving GRES 
and BWS problems more accurately than PFT-Lo students, whereas for multiple case problems 
the difference is smaller. PFT group seems to influence effective solution of problems where ab-
stract representations are useful. In the syllogism study, the PFT-Hi group are better at translating 
out of the graphical, EC representations, which promote a parallel/ abstract approach. So, to what 
extent is the PFT a measure of strategic flexibility? One possibility is that it is a measure of ability 
to translate between representations which, as previously mentioned in Chapter 6, may be an im-
portant aspect of using multiple strategies. The HP study does not indicate that PFT-Hi students 
are better than PFT-Lo students at other problem types, but nor are they found to be worse. The 
flexibility hypothesis, then, does not gain support, but it is not disproved either. At the least, the 
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PFT reflects effective use of parallel/ abstract approaches both in HP and in syllogistic reasoning 
and is silent with regard to sequential/ specific approaches. 
The GREA subscale was also found to relate to performance on learning methods for solving 
syllogisms. GREA-Hi students learned better from the EC method, whereas GREA-Lo students 
learned better from the ND method. The GREA-Hi students are those that are better at both the 
GRES and GREM problems, and so from the perspective of the taxonomy of problem types, the 
GREA is a composite measure. The GREA-Hi students therefore present as a group that is flexible 
and able at different types of problem. The analyses of the "Office" problem (Figure 7.1) and the 
"Poets" problem (Figure 7.2) earlier in this chapter suggest that different levels of abstraction in 
representation are required for solving these problems, but that both would be rather difficult and 
cumbersome if all possible situations are specified uncritically. The original GREA groupings, 
then, suggest some reflection of the parallel/abstract approach, provided it is borne in mind that 
such approaches require eventual specification of individuals. How the specification is arrived 
at is the distinction between the algorithms, and the GREA measures this distinction. 
A reanalysis of the teaching syllogism study suggests itself: to assess whether it is GRES or GREM 
response that predicts response to the two teaching methods. Median splits were performed on 
the groups according to their scores on the GRES, the GREM and the GREV measures as defined 
in the second HP study. Two-way ANOVAs with teaching method and GRE problem type group 
were performed, with errors and interventions on each stage in the method as dependent vari-
able. Table 7.10 shows the interactions. The GREV measure does not discriminate performance 
on the two teaching methods, this confirms earlier analyses using the "old" GREV subscale mea-
sure. Both the GRES and the GREM groups distinguish response to the two methods, though the 
GRES group distinguishes the translating in stage and the manipulating stages for both errors 
and interventions. All the interactions are in the same direction as those found for the GREA 
measure in Chapter 6 - scoring high on the GRES or the GREM problems relates to finding the 
EC method easier and the ND method more difficult. However, the composite GREA grouping 
did not distinguish response to the methods for the translating-out stage, but the GRES shows a 
clear influence here, and there is a suggestion of one from the GREM group. This is the point in 
the procedure where the selected individual is specified, a process akin to the construction of a 
single case in the "Office" problem, for example. 
Once again, the GREV measure does not predict differences in response to the two methods. This 
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Interactions I GRES 	 GREM 	 GREV 
Translation-in, errors F(1, 13) = 3.01, p=O.11 
interventions F(1, 13) = 4.56, p=0.06 
Manipulating, errors F(1, 13) = 6.69, p=0.02 
interventions F(1, 13) = 7.79, p=0.02 
Translating-out, errors F(1, 13) = 5.86, p=0.03 
interventions F(1, 13) = 11.26, p=O.Ol 
F(1, 13) = 0.89, ns 
F(1, 13) = 0.47, ns 
F(1, 13) = 0.64, ns 
F(1, 13) = 4.26, p=0.06 
F(1, 13) = 4.32, p=0.06 
F(1, 13) = 4.39, p=0.06 
F(1, 13) = 0.09, ns 
F(1, 13) = 2.17, ns 
F(1, 13) = 2.63, ns 
F(1, 13) = 1.97, ns 
F(1, 13) = 0.01, ns 
F(1, 13) = 0.15, ns 
Table 7.10: ANOVA interactions for syllogism teaching and the different GRE problem types. 
suggests that one of the other "ignored" dimensions that distinguishes GREV problem types from 
GRES and GREM problems is perhaps at play. The level of abstraction is somewhat an oversim-
plification of the potential variation in reasoning approaches. Finding a relationship between the 
GREV and the ND method in the reverse direction would have strengthened claims for the di-
chotomy between the parallel/ abstract and sequential/ specific approaches to problem solving. 
The ND method does not seem to present the "perfect" strategy for students with a preference 
for a sequential/ specific approach. 
In summary, the HP study has shown that use of different levels of abstraction in representa-
tions is related to the number of cases constructed in reasoning. These strategies are observable 
and rigidly applied by students in a number of different reasoning tasks. The final chapter next 
considers these findings in the context of dual process theories of thinking, devised to explain 
individual differences in reasoning. The conclusions also extend some of the educational impli-
cations of the empirical studies in this thesis. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions: theories of reasoning 
and theories of thinking 
Following a summary of the main achievements of this thesis, some of the difficulties and chal-
lenges to the account presented are anticipated. Considering alternative accounts for the same 
phenomena leads to suggestions for future work. These conclusions also contemplate the con-
nection between theories of reasoning and theories of thinking, a connection profitably forged 
by individual differences research. Dual-process accounts of thinking accounting for different 
approaches to reasoning are related to the computational styles approach taken in this thesis. 
Penultimately, the impact of the current studies on educational issues are explored, particularly 
the implications for the aims and effectiveness of teaching formal problem solving skills. Finally, 
suggestions for future directions and explorations are made. 
8.1 Achievements of the thesis 
This thesis has attempted to provide explanations of aptitude-treatment interaction results in 
terms of the processes related to use of different representations. Such an approach has provided 
both theoretical and empirical results. 
The strategies used for solving problems in a number of domains have been reclassified in terms 
of the level of abstraction in the representations used in the strategies. There is a general trend 
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towards developing strategies that use more appropriate levels of abstraction. However, use of 
these strategies is not entirely due to abilities in developing this appropriate abstraction, but also 
due to preferences for using different levels of abstraction in representation. This point will be 
returned to below, when alternative explanations that consider these styles as abilities are consid-
ered. The characterisation of the different strategies has been described in terms of the compu-
tational processes that are induced by the use of different levels of abstraction in representation, 
styles that process specific cases sequentially, or more abstract cases in a more holistic manner. 
Psychometric approaches to strategies and representations have been redescribed in terms of 
computational styles, which is closer to an explanatory account, and also makes modelling of the 
different strategies possible. 
A further theoretical achievement, with implications for educational research, is the classification 
of different problem types in terms of the level of abstraction in the representations used to solve 
them appropriately. This enables a first attempt at characterising what the different problems 
in the GRE analytic reasoning test are gauging: they probe the flexibility of students to employ 
different levels of abstraction as appropriate to the problem in hand. This underlies the use of 
the GREA subscale as a style measure relating to performance in other reasoning domains. Stu-
dents that are comfortable with use of abstract representations perform better on the GREA test, 
whereas those that are more au fait with a case-specifying approach do not perform so well on 
these problem types. Furthermore, such a classification enables the GREV subscale to be con-
sidered on the same dimension with the GREA subscale, supporting the presence of both these 
scales on the same test. Consequently, this means that performing successfully on this test re-
quires using a wide range of abstraction in representations and successfully fitting the level of 
abstraction to the problem type, which would require metacognitive assessment of the represen-
tation to be used before the problem is attempted. Providing an analysis of what the GREA test 
actually tests is no small achievement. There have been few, if any, studies relating the GREA 
test to psychometrics (see Enright, Tucker & Katz, 1994), and no process accounts have been at-
tempted, except for a computer program that solves the single case class of problems, developed 
by Rood (1997). The GREV subscale is similarly underexplored, with descriptive attempts being 
rare exceptions (Yang & Johnson-Laird, 1999). 
A main empirical finding of the studies in this thesis was the generalising of strategies across 
domains, enabled by considering strategies, representations and algorithms jointly. The same 
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aptitude-treatment interactions were replicated not only in one domain (HP) with two very dif-
ferent subject populations, but also in a very different reasoning task (syllogisms) with a much 
shorter teaching intervention. This suggests that the description of the strategies in terms com-
mon to both these domains is plausible and, indeed, necessary for a full appreciation of the 
effects. 
Another achievement of the thesis is in terms of the separation of different stages in external 
representation use. A case was made for the differentiation of translating-in, manipulating, and 
translating-out of representations when attempting to characterise the use made of external rep-
resentations to support reasoning. The use of psychometrics supported the separation, but it 
drives an underexplored field of study into the different influence of the different stages on prob-
lem solution, left unexamined by contemporary studies (see, e.g., Scaife & Rogers, 1996; Cheng, 
Lowe & Scaife, in press). Issues of constructivism (Cox, 1996), for example, relate differently to 
the various stages in use of representations. What effect does being given representations have 
on the student's ability to translate effectively into and out of the representation? What influ-
ence on the manipulation of the representations does being given the representation have? These 
questions are doubtless related but by no means identical, and a breakdown of representation use 
into (at least) these three stages is a potentially useful addendum to current research into external 
representation use. 
The individual differences in reasoning highlighted by the current analysis indicate that stu-
dents respond differently to teaching methods that use different representations, and also spon-
taneously develop strategies that use representations that differ in similar ways to those em-
ployed in the teaching. For categorial syllogisms, Ford's (1995) analysis of spontaneous strategy 
development gives credence to case-identifiability as the underlying class of algorithms that is 
being implemented in various ways by students. Furthermore, transfer of skills from one do-
main (HP) to another (BW and GRE) have been discovered. These skills do not reflect flexible 
approaches to problems as a result of learning logic, rather they indicate "pathological" tenden-
cies in the student's strategic repertoire. This inflexibility arises in students that have a weakness 
for solving certain types of problem, requiring either concrete or abstract representations, and 
then developing skills to cope with these weaknesses which interfere with problems that they 
initially had little difficulty with. Such findings have implications for the teaching of logic and 
strategic flexibility. These will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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These achievements rest on experiments that are not without difficulties, and the theory behind 
the interpretations of the results rest on certain assumptions that may not be widely shared. Some 
difficulties with these accounts are discussed in the next section. 
8.2 Criticisms and problems 
There are four criticisms that could be levelled at the account of individual differences in rea-
soning presented in this thesis. The first three are practical concerns, and the last questions the 
theoretical basis of the account. 
One possible criticism is that the experiments reported have all used small populations of sub-
jects. Use of psychometrics, because they tend to be multicomponential, and because test-retest 
reliabilities are often quite low, will only support theories of task solution if large subject numbers 
are employed. The lack of correlation between the GRE tests and the HFT, for example, which 
would be expected to be significant in a large population, point to the weakness of using small 
groups. The subject group size for the teaching syllogism study is small, as is the group that 
participated in both the pre-tests and the post-tests in the second HP study. Using subject groups 
as small as 17 is far below the large numbers used in many psychometric studies. 
Relatedly, the second criticism concerns the experimental designs being far from ideal. Different 
pre-tests are used for the different studies, and no explicit connection between the two reasoning 
domains is provided. The experimental designs appear rather ad hoc, so comparisons between 
domains can only be suggestive. 
Addressing the first criticism, the use of large subject groups to compensate for the variance 
in use of psychometric measures was neither necessary nor appropriate in the studies reported 
in this thesis. This is because large subject groups help to smooth out the unevenness in rea-
soning performance when related to psychometrics, and this unevenness is the very focus of 
investigation in this thesis. In addition, the current study aimed to investigate exactly what the 
psychometrics are testing, by relating them to detailed data available from the studies. Due to 
the high concentration of data in the studies, it was considered impractical and unecessary to use 
large subject populations. Concentrating on strategy variation, rather than crude performance 
measures means that small subject groups are better fitted. The existence of aptitude-treatment 
interaction (All) replications in the three studies indicates that the populations are large enough 
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to reveal interesting similarities across domains. True generality of the results can be claimed 
when similar patterns of performance emerge from different subject populations solving tasks in 
different reasoning domains, and this provides a truer indication of the usefulness of the current 
approach to elaborating individual differences in reasoning. 
The All replications are also pertinent to the second practical criticism. These ATIs, which have 
proved remarkably elusive to attempts at replication (Snow, 1980), show that the overlap be-
tween the domains is well-established, and qualitatively similar. However, ideally, a study that 
directly links the two reasoning domains would provide more complete support for the connec-
tion between strategies used for these two domains. Failing that, using all the same pre-tests and 
post-tests for each of the teaching studies would be next best. The designs of the studies were 
initially inspired by attempts to relate different representation use to previous studies of strategy 
change which used only spatial ability measures. The PFT was used in both teaching studies. Un-
fortunately, the importance of style in strategy change and representation use that was revealed 
in the syllogism study emerged after the second HP study, so the II task and the serialist/holist 
questionnaire were not related directly to HP. A study that compared performance on syllogism 
problem solving to performance on HP would be an interesting investigation, though one per-
haps prone to interference between domains. The studies reported are not complete in their 
overlap, but the areas of commonality are sufficient for the investigations to be more than merely 
speculative in their contribution to reasoning research. 
The third criticism challenges the "subjective" nature of the teaching syllogisms experiment. 
There was only one instructor that taught the syllogisms, and interventions were made when 
the subject was judged by the instructor to be having difficulties with the method. There is also 
a fair degree of subjectivity in the marking of interventions and errors from the videos and tran-
scriptions of the teaching dialogues. It would certainly be useful to have a replication of the 
teaching experiment using another instructor, or alternatively to construct an automatic tutor for 
teaching the methods for solving syllogisms. However, justification for the results of the teaching 
syllogism experiment once again comes from the existence of the ATJs, Ails that emerge when 
the instructor is blind to the psychometric scores of the subjects. The replication of similar ef -
fects in different reasoning domains suggests that such patterns of interactions are robust, and 
subjective influences did not affect the results unduly. 
The fourth, more theoretical concern, challenges the relationship between the representational 
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differences observed in the different reasoning domains discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, and the 
computational account as outlined in this thesis. This relationship is underspecified, underex-
plored, and furthermore is not the only way of describing the differences. As observations these 
points are perhaps valid, as criticisms they are not. There are several ways that psychometric 
accounts can be aligned with computational accounts and this suggests that such alignments are 
not isomorphic. But this is not to say that such connections are not useful, or that they are theo-
retically flawed. Good theories provide explanations and predictions for performance as well as 
descriptions of that performance. Observing the similarity between the Ails in different domains 
requires an expression of those commonalities between performance on the various tasks. The 
sequential/specific parallel/ abstract distinction is one such expression. 
So is the theory too general to be useful? The results of the empirical studies in this thesis suggest 
that interpreting reasoning performance in terms of the computational styles is a productive ap-
proach. The space of possible strategies is illuminated and a program for effectively intervening 
in the development and teaching of problem solving skills is generated. A way of assessing the 
usefulness, generality, and explanatory value of the current approach is to compare it to other 
accounts that have provided description, classification, and explanation of different strategies 
in reasoning. Though framed as alternative accounts, without attention to strategies, representa-
tions and the underlying processes these accounts are incomplete and may require supplementing 
with another level of description. In this sense, alternative explanations may be incomplete or 
complementary accounts of individual differences in reasoning. 
8.3 "Alternative" explanations 
Another possible criticism of the account provided in this thesis is that it just describes the phe-
nomena at the wrong explanatory level. A better alternative would be to describe different styles 
of reasoning in terms of the different representations used (e.g., Roberts et al., 1997). However, 
the starting point of the investigations in this thesis was the inadequacy of describing strategy 
preference and change in terms of types of representation. Spatial ability measures related to 
complex problem solving tasks in that subjects that scored high on these measures were better 
able to develop representations that were more effective for solving the problem. So, the change 
from spatial to verbal occurs in linear syllogisms, but not for the sentence-picture verification 
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task, and certainly not for categorial syllogisms. 
The next alternative is that the level of abstraction in the representation is the appropriate level 
of explanation. This is closer to the mark, but it doesn't capture students' preferences when 
different types of representation do not differ in terms of their level of abstraction, and this seems 
to be the case for categorial syllogisms. Paivio (1986) switched from describing the different 
representations to consider the processing inherent in using the different representations, and 
such a reanalysis is necessary for explanations of performance above and beyond descriptions of 
strategic variation. In HP, the All was explained in terms of abstract representations relating to 
using few cases in proofs and concrete representations relating to strategies that specify many 
cases. In the syllogism study, the level of abstraction is harder to identify, but the difference is 
instantiated in terms of how and when the properties of individuals are expressed in the EC and 
ND methods. In the syllogism domain, the All is due to preferences for this general approach, 
rather than preferences for different levels of abstraction in the representations used. 
Rather than challenging the level of description of the strategic differences observed across a 
range of reasoning tasks, another point of divergence in theory is whether differences are due to 
styles, or whether such different strategies can reduce to measures of ability. The idea here is that 
certain strategy patterns emerge due to differing abilities to develop and test alternative strate-
gic approaches to the problem. Roberts and Newton (in preparation) have such a theory: they 
suggest that strategies develop only when there is a "window of opportunity" for such devel-
opment. The conditions under which such a window occurs are when the subject has sufficient 
resources left over from maintaining the representation they are using, and sufficient cognitive 
load to justify making such changes. So, for example, in the compass directions task, subjects that 
scored higher on measures of spatial ability were more likely to change from the spatial to the 
cancellation strategy sooner and these are the students who have better "representational abili-
ty", leaving more resources available for assessment of alternative strategies. However, such a 
strategy change did not occur for these subjects when pencil and paper was provided, removing 
the incentive to ease cognitive load during the task. 
Such an approach is consistent with accounts that have linked intelligence, or psychometric g, 
to reasoning ability, where greater intelligence is characterised in terms of greater cognitive re-
sources for problem representation and solution. Kyllonen and Christal (1990) eponymously 
stated that "reasoning ability is little more than working memory capacity!?". They found that 
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general reasoning ability (Carroll, 1989) correlated highly and consistently with general working-
memory capacity. Just and Carpenter (1992) put forward a complementary "capacity" theory of 
working memory that interprets the connection between reasoning ability and the availability 
of activation as a resource for cognitive processing. Hence, the ability to abstract information is 
consonant with greater availability of resources, and this is a position put forward by Stanovich 
(1999). This will be discussed below. 
For the studies presented in this thesis, the two "computational styles" (see Table 8.1) discussed 
could be due to differing abilities for representational ability. One computational style reflects 
the availability of greater cognitive resources. So, the PFT and the HFT, and the GRE test are 
measures of "intelligence", or cognitive resources, rather than reflecting cognitive styles. Stu-
dents that scored higher on any or all these measures demonstrate greater intelligence, and so 
the strategies that these students utilise are those due to the possession of greater resources. A 
difficulty for such accounts are that the different "ability" measures do not reflect use of the 
same strategies. Furthermore, the All results present problems for such accounts. Presumably 
students that have more cognitive resources would learn better from any teaching method, and 
this was a possibility considered in the syllogism teaching study with regard to the PFT mea-
sure. Such a complex pattern of strategy development and the Ails suggest that the strategies 
at issue reflect bipolar measures, and hence cognitive styles rather than abilities. Accounts of 
working memory do have a significant role to play in describing and depicting the processes at 
play. Absent in the account presented in this thesis is any mention of the engine powering case-
storage and inference production. Such an account, however, should be aware that resources are 
deployed differently according to cognitive style and experiments relating working memory to 
reasoning ought to take these into consideration. 
Studies of the relationship between different components of working memory (see, e.g., Badde-
ley, 1990) and reasoning performance are a particularly promising starting point. Gilhooly et al. 
(1993) gave subjects categorial syllogisms to solve in a control condition and a dual task condi-
tion. The dual task was one of three secondary tasks: tapping, which occupied the visuo-spatial 
scratchpad (VSSP); articulatory suppression, occupying the phonological loop; and random gen-
eration of numbers between 1 and 10, which interfered with the operation of the central execu-
tive component. Of these tasks, only random generation significantly reduced the accuracy of 
syllogism solving. It was proposed that the articulatory loop has a lesser role in performance, 
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whereas the VSSP has no involvement at all in the subjects' performance on this task. However, 
they noted that the presence of dual tasks forced subjects to change strategy for solving the prob-
lems. It seemed that most subjects were employing an atmosphere or a matching strategy while 
solving the problems, with only a few working on the "logic" of the problem. In the dual task 
conditions, subjects switched to less sophisticated strategies. Toms, Morris and Ward (1993) also 
found that, for conditional reasoning, occupying the VSSP and the articulatory loop did not inter-
fere with reasoning performance, but central executive dual tasks did. Vandierendonck and De 
Vooght (1997) found that all three components of working memory were involved in linear syllo-
gistic reasoning, whereas Oberauer et al. (1996) found that the VSSP did have a role in syllogistic 
reasoning. These somewhat conflicting results provide further evidence that the different strate-
gies that subjects are employing on the tasks must be taken into consideration. Relating dual task 
conditions to the use of taught strategies such as the EC or ND methods for solving syllogisms, 
or classifying students on a pre-test into those that use spatial or verbal strategies on a given 
task (Ford, 1995) may assist in assessing the variation and change in the resource deployment of 
working memory components in reasoning tasks (Shah & Miyake, 1996). 
A further possibility for redescribing the results presented in this thesis comes from the heuristics 
and biases literature. Recent work in this field has offered "dual process" accounts of reasoning, 
which postulate two different systems, or processes, that individuals can apply to problem solv-
ing situations. These theories are discussed in the next section, relating theories of reasoning to 
theories of thinking. These dual process accounts provide a useful generalisation of the current 
investigation, and also link the current theory of individual differences in strategy and represen-
tation use to heuristics and biases in reasoning. 
The dual process accounts are relevant to the account of use of different strategies, represen-
tations and algorithms in reasoning because they indicate a similar dichotomy of approaches. 
The extent to which the individual is prone to contextualisation of information - a central theme 
of dual process accounts - is a symptom of the vulnerability of the representational system to 
such influences. The point, in summary, is that contextualisation is more likely to occur with se-
quential/specific approaches as contextualisation enables individuals to be fully specified (even 
if these are at the expense of covering the space of possibilities). This point will be elaborated 





Processing styles parallel sequential 
abstract specific 
No-conversion Non-Convertor Convertor 
Psychometrics Holist Serialist 
GREA-Hi GREA-Lo 
HFT-Hi HFT-Lo 
Table 8.1: Properties of the two reasoning styles. 
8.4 Theories of reasoning and thinking 
This thesis has presented arguments and experiments in support of an account of reasoning that 
details two learning styles that are based on different computational styles of processing. These 
two styles are manifested with a number of related properties, and have been shown to relate to 
different psychometrics as shown in Table 8.1. 
This is reminiscent of other dual-process accounts in reasoning. Three theories in particular are 
closely related to the account presented in this thesis. They differ from the current account in that 
each makes moral claims about the reprehensibility of using one or other process for reasoning 
tasks. The two reasoning styles depicted in the current study are essentially different ways of 
approaching tasks, which may be more or less appropriate according to task requirements. 
In order to account for the apparent irrationality in reasoning tasks of highly intelligent in-
dividuals, Evans and Over (1996) formulated a distinction between two forms of rationality. 
Rationality i is attuned to actions that that are efficient and general for achieving personal goals. 
Rationality2 has a more objective bent, producing actions that are based on a reason sanctioned 
by a normative theory. Rationality i is achieved via tacit cognitive processes whereas rationality 2 
is served by explicit processes. They note that "our thinking is highly focused on what are sub-
jectively relevant features in the task information and from memory" (p.143), and this form of 
processing is very quick, powerful, preconscious, parallel and implicit. Furthermore, this form 
of processing is exhibited as "biases" in reasoning in the Linda problem (see below), or in the 
four-card task, for example. However, it is coupled with an explicit reasoning system, and the 
operation of the two systems combine in determining actions. The operation of these two sys- 
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tems is interactive, rather than sequential or conflicting. Inferences and responses can result from 
the operation of the implicit system with the subject giving an answer that "feels right", or the 
subject may make a conscious effort at explicit reasoning and so exhibit System 2 processing. 
When the explicit system is employed, it is still prone to the limitations imposed by the implicit 
system: 
For example, on the selection task not only is people's conscious thinking restricted 
in general to the matching cards, but their thought about the consequences of turning 
the cards is also limited to the matching values on the other side (Evans & Over, 1996, 
p.146). 
Sloman (1996) also distinguishes two systems of reasoning. The first, related to Evans' "heuristic" 
system, is based on associative processing: "associative reasoning inherits a property of associa-
tive systems: It computes on the basis of similarity and temporal structure" (Sloman, 1996, p.4). 
It has the properties of reflecting "similarity and contiguity", operating "reflexively", is parallel, 
and is generally unconscious processing. In contrast, the rule-based system is defined in terms 
of its having the properties of "productivity", "systematicity", and operating sequentially. Evi-
dence for this distinction is found when subjects hold simultaneously contradictory beliefs, each 
generated by the separate systems. Tversky and Kahneman's (1983) "Linda problem" is a prime 
example of a task where this occurs. Subjects were given the following paragraph: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philoso- 
phy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social 
justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
Then, subjects are asked to rank eight statements about Linda according to their probability. 
These included the following sentences: 
Linda is a bank teller. 
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. 
The latter statement is a conjunction of the former with a further condition, so the probability 
of this statement being true has to be less than or equal to that of the former statement. Most 
subjects judge the latter statement to be more likely. Sloman interprets this as the operation of 
the associative reasoning system. Applying probabilistic theory, as done by the experimenters, 
for example, gives a conflicting response, exemplifying the operation of the rule-based system. 
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Gould's instrospections on this problem reveal the contradictory beliefs generated by different 
systems: "I know that the [conjunction] is least probable, yet a little homunculus in my head 
continues to jump up and down, shouting at me—'but she can't just be a bank teller: read the 
description' " (1991, p.469, quoted in Sloman, 1996). 
There are two criticisms levelled at Sloman's dichotomy in a commentary by Gigerenzer and 
Regier (1996), and these are pertinent for all such attempts to divide nature (or nurture) into 
two. The first criticism is that Sloman's distinction is inchoate and blurred. The second is that as 
more and more distinctions are superimposed, the less testable becomes the division as clusters of 
properties rather than single properties become the issue in question. Two methods of addressing 
these related problems are to, as Gigerenzer and Regier suggest, turn divisions into operable 
computational models. Alternatively, properties of the data that reflect use of different reasoning 
systems must be isolated. This latter course has been the fruitful approach of Stanovich (1999) 
and Stanovich and West (in press). 
Stanovich classifies the dual-process theories of Evans and Over (1996) and Sloman (1996) as be-
ing cases of the same distinction. He terms the two reasoning processes System 1 and System 2. 
System 1 is fundamental, automatic, heuristic (Evans, 1989), implicit, associative (Sloman, 1996), 
and holistic. System 2 is controlled, analytic, explicit, and rule-based. Further, System 1 is in-
dined to impose a context when, or perhaps in order to, interpret problems. Applying conversa-
tional conventions to problems where this is inappropriate is a feature of using System 1. System 
2, in contrast, is characterised by decontextualisation of information. Decontextualisation has 
frequently been conflated with the ability to abstract. Donaldson (1978) located the ability to dis-
embed from the immediate surroundings as the essence of learning to use abstract rule systems, 
and consequently the development of higher intellectual skills. Denny (1991) defines decontex-
tualisation as "the handling of information in a way that either disconnects other information 
or backgrounds it" (p.66), and this resonates with the field-independence/dependence cognitive 
style. This link between reasoning systems and decontextualisation means that testable predic-
tions can be made about the extent to which an individual reasons with each of the two systems, 
with respect to the level of decontextualisation that is employed. 
This propensity for the context to be pervasive in information processing is termed by Stanovich 
the "fundamental computational bias" in reasoning. The main processing tendencies covered 
by this bias are the tendency to adhere to Gricean conversation principles, to use prior know!- 
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edge, and to reason enthymematically (1999, pp.192-193). This explanation serves to explain the 
conjunction fallacy in responses to the Linda problem, even among the experimenters that have 
pondered the problem there is still a bias towards responding with "the social and pragmatic 
contextualization necessary to support a Gricean mechanism of intention attribution" (Stanovich, 
1999, p.197). 
What attempts have been made to explore individual differences in dual-process systems of rea-
soning? In a large-scale series of studies, Stanovich and colleagues have related performance on 
a number of reasoning tasks with measures of "thinking dispositions" and "cognitive ability" 
(Stanovich & West, in press). They found that normative responses to categorial syllogisms and 
the four-card task were correlated with SAT scores (p<O.Ol). They took this to indicate that, to a 
certain extent, computational limitations determine response. However, there was no neat con-
nection between responding "logically" and scoring high on the SAT. Stanovich and West (1998) 
note that several students that score low on the SAT respond correctly to all syllogisms, and to 
the four-card task, whereas some students that score high on the SAT do not make the logical 
responses to these tests. When SAT scores are partialled out, there remains a correlation between 
performance for the four-card task and for syllogisms (p<O.Ol). This suggests that a decontextu-
alised response to these tasks is a matter of style. Stanovich and West (1998) conducted a further 
study to measure responses to several items that purported to assess thinking dispositions with 
responses to reasoning tasks. Such items questioned the students' openness to operate in a de-
contextualised manner, so, for example, they were questioned on the extent to which they may 
remain undecided about an issue, about whether there are moral absolutes, or whether they can 
distinguish beliefs from debate on issues. As Stanovich (1999, p.191) notes, these items "are in-
directly tapping the processing style of cognitive decontextualization". Strong correlations were 
found between a composite score of these thinking dispositions and syllogistic problem solving 
(p<O.Ol), as well as with a host of other reasoning tasks. 
For a study of belief bias effects in syllogism solution, Sá, West and Stanovich (1999) gave their 
subjects problems with conclusions the content of which were either true if the syllogism was 
invalid, or false if the syllogism was valid. They found that a high cognitive ability score related 
to responses that ignored the real-world content of syllogisms, and focused on the form of the 
argument. 
Stanovich concludes that System 1 is more basic, and individual differences in response to rea- 
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soning tasks are due to differences in ability to decontextualise information and apply System 
2 processes to the given task. Ability to do this is related to psychometric g, but is not wholly 
determined by cognitive ability, and can be equally well determined by questionnaires about 
individuals' dispositions to decontextualise information. 
The dispositional approach to applying the different reasoning systems is vindicated by the re-
suits of variation in strategy use in this thesis. The influence of g as an indicator of the use of 
the different computational styles, however, is implausible. Reasons for rejecting theories that 
"intelligence" predicts strategy use were presented earlier in this chapter. To reiterate, "ability" 
measures such as the GRE test, seem to rather reflect styles of processing. The prevalence of Ails 
testify to this and present a challenge to accounts that posit one strategy as more fundamental or 
less sophisticated than another. 
The question as to whether the two computational styles reflect different applications of System 2 
processes can be addressed by examining the hallmark feature of the System 1 and System 2 pro-
cesses identified by Stanovich: the extent to which information is decontextualised in problem 
solving. There are explicit tests used to predict decontextualisation that were used in the studies 
reported in this thesis. The HFT has been used to indicate the extent to which information about 
diagrammatic figures can be accessed independently from its background or context. So, scoring 
high on the HFT relates to a propensity to decontextualisate information. The immediate infer-
ence task can also be used to gauge the extent to which information from quantifier interpretation 
is decoupled from conversational contexts (Newstead, 1995). So, certain patterns of response on 
the immediate inference task will reflect the extent to which the individual decontextualises in-
formation. 
There was no effect of HFT group found in the teaching syllogisms experiment. However, this 
measure did prove fruitful for the HP study. Scoring high on the HFT relates to using more ab-
stract representations in HP, in particular on Question 4, HFT-Hi students represented problem 
information in the sentential modality when problems were presented with a graphical situation 
(see Chapter 3). Expressing graphically presented material sententially is an indication of decon-
textualisation of information. Sá et al. (1999) contend that applying System 2 reasoning is the 
ability to abstract, rather than the ability to solve abstract problems, and that this is the focus 
of individual differences. This seems to be precisely the behaviour of the HFT-Hi group for HP 
problems. 
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The HP studies indicate that students learned differently from HP according to their "disposi-
tion" to decontextualise information. It is not the case that students learn to decontextualise in-
formation as a result of following the course, however. The strategies used by different students 
varied in terms of the level of abstraction used, and in some cases the students ceased to use 
abstract representations, and this affected their performance on the determinate GRE problems. 
There is therefore no hint that students learn to operate System 2 decontextualisation as a result 
of following the HP course, which might be thought of as an aim of formal logic courses. This is 
no negative result, however, rather the landscape of learning is found to be far more varied than 
might have been anticipated. The styles are the issue, and these predict what is learned from the 
teaching interventions. 
The GRE as a transfer task is particularly interesting in that it requires a selection of both cooper-
ative or "formal", or normative, communication modes. In the "Office" problem (Figure 7.1), for 
example, when told that there are six office workers, it is important to assume there are six and 
only six office workers otherwise it is going to be very difficult to get going at all. But when told 
in the "Poet's" problem (Figure 7.2) that some of the students who like Eliot's poetry also like 
Auden's poetry, it is important to assume that possibly all the students that like Eliot like Auden 
also. Hence, scoring well on the GRE reflects selective decontextualisation. Scoring less well on 
the GRE test, then, may be a reflection of an inability to select which implications to maintain. 
Having a disposition to decontextualise all information may then be an impediment to solving 
certain GRE problems. 
A hallmark of using reasoning System 1 is the use of background knowledge, presupposition 
and conversational implicature, such as Grice's principles of communication (1975). Contextu-
alisation encourages specification of properties, the focus on individuals perhaps at the expense 
of considering all alternatives. The II task can be used to reflect the extent to which information 
is contextualised, when no apparent context is present. Applying a context for quantifier inter-
pretation is likely to encourage rash responses. If "Some As are Bs" is contextualised as "Some 
animals are dogs", then this will lead to the rejection of "All As are Bs", when "can't tell" is the 
normative response. Students that respond rashly are those that accept no-conversion, perhaps 
as a result of contextualising the statements. Those that do not accept no-conversion tend to be 
hesitant in their response, which suggests that no contextualisation, or specification of individu-
als occurs for these students. Convertors prefer the parallel/ abstract approach, Non-convertors 
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prefer the sequential/ specific approach. Though System 1 processes in Stanovich's account seem 
to have the holistic and parallel properties of a Style 1 approach, this is misleading, as the primary 
distinguishing feature of the two styles is in terms of the extent to which properties of individuals 
are specified or left abstract. System 1 therefore relates more closely to Style 2 and System 2 to 
Style 1. Furthermore, Convertors seemed to score lower on the HFT than Non-convertors, and 
performed better on the GREA subscale, suggesting that they were skilled in decontextualising 
information (see Chapter 6). 
Newstead (1995) explicitly identified Gricean errors in the II task as rejecting "All As are Bs" 
given "Some As are Bs", and accepting "Some As are not Bs" given the same statement. Subjects 
in the syllogism teaching experience responding in this way did not have lower scores on the HFT 
(t(15) = 0.98, ns) though it was in the expected direction. Subjects that made Gricean responses, 
however, did score lower on the GREV subscale (3.29 compared to 5.29, t(15) = 2.47, p<0.02) and 
approached significance with the GREA subscale (7.00 compared to 8.64, t(15) = 1.57, one-tailed 
p=O.07'). 
A close link between the Sa et al. (1999) study and theories of separate processing in the two 
hemispheres emerges in a study by Deglin and Kinsbourne (1996). In a perhaps unique exper-
imental design, they produced syllogisms with premisses that were not true and gave them to 
patients undergoing unilateral ECT treatment for schizophrenia or manic-depressive psychosis. 
Unilateral ECTs suppress activation in one hemisphere, and the patients in this study underwent 
both right-hemisphere and left-hemisphere suppression as part of their treatment, and syllogisms 
were given to patients during suppression of each hemisphere. After left-hemisphere suppres-
sion, rejection of false premisses occurred much more often than in a control condition, and sub-
jects refused to use the premisses in order to reason. Under right-hemisphere suppression the 
number of answers according to the form of the premisses increased: 
• subjects' attitude to false premises changed radically. The subject who showed 
pronounced emotional responses to false premises under left hemisphere suppres-
sion, now performed formal-logical operations quite calmly, with confidence, and re-
mained unmoved by the absurdity of the information offered by the premises (p.300). 
Deglin and Kinsbourne take the results to indicate that the left hemisphere is involved in formal, 
logical processing, whereas the right hemisphere operates on "empirical" information. They 
consider this a demonstration of the hemispheric basis to Goldstein's abstract/concrete attitude 
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distinction, and equally a demonstration of the complementary thinking styles of context-bound 
and context-free mechanisms for reasoning. This study can equally be given a "decontextualisa-
tion" gloss, with the right hemisphere operating contextually, and the left hemisphere attempting 
to process without the influence of context. The ability to decontextualise information calls for the 
dominance of the left hemisphere processing over the right hemisphere. Individual differences 
in reasoning can thus be seen to be relate to hemispheric operation and interaction, and this 
brings the discussion almost a full circle from the original formulations of the analytic /holistic 
distinction. 
Decontextualisation is a related issue to the studies presented in this thesis, but the computa-
tional account is not reducable to the dual-process framework. The ATIs in this study indicate 
that the two computational styles are not grounded in reasoning systems that differ in terms of 
how "fundamental" or "primitive" they are. The g component is not a useful way of describing 
these styles. Rather, the computational styles indicate alternative means to making computation 
tractable in a variety of situations. Some convergence with the patterns of inference called upon 
by contextualised as opposed to decontextualised problem solving would be a useful approach 
to describing the thinking dispositions of Stanovich and West's (in press) account. 
8.5 Educational implications 
One of the aims of this thesis was to explore individual differences in the way students respond 
to learning from formal systems. So what educational implications can be garnered from the 
empirical studies? 
The ATIs show that, when teaching formal systems, the student's profile is crucially important in 
terms of what will be learned from different representations. Three questions arise with respect 
to applying this research in educational programs: 
• Should educational programs be designed to address students' strengths or their weak-
nesses? So, should students that find abstract representations difficult to use be presented 
with concrete representations? Relatedly, should students that have a preference for case-
limiting strategies be trained to use inference-limiting strategies? Should learning be (max-
imally) difficult for students? 
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• Ought the focus to be training in cognitive strategies or metacognitive control? Will more 
effective interventions be as a result of teaching strategy assessment rather than strategy 
width? How can flexibility be taught? 
Relatedly, how can transfer of problem solving skills be better facilitated? 
An answer to these issues can, to a certain extent, be approached by the results of the current 
studies, but testing the efficacy of certain interventions requires future work in order for neces-
sary empirical justification to be provided. 
Some students seemed to learn more quickly from presentations that benefitted parallel/ abstract 
approaches, whereas other students learned more quickly from representations geared towards 
a sequential/ specific approach. If a student had their style matched to a method, then the first 
HP study indicated that they transferred skills better to transfer tasks, if there was a mismatch 
then they became worse at problems in transfer tasks. Putting the syllogism and the first HP 
experiments together indicates that teaching matched methods may be better for students: they 
acquire them more easily and they seem to transfer skills to other tasks better. It is predicted that 
students with a preference for parallel/ abstract methods would better transfer the skills they 
learn from the EC method, whereas sequential/specific students would transfer skills from the 
ND method. This is a matter for further investigation. 
One explanation for an aptitude-treatment transfer interaction may be that matching methods 
to styles means more cognitive resources are freed up when learning the method. This means 
that alternative strategies can be pondered (Roberts et al., 1997) and extra resources are available 
for metacognitive control (Crowley, Shrager & Siegler, 1997). Another explanation may be that 
when there is a match between style and method this means that the procedure can be learned 
at a deeper level. Some of the subjects with a sequential/ specific preference in the syllogism 
teaching study seemed to take a procedural approach to the EC method, for example, and some 
of the parallel/ abstract preference subjects had no sense of the "workings" of the ND method. 
Without a sense of the way the method works there can be no generalisation of the skills acquired 
in learning, a lesson suggested in the analogical literature (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). 
Future empirical work that would cast light on these questions would involve teaching students 
methods that either matched or mismatched their cognitive style. This could be done with the 
EC/ND methods for solving syllogisms, or with HP courses that restricted the types of abstrac- 
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lions that could be made: so the student would be taught to use abstract representations, or 
concrete representations. Then the transfer of skills to other problem solving domains could be 
assessed. 
The results of the second HP study are pertinent to the second question raised above. The study 
indicated that certain students learn strategies that compensate for their initial weaknesses: they 
get "locked in" to certain ways of responding. This has the result of making performance on other 
types of problem worse: they learn a strategy which is good for addressing their initial weakness, 
but interferes with performance where this strategy is not appropriate. Such strategies are either 
pathologically abstract or concrete, and these strategy types can be interpreted in terms of pref-
erences for different processes. HP presents sufficient flexibility such that both computational 
styles can be served by the domain. These students had a good idea about their weaknesses, but 
seemed to learn only one approach to problems. The flexibility of the domain was not always 
reflected by flexible use of different levels of abstraction. Some students, however, did seem to 
learn a flexible approach to problem solving. This is particularly clear in the first HP study, where 
those that scored highest on the GREA subscale were those that used strategies appropriate to 
different tasks. This is also confirmed in the second HP study, with the GCS-short GCM-short 
group. 
The conclusions, then, are that some students have a propensity for learning a single strategy 
for problem solving, regardless of the appropriateness of this strategy. This is a reflection of be-
haviour in the reasoning domains discussed in Chapter 2 where some students do not progress 
with strategy development. The HP studies show that students are good at addressing their 
weaknesses, but they do this at the expense of their initial strengths, under certain conditions. 
The problem becomes coaxing the pathological students to be more flexible in their strategy de-
ployment, indicating the inappropriateness of certain approaches to problem solution. How this 
is to be achieved is a matter of empirical investigation initially. Flexibility is more likely to occur 
if methods are matched to students' computational styles, because then a procedural approach to 
problems is less likely to occur, as are attempts to apply inappropriate representations learned in 
different contexts. The current studies do at least give a foot-up to attempts to facilitate flexible 
strategy use by identifying student styles and teaching domains that are likely to be susceptible 
to particular patterns of strategy inflexibility. Thus, the students that initially score low on single-
case GRE problems are more likely to develop strategies that utilise a lower degree of abstrac- 
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tion in representation. Students that score higher on these problems are more likely to develop 
strategies using more abstraction in representations. Training programmes can thus be tailored 
according to the styles of the student, attempting compensating exercises for the propensity to 
deploy only one type of strategy. 
Another alternative would be to teach students different strategies explicitly, and observe the 
repertoire of their use. This may again result in inflexible strategy use, or utter demoralisation, or 
more optimistically it may contribute to deeper understanding of the task. If this turned out to be 
the result, then multiple representations would then promote flexible approaches to reasoning. 
The issue of teaching transfer of skills across domains has been a cause of concern. Stanovich's 
(1999) fundamental computational bias indicates that what usually happens is that performance 
and learning occurs in a very context-specific area, and such skills do not transfer from task to 
task. Perkins and Salomon (1988) consider attempts for transferring skills between tasks. They 
argue for the importance of including "bridging" between tasks during training. One contribu-
tion this thesis has made to the issue is to indicate occurrences of strategy or skill transfer between 
domains when these are not explicitly taught. This is true both for near-transfer tasks from HP, 
such as the BW, which might be anticipated by Perkins and Salomon, but also in tasks where the 
similarity between domains is less clear, such as the GRE test. The studies in this thesis also ex-
plore the cognitive profile of students that present with effective transfer. Understanding when 
and why such transferences occur provides a better means for structuring programmes designed 
to facilitate transfer of problem solving skills. A study by Zhang, Johnson and Wang (1998) ex-
amined the transfer of skills across different presentations of the same problem, conjoining issues 
of representation with skill transfer. 
Zhang, Johnson and Wang (1998) examined the transfer effects of different representational for-
mats for the tic-tac-toe algorithm. They focused on three of the representational schemas used in 
Zhang's (1997) study: lines, numbers, and colours. The line presentation involves a spatial array 
of 9 positions, where the winning pattern is to select three positions in a line. The number version 
requires the selection of numbers from 1 to 9, the winning pattern being to get 3 numbers that 
add up to 15. The colours method represents the different items in terms of clusters of 2, 3 or 4 
differently coloured circles. The winning pattern here is to select three groups which all contain 
the same colours. Students were required to play a computer, which meant that their task was to 
gain a draw. Subjects were exposed to one version of the task, until they gained draws ten times 
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consecutively. Then they were given one of the other representations of the problem. 
Zhang et al. found that transfer from the number presentation to the colour presentation was 
positive, whereas transfer from lines to numbers was negative. Thus, students were quicker at 
achieving success at the colour representation following the number representation, and slower 
when given the colours following the line presentation. However, the strategies used by students 
on the different presentations varied, and this seemed to reflect different levels of comprehension 
of the abstract algorithm. The task can be solved just by choosing any two even numbers every 
time. Some subjects solved the task by choosing the same two numbers every time - this is 
termed the "fixed-number" strategy, and does not demonstrate explicit understanding of the 
two-evens algorithm. Thang et al. found that students utilised the fixed-number strategy to solve 
the number presentation much more frequently. For the line method, students discovered that 
two evens had to be selected, but were more flexible in their actual choices, so they learned a more 
general strategy. These differences in strategy use affected ease of transfer across representations, 
as after learning from the number presentation students were looking for a specific fixed number 
response which could be found more quickly than the more general two-evens strategy in the 
colour presentation. Students who had seen the line presentation initially had learned the more 
general strategy which took longer to find in the colours. It was the line students that learned the 
more general strategy, according to the authors. Thang writes "task performers usually only deal 
with the specific representational and implementational contents in which the abstract structures 
are only implicitly embedded" (1997, p.184). 
This is an echo of the discussion on requiring a match between representations and the styles 
of the student in order to promote effective transfer. There is no individual differences account 
in Thang et al.'s work, but Ails corresponding to those found in the syllogism teaching and 
the HP studies would be anticipated. The different levels of abstraction in the three forms of 
tic-tac-toe representations are likely to relate to the different computational styles of students. 
Learning generalities across domains follows from learning the structures that are implicit in a 
particular domain, and this is most likely to be achieved in cases where aptitudes and treatments 
are matched. 
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8.6 Future work 
Proposals for a number of extensions to the current studies have been suggested throughout this 
chapter. One of which involved generalising the instruction in the syllogism teaching, ideally by 
constructing an automatic tutor. This could then be used to compare the EC and the ND methods 
with the adapted-EC method, discussed in Chapter 4. Proposals were also made for studies to 
improve flexibility of strategy use and effective transfer of skills across domains by adapting 
teaching methods according to the computational style of the student. Some further work to tidy 
up the studies by applying the same tests in each experimental domain would also be useful. 
The groundswell of research in individual differences in reasoning has primarily been concerned 
with the dual-process accounts of reasoning. An alignment of the 'thinking styles" measures 
from this literature with the computational approach taken in analysing the current studies 
would be beneficial for forging generalisable and converging accounts of reasoning performance. 
A finer-grained analysis of the different ways the working memory components may contribute 
to the different strategies would be a useful next step on the way to modelling the computational 
styles. Particularly interesting would be the different deployment of resources at different points 
in the task - are there different loads related to parallel/ abstract cases as opposed to sequen-
tial/concrete cases, for instance. Levesque's (1988) suggestions predict that representing and 
operating on abstract cases is a different type of effort to that required by sequentially process-
ing fully-specified cases. Working memory models would be complementary to rational analysis 
accounts of the two computational styles. 
There is a fine-line between distinguishing the pedagogical issues of how and what to teach, 
from cognitive theories of how and what is learned, from philosophical issues of what logic is 
and ought to be. The aims of teaching logic seem inextricably tied to the aims for studying the 
nature and styles of reasoning. This link is furthered by the importance of individual differences 
in relation to both. For teaching logic, the studies in this thesis indicate categorically that what 
representations are used for reasoning are crucial for determining what skills are transmitted to 
the student, and this is a function of their aptitude or propensity for certain styles of processing. 
For studying the nature of reasoning, individual differences prove to be a crucible (Underwood, 
1975) for investigating the space for variation in the operation of the dual processes. The intended 
interpretation of the dual processing in this thesis is one that combines accounts in terms of 
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representation, strategy, and computational style, but equally the reader can subscribe to any one 
of a number of dual-process accounts. Each seems to describe the same dichotomy, and each is 
converging on the evidence for combining the output from each processing system. Deciding 
between them depends on selecting the best in terms of generality and power for prediction. A 
computational account, no matter how "abstract", better serves this aim. 
The purpose of logical exposition, for Kant, is to postulate an organon, or a processor, as well as 
a description of the logical steps themselves, and thus logic necessitates a description of the laws 
of the psyche - a psychology: 
Now if logic is a mere theory of the conditions under which a cognition is perfect 
according to the laws of the understanding and of reason, then it is not a theory of 
execution; it would be a theory but not an organon (The Blomberg Logic, part 26). 
Aligning psychometric and computational accounts of reasoning provides a means for approach-
ing this ideal. 
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Glossary of abbreviated terms used, with page of first mention. 
All 	Aptitude-Treatment Interaction (p.179). 
BW 	Blocks World test (p.59). 
BWM 	Multiple-case problem on the BW test (p.145). 
BWmodal "Might follow" problem on the BW test (p.146). 
BWN 	Non-consequence problem on the BW test (p.145). 
BWS 	Single-case problem on the BW test (p.145). 
EC 	Euler's Circles method for solving syllogisms (p.77). 
EFT 	Embedded Figures Test, used to test FID (p.48). 
FID 	Field-independence/dependence cognitive style dimension (p.47). 
G-goal 	Graphical goal in a HP problem (p.148). 
GC-goal 	Graphical Consequence goal in a HP problem (p.149). 
GN-goal 	Graphical Non-consequence goal in a HP problem (p.148). 
GCS-goal Graphical Consequence single-case goal in a HP problem (p.149). 
GCM-goal Graphical Consequence Multiple-case goal in a HP problem (p.149). 
GRE 	Graduate Recruitment Exercise, test of analytic reasoning ability (p.53). 
GREA 	Analytic reasoning subscale of the GRE (p.53). 
GREM 	Multiple-case problem on the GRE test (p.142). 
GRES 	Single-case problem on the GRE test (p.140). 
GREV 	Verbal reasoning subscale of the GRE (p.53). 
HIT 	Hidden Figures Test, used to test FID (p.48). 
HP 	Hyperproof (p.57). 
ICIA 	Identify Critical Individuals Algorithm (p.78). 
II 	Immediate Inference task (p.89). 
ND 	Natural Deduction method for solving syllogisms (p.78). 
PFT 	Paper Folding Test, used to test spatial ability (p.30). 
S-goal 	Sentential goal in a HP problem (p.148). 
SPQ 	Study Preference Questionnaire, used to test serialist/holist preference (p.112). 
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